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Building Bridges For The Next Milenia:
Partnerships In The History World
Sam Thomas
There are two quotes that I believe best sums up the importance of history, andthe responsibility that we, as historians, owe to society although neither of the
writers was an historian. I wil open with the first and close with the second.
The most efectual means of preventing tyranny is to iluminate,as
far as practical, the minds of the people at large, and more espe-
cialy to give them knowledge of those facts which history
exhibiteth, that possessed thereby of the experience of other ages
and countries, they may be able to know ambition under al of its
shapes, and be prompt to exert their natural powers to defeat its
purposes. Thomas Jeferson
Barnard Bailyn, former historian at Harvard University and past president of
the American Historical Association states that, “history . . . is public knowledge, and
the broader, the more popular the audience for accurate history, the beter.”
As we assembled here today know, history serves us in so many diferent yet
interconnected ways. hHstory informs and educates us by providing perspective and
context that alow us to make informed, and, hopefuly, inteligent, decisions about
the future; but history does more than teach and prepare us. Historyalso has both
the power and the energy to entertain, to delight, to expand, and to intensify the
experience of being who we are, of being American, of being South Carolinians.
Al historians, whether teaching, writing, or presenting, work in teams al the
time. Historians, history organizations, and history institutions working in partner-
ship with each other and with their communities immediately rise to the top as the
leaders in advancing the cause of the world of history. Simply, we are the keepers
and compilers of our shared record of the past. We al must keep this in mind. We
are the movers and the shakers of the future. Now, granted, we may not have the
financial resources that many others do, but the research, the writing, the exhibit-
ing, the interpreting we do, in the long-run, goes far beyond our present times.
By helping to save and keep history’s resources we form a deeper connection
with our culture, our heritage, our people, our nation. And we do this best by join-
ing and sharing with others in sharing the evidence and engaging in the intelectual
exchange of ideas in our chosen field. It is true that “Knowledge is Power”; and the
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more knowledge we have the more power we have, but it is nearly impossible to
increase that knowledge on an individual basis, whether as an individual researcher
or an individual institution. None of us here today has ever completed a project
completely on our own without additional assistance. That is the nature of history,
and the nature of doing history.
By preserving and presenting the evidence of the past and by actively connect-
ing past, present, and future through our writings, our exhibitions, our public pro-
gramming, historians and history organizations pass along the gift of history to the
future generations. We are the sentinels of the twenty-first century Enlightenment.
In Britain the chief “caretaker” of a colection, or colections, is caled the
keeper. I think that is a teling title. It is somewhat unfortunate we do not use that
title more in this country. We historians are keepers. Through al the diferent facets
of our jobs—writing, teaching, exhibiting, preserving—we are “keeping” history alive,
and in so doing we “keep” the culture and heritage of our region, our state, our
nation alive for those future generations.
In this process of keeping history alive, we must not forget, however, that there
are many diferent facets to that history. I am reminded by something I once heard
a good friend and felow coleague remind me of when he said, “you know shared
experience does not mean shared view.” That is something that I, as a curator and a
historian, try to keep in mind every day, and I am constantly reminding my co-work-
ers of it. Just because you and I were there at the same event, at same time, doesn’t
mean we wil come away with the same thoughts. As al of you already know, no two
historians wil ever totaly agree on anything. But then that is something that makes
this field so lively and keeps this study alive—and keeps conferences like this going.
By doing history we accept a great responsibility into our hands. It is a respon-
sibility to those we work with, those we direct, those we train, and those to whom we
present. We are a necessity for the future of South Carolinian and American genera-
tions. We are a positive good, to borrow a term from the nineteenth century.
As every one of you know, this state has a rich heritage. But despite that rich
heritage South Carolina has been slow to embrace it. Since the recent success of The
Patriot heritage tourism is beginning to take on a more important role in South Caro-
lina. The potential financial benefits of heritage tourism brings with it an increased
importance to preserve. We are losing many of our historic buildings and structures at
such an alarming rate, particularly in my region with the rapid growth emanating from
Charlote. Our landscape, our historic landscape, is daily being altered.
Heritage tourism, according to the South Carolina Department of Parks, Rec-
reation & Tourism (PRT), is the fastest growing portion of the state’s largest indus-
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try, bringing in 2.7 milion visitors a year. What’s more these visitors spend $581
milion and directly impact 13,570 jobs. But as Buddy Jennings, director of PRT has
stated, “if we don’t work to preserve our state’s historic fabric now, we aren’t going to
have resources with which to build upon.”
South Carolina used to be an agricultural state, but much of that look is quickly
being lost to developers’ buldozers and urban sprawl. Homes and farm structures
are being destroyed; historical and archaeological sites are being threatened. These
are the very sites that support and promote heritage tourism.
The American Association of Museums published in 1999 the results of a com-
prehensive study the organization undertook on the state of museums in American
society. The results were somewhat surprising. The report noted that the United
States had more than fifteen thousand museums and approximately two-thirds of
them are history museums. They average about 865 milion visitors per year or 2.3
milion visitors per day. This number represented a 50 percent increase in visitation
in just one decade since the last survey.
Based on this survey, which involved a core group of 1,500 people from across
the country from al segments of society, historians Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen
published that same year The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of History in American
Life. In this publication the two presented a picture of how Americans view this nation’s
history organizations. They found that over 90 percent of the people surveyed en-
gage regularly in history-related activities. They also found that 57 percent visit mu-
seums and historic sites on a regular basis. The interviewees were also asked when
they feel most connected to the past. Second only to gatherings with their families,
they cited visits to museums and historic sites most often as the situation that makes
them feel most in touch with history.
The survey didn’t stop here, however. When asked to identify their most trusted
sources for knowledge of the past, again there was a surprising answer. They cited as
first, museums and historic sites—ahead of eyewitnesses, family members, history
books, movies, television shows, high school history teachers and colege professors
—those are not ranked from most trusted to least.
Even with this rather brightly colored view of the future of history in this coun-
try, there are some worrisome problems confronting those of us who struggle every
day to preserve, present, teach, and interpret the past for our future generations.
The greatest problem facing us in our struggle is, and probably always wil be, finan-
cial. That is why creating partnerships within our world is becoming more and more
imperative. As funds get tighter and tighter it is becoming increasingly more difi-
cult to undertake the expanding demands that are increasingly being asked for in
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public programming and education. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly evident
that in order to survive as historians and in order to keep our field and “craft” alive, we
must look more and more to creating partnerships both within and outside our world.
The same report I previously mentioned also found that the media and local
oficials in general believe that museums and institutions of higher learning prima-
rily serve a limited segment of the population. This is a dangerous view, for it tends
to contribute to the atitude that museums and institutions of higher learning—and
museums should rightfuly be included in that category—are already sustained by
that limited segment. Therefore, it is becoming more imperative that we profes-
sional historians begin to rol up our pants legs and wade into the river of history.
History is a craft. and as a craft it needs to be practiced. We need to be out in the
field more in one way or another, as this wil continue to build our audience.
Students are increasingly being turned of by history. They find it boring and
dul. What is worrying me, however, is that an increasing number are showing that
their knowledge and understanding of major leaders and key events is sketchy, but
what I believe is even more dangerous is their methods of historical inquiry never
seem to develop. These are the people who wil be the voters and leaders of tomor-
row. History must be brought alive to this future generation. Whether we are writ-
ing, interpreting, or presenting, it is our responsibility to help our younger audience
make the connection between their present lives and their shared heritage. If we
accomplish this then we are also creating a future generation of volunteers, patrons,
and supporters. The key here is to make history come alive.
I must tel you of a personal incident that happened to me in my last US survey
course I was teaching at York Technical Colege. I had a student who seldom missed
class, but also seldom paid atention. Those of you who teach know that as you stand
up there lecturing you notice the ones who are keeping up and those who are nod-
ding of. Wel, we were nearing the end of the first half of the US survey course, and
this particular student, I’l cal him Harry, was constantly nodding of in class. This
particular night we were talking about the Civil War—in only an hour and a half—
and he was nodding of as usual. I decided to spice the lecture up a bit with a sidebar
about Union General “Fighting Joe” Hooker and his atempts to restore the morale
to the Union army folowing their disastrous loss at Fredericksburg. I was teling
them that one of the ways General Hooker decided to bolster his men’s morale was
to not only alow women to folow his army but to encourage it. Thus, these camp
folowers earned the nickname of “Hooker’s girls,” or “hookers.” Wel, when I said
this, Harry, who up to this point had been easing through the lecture, shot straight
up in his seat, and only then did he realize he had moved so suddenly he had gained
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the atention of the entire class. For Harry, history was coming alive for the first time
that entire semester. So, our audience has to find a connection.
Creating a connection with their heritage for our audience is not an easy task.
In my own field as a museum curator, exhibition presentations are changing. It used
to be fine to present an important document or object to the viewer with a bit of
descriptive text, but that is no longer going to satisfy our audience. We are finding
that we are now having to include more information to hold their atention—and
the visitors who come through our doors are requiring and asking for more and
more. They are no longer content to simply know what they have in front of them is
an important cooking pot. They now want to know what is important about it and
the context it fits within.
Whether we are writing books, producing course materials, or creating exhibi-
tions, we are imparting to the world a knowledge of the events that transpired in the
past. In doing this we carry a responsibility to accurately present the material in as
lively and unbiased a manner as possible. Too often we get caught up in our “ivory
towers,” looking down on the rest of the world; looking down on the folks, the orga-
nizations that are doing the real work—the people who are actualy geting out there
wading through history in their boots. This atitude was recently brought back to me
over a group discussion with some revolutionary reenactors.
At Historic Bratonsvile in York County we have a 1780 batle site caled Huck’s
Defeat. For the past ten years I have been researching and writing about the batle in
one form or another. There are a number of diferent accounts of the batle, but not
one of them agrees. Over the course of the ten years I had put together what I thought
was the most accurate account of the batle. And then one Saturday as I took a couple
of reenactors over the batlefield, they began to ask me some unusual questions and
noticing some things I had not realy thought about. After the tour, I gave one of the
felows copies of al the diferent accounts, and he began to assemble them into a
“new” version of the batle—one that now makes a lot more sense.
I had never thought to include a lowly, common reenactor in any of the discus-
sions on this batle, but I wil from now on. What I learned from this is we can’t be
snobs about our history. No ethnic group owns its heritage, just as no discipline owns
its field. We must be wiling to listen—from al directions. And we must be open to
creating partnerships in areas we had not considered before. Only through these
partnerships wil we be able to add to our knowledge and research and to reach a
larger audience.
There are great possibilities out there for us al if we can just raise the bar by
trying to further the prospects of creating partners. The partners are also out there,
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and in many cases they are just as wiling to join with you as you are with them. In this
way we reach a greater audience and sustain ourselves in the process, and, hopefuly, in
that process we create a greater connection between our audience and their heritage.
Only after our audience finds a connection and an interest to carry their per-
sonal atachment to history forward wil we fulfil the responsibility of being true
keepers. We have to keep in mind that no mater what we do within the field, it wil
al be for nothing if we don’t have that audience. It is that audience that wil sustain
us—not we ourselves. We are the keepers who wil interest and then train that next
generation of keepers.
I wil close with a few words from that eminent scholar and theologian, Dr.
Russel H. Conwel, writing in the 1880s:
He or she who can give to the people beter streets, beter homes,
beter schools, beter churches, more of religion, more of happi-
ness, more of God; he that can be a blessing to the community in
which they live tonight wil be great anywhere; but he who cannot
be a blessing where he now lives wil never be great anywhere on
the face of God’s earth. . . . Your diamonds are not in the distant
mountains or in yonder seas. They are in your own backyard, if
you but dig for them. . . . Do what you can with what you have,
where you are today, for there you have acres of diamonds. Dr.
Russel H. Conwel,“Acres of Diamonds,” 1883.
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In the Deep Mid-Winter:
Fuel Prices in Seventeenth-Century London
Linda Hayner
When North Sea winds ushered in winter’s cold, families huddled close to stoveand hearth. Sooty hands reached for the coal scutle to build up the fire, and,
for a moment, winter’s discomforts were stayed.
The availability of heating fuel, always an important consideration of London-
ers and their governors, had become more pressing during the late-middle ages as
wooded areas around the city fel to fields and orchards. By 1375 London’s Com-
pany of Woodmongers was bringing wood into the city from some distance.1 By 1600
London’s hearths and industries demanded more fuel than the England’s forests
could readily provide. The discovery of coal in Northumbria in the late-twelfth cen-
tury, a mineral not mined in Britain since the Roman era, slowly filed the gap. The
future of coal was assured when in 1486 at Finchdale (County Durham) pumps were
developed to remove water from the coal mines. Soon English ships laden with
Newcastle coal coasted south to London, the city whose demand for and depen-
dence on imported fuel grew each year.2
Provision of coal for London and regulation of the market came under the
supervision of the Court of Aldermen. The free and abundant flow of this fuel in-
volved them in overseeing prices, guaranteeing weights and measures, and building
and maintaining storage facilities at Bridgehouse, Bridewel, Duke’s Place, and, later
on, near Holborn Bridge. Supervision became intervention when the supply was
endangered, when the price was unusualy high, or when complaints grew regarding
inaccurate measures and stockpiling (or engrossing) coal to drive the price up.
The economic depression of the 1620s and 1630s shows how volatile prices
could be. The causes of the depression involved trade competition with the Dutch
and currency manipulation in the German states, both factors that made British
textiles more expensive than the cloths of their competitors. The resulting bank-
ruptcies threw many laborers out of work just as a series of poor harvests substan-
tialy increased the price of food.3 The price of coal also rose. By November 1627 a
chaldron of seacoal went from twenty to almost forty and then to fifty shilings. Fuel
bils for industries and households doubled and then rose some more.4
The Court of Aldermen, concerned because of the faling supply as wel as the
rising price of coal, discovered that the captains of the coal ships now refused to sail
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up the Thames. Instead, they dropped anchor at Harwich and adjacent ports on
England’s east coast. The captains feared impressment. Any ships and crews coming
to London were liable to be pressed into the royal navy as participants either in the
trade war against the Dutch or in the Thirty Years’ War.
The court’s representatives went to Harwich to contract for the coals and se-
cure some convenient way to transport them to London. In fact, the aldermen hoped
to convince the captains to deliver their coals directly to London. To that end, they
guaranteed that the coal ships could freely come up the Thames and leave without
sufering any impediment. Their lordships averred that, if they could, they would
free the coalships in the river already marked for royal service. The crisis soon ended,
and in June 1629 the price of coal delivered to London fel to sixteen shilings six
pence a chaldron.5
Barely ten years later, the civil wars again contributed to the volatility of coal
prices. When royalist forces captured and closed the port of Newcastle from 1642 to
1644, fuel prices rose to exorbitant levels. When possible, the city and its parishes
purchased and stockpiled fuel.6 It was good that they did. Few ships made it through
the royalist blockade. The price of a chaldron of coal in London climbed to forty-six
shilings in spite of the city’s atempt to fix the price at twenty-three shilings or less.
Wharfingers seling coals at higher prices were warned. Orders went to ships lying in
the Thames not to ofload or sel their coals except at the price of twenty-three shil-
lings per chaldron or sufer seizure of their cargo. The Aldermen backed this threat
with a reminder that they had the support of the House of Commons. Indeed, Par-
liament had already instructed the Commitee for the Navy to begin importing coal
from Scotland to augment dwindling supplies in the south.7
By October 1644 fuel was so scarce that the poor were feling timber trees for
firewood. A parliamentary ordinance of that month extended the limits of cuting
felable wood to a circuit of sixty miles around London and to the lands of any arch-
bishop, bishop, dean, chapter, “papist,” or other delinquent.8 Parishes purchasing
coal for their poor paid as much as fifteen and three-tenths pence per bushel of coal.
When parliamentary forces retook Newcastle in November 1644 and coal flowed
freely to the city once again, the price dropped by nearly 80 percent to three and
one-quarter pence per bushel. A year later, the parish of St. Dunstan in the East stil
was not taking any chances and in June 1645 purchased twelve chaldron of coal for
its poor against the coming winter.9
The trade war between the English and Dutch continued during the Interreg-
num. Parliament responded in 1650 with an Act caling for more ships to protect the
coasts from marauders. To raise the money it levied duties, efective from 1651 to
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1654, of two shilings per chaldron on Newcastle coal, and two shilings six pence on
Scotish coal. The money gathered between 2 April and 11 October of each year
went to build forty-one new ships. The rest went to relieve the poor.10
The new imposition afected al coal coming into the city, including coal pre-
viously free from such duties and intended for the poor, such as that given by James
I in 1606. He had granted to the mayor and citizens of London, free of custom or
import, 4,000 chaldron of seacoals for the poor. The grant was confirmed in 1623
and entered into the city records in 1629.11 The city asked Parliament to free “from
al impositions and charges (as formerly) the 4,000 chaldron of seacoals” provided
for the use of the poor of London. For the duration of the impost, the 4,000 chaldron
of coal would remain exempt. The city even convinced the woodmongers to trans-
port the coals assigned to the poor free of al charges.12
Like most city institutions, both religious and civic, the Court of Aldermen
had a fund dedicated to the purchase of coals for the poor. These funds were usualy
raised through charitable gifts. When the fund became large enough, it was often
invested in a company such as the British East India Company for a return of be-
tween 4 and 6 per cent per annum. In 1621 the city chamberlain in charge of these
monies had a fund of £515 to purchase coal for the poor; in 1628 the amount had
risen to about £600.13 Whether this was from current contributions for the poor or
from the interest from invested capital is not apparent from the sources. If it indeed
was investment interest, then the capital invested would have risen from about £10,000
in 1621 to at least £12,000 in 1628.
 The city commonly released each week fifteen chaldron of coal for sale to the
poor for between six and seven pence a bushel. At first, the poor went to Bridgehouse
or Bridewel where each presented a ticket from one of the parish churchwardens. A
ticket-holder could then purchase up to one-half bushel of coal a day. The large num-
bers of poor who appeared soon created such disorder and violence that the coals were
subsequently divided among the twelve wards of the city to be sold.14
Maintaining weights and measures for coal was another constant problem for
the Court of Aldermen. The chaldron, the common unit of coal measurement,
equaled approximately two tons or thirty-six bushels by Winchester measure, the
common measure in London. Sacks were to be an el (forty-five inches) in length
and three-quarters of a yard in breadth, and hold three bushels of coals. A larger
measure—the fat —each held nine bushels of coal. The smaler measures were the
bushel, half-bushel, and peck.15
Cases of light weight and short measure were frequent.16 In 1623 Thomas
Hardwick, Wiliam Haselfoote, and John Dicke were convicted of purchasing smalcoal
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by the sack and reseling it by the peck and half-peck at inflated prices to the poor.
The court commited al three to Bridewel where they stayed until the aldermen
decided to free them. As an afterthought the court ordered “that al the sacks and
measures for coals that are already seized or hereafter to be seized within this city [as
false measures] shal be brought into the Guildhal and there burned.” On 10 July
1626, the court heard a case against several men making unsized sacks for carrying
seacoals. The court caled in the coalmeters as wel as the master and wardens of the
woodmongers to examine the sacks and advise the court whether they would hold
ful measure or not. Perhaps the coalmeters were not the best expert witnesses, for
they themselves were sometimes accused of shrinking their own sacks. The warfingers
and woodmongers also appeared on 19 April 1631, before the court over the size of
a suspect fat. The warfingers claimed that the fat in question would not hold nine
bushels by the city’s standard. The woodmongers declared that if the fat was care-
fuly filed, it would indeed hold nine bushels.
Another flurry of complaints in 1664 reached the royal court. Accusations of
engrossing coals to raise prices as wel as using deceitful weights and measures to de-
fraud the poor flew thick and fast. Charles II commanded a speedy and efectual rem-
edy. The aldermen set up a commitee of inquiry whose report did not please the
woodmongers.17 On the issue of enhancing the price of seacoals, the commitee laid
the blame squarely on the company. Their actions alone resulted in the unnecessary
rise of coal prices. In their defense, company members claimed they had heard rumors
of a second Dutch war. Therefore they had laid in large stores of coals in view of the
aleged potential threat to coastal shipping between Newcastle and London. To this
point, the actions of the woodmongers were plausible and could even be considered
laudable. Their next move, however, removed al doubt regarding their true purpose.
After laying in their stores, the woodmongers withdrew from the city. Ever since their
company’s incorporation of London’s carters in 1606 the woodmongers had controled
al commercial transport carts in the city. The city government had even increased that
control in May 1661 when it passed the licensing of carts to the woodmongers and
limited the number of carts for coal haulage to only 140.18 By leaving the city, the
woodmongers assured that no carts could be hired to move coal or ofload ships. The
Company of Woodmongers had by this time also assumed control of as many wharves
as it could. As a result only the woodmongers had the facilities to unload and transport
coal. To add insult to injury, in 1664 the woodmongers accused the warfingers and
others who “buy [coal] to sel [it] again” of trying to corner the coal market.
The one hundred fifty vessels that arrived after the withdrawal of the
woodmongers sailed into what the commitee caled a “dead market.” The coal fleet
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lay in the Thames. And the woodmongers intended to leave the ships there until the
season was too far advanced for them to make another trip to Newcastle and back.
Without this last voyage London would have insuficient coals for the winter, and the
value of the woodmongers’ stockpiled coal would rise as supply dwindled.
The city’s investigators declared that the Licensing Act of 1661 must be re-
pealed or altered and went on to level another charge against the woodmongers.
While the later bought using lawful measure, they sold using sacks sized and li-
censed by themselves and sold to company members for twelve pence a set. “Upon
trial [the sacks] are found extremely deceitful wanting four or five bushels in a
chaldron.” When chalenged, the company would not alow its sacks to be measured.
Anyone who tried to do so had his name passed among the company members and
would have no coals sold to him.
Now on the defensive, the woodmongers charged the commitee of trying to
set an unfair price on seacoals to their disadvantage, and of keeping coals from land-
ing in London. The commitee was not amused:
We do first certify that we have neither intended nor had any discourse
or mention of seting a price upon seacoals, but do conceive if any such
report and rumor have been (which we undoubtedly believe) and have
had any such efect, the same has been raised by the Woodmongers to
keep out al supplies of coals til they have utered their own stores at the
present dear or dearer rates for we do not hear of any besides Woodmongers
(but of them very many and often) that have made it their discourse and
dispersal abroad the said report and rumor of seting a price on coals.19
The city government immediately advised the king of the situation and of-
fered a solution, namely the suggestion that al importers of coals be alowed to
dispose of them to their best advantage for the next ful year, only reserving ten per
cent for the poor. By this means the city’s supply of coals could be most quickly
augmented presently and during the folowing winter to the best benefit of the coal
merchants, the fleet, and the inhabitants of London.20
The Court of Aldermen then charged the Company of Woodmongers with
several abuses in the trade of coal. First, the court aleged that company members
had used their position and power to engineer shortages of coal, and thereby had
forced price rises to their benefit. Second, the aldermen further asserted that the
woodmongers had also increased their incomes during years of normal supply by
employing short weights and measures.21 The court concluded that hardly a citizen
in London had not sufered from the woodmongers’ greed.
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Whether the woodmongers made further protests before the aldermen is un-
known. It is dificult to imagine that they quietly gave up their lucrative trade. In the
end, however, the scandal brought the company down. By 1668 the company had
surrendered its charter and ceased to function. The Carmen returned to their origi-
nal status as a separate guild, which was active as late as the turn of the twentieth
century.22
The demise of the Company of Woodmongers did not in itself subsequently
guarantee adequate supplies of coals at reasonable prices at al times. Engrossing,
i.e. stockpiling, by coal merchants remained a problem. Profiteering and short weights
continued. Nevertheless, as guardians of the city the aldermen had moved to protect
the health of London’s economy. With the end of the Company of Woodmongers
there was one less organization trying to make a profit at the expense of London’s
citizens.
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Voting for God: The Politics of South Carolina
Camp Meetings
Dale Walden Johnson
After eight years as president, George Washington yearned for his freedom. Hewanted nothing more than to leave politics and return to his beloved Mount
Vernon. In September 1796 Washington reflected on his role as president and with
the assistance of Alexander Hamilton, ofered the nation some parting advice. His
“Farewel Address” with four specific points of counsel was printed in newspapers
throughout the country. Washington urged the infant nation to avoid entangling
aliances with foreign powers that might draw it into a war it was il prepared to fight.
He warned of the growing danger of sectional rivalry in America. He instructed the
citizens to avoid radical measures in favor of the avenues carefuly crafted in the
Constitution to bring about peaceful change in government. Speaking as America’s
elder statesman Washington feared that idealistic young radicals might folow a revo-
lutionary path and overthrow this democratic experiment. The Constitution pro-
vided a means to alter the government through an orderly process. Finaly, President
Washington warned the nation to avoid the temptation to congregate behind a party
faction or political ideology.
Washington had witnessed his own smal cabinet plagued by party factions. He
selected Alexander Hamilton, his aide during the War for Independence, as the nation’s
first secretary of treasury. Hamilton held his own lofty political aspirations but con-
tented himself with close association with the president and leadership of the so-caled
Federalist Party. Washington chose felow Virginian Thomas Jeferson to head the De-
partment of State. Jeferson’s diplomatic experience in France prepared him for this
crucial post. Jeferson held a diferent vision for America from the Federalists and
eventualy assumed leadership of the Anti-Federalist or Democratic-Republican Party.
A recent historian has captured the essence of the ideological divide separating the two
men. “Hamilton feared anarchy and loved order. Jeferson feared tyranny and loved
liberty.”1 Thus Washington’s first cabinet contained not only members of two compet-
ing party factions but also the leaders of the respective movements.
The early-national period of our nation’s history is much too early to think of the
Federalist and Republican parties the way we conceive of parties today. They lacked
structure, organization, and the wel-oiled machinery we commonly associate with today’s
two-party system. What’s more, the “original” Federalist and Anti-Federalist factions
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developed over time. The ideological factions of 1789 had changed considerably by
1800. We cannot draw a direct line of descent between the early and later parties,
but the linkage is stil valid.
The roots of the two political factions developed in the debate over ratifica-
tion of the federal Constitution. Before the Constitution became law it needed rati-
fication by three-fourths of the states. Supporters of ratification styled themselves
the Federalists as the power was centralized in the central government. Three lead-
ing Federalists—Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison—lobbied for rati-
fication of the new government in a series of eloquent newspaper essays, which were
later colected into book form titled the Federalist Papers.
The Constitution was formed in an efort to correct the weaknesses of our first
government, the Articles of Confederation, which gave most of the power to the
states. The Articles soon proved unworkable, and after a series of preliminary meet-
ings, delegates were invited to Philadelphia with the express purpose of revising or
amending the Articles. Representatives atending the convention did not revise the
Articles but in fact created an entirely new system of government, granting many
powers to the central government at the expense of the states and the people. This
shift of power worried many of the founding fathers in Philadelphia. The Republi-
cans considered the Constitution an imbalanced government because of the sweep-
ing powers assigned to the three branches of the federal government. The Republicans
refused to support the new system of governance in its present form and would urge
their state’s approval only if the Constitution guaranteed certain fundamental civil
protections. Federalists, however, defended the Constitution in its unaltered form,
arguing that the constitution of each state granted these basic protections. Debate
centered around twelve freedoms, which were later combined in the ten amend-
ments commonly caled the Bil of Rights. Ratification of the Constitution in 1792
limiting the power of the central government did not end the ideological feuds of
the two parties. In various names the parties became a permanent part of the politi-
cal landscape in America.
George Washington did not run with any party afiliation in 1788 or 1792 but
favored the Federalists’ vision of governance. Washington, as noted above, selected
a cabinet of both Federalists and Republicans. Hamilton and General Henry Knox,
the head of the War Department, defended Federalism, while Jeferson and Ator-
ney General Edmund Randolph were wary of giving too much power to a central
government. Republicans jealously defended a decentralized government with power
reserved for the states and individual citizens. Jeferson and the Republicans favored
less rather than more government. They favored a nation of self-reliant farmers and
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smal shopkeepers. Federalists tended towards aristocrats and atracted people of
wealth. Washington’s experiment in selecting a cabinet in an even-handed manner
did not entirely succeed. The tension between Hamilton and Jeferson grew to out-
right hostility, prompting Jeferson to resign from the cabinet in 1794.
Having witnessed the heat generated by party factions in his cabinet, Washing-
ton counseled in vain against “the baneful efects of the spirit of the party” in his
Farewel Address. Federalists held the ofice of president for twelve years through
Washington and John Adams. The debate between the two parties smoldered in
those years but burst into flames in the election of 1800 on the eve of the religious
revival at Yale and the camp meetings in Cane Ridge, Kentucky.
The Jefferson-Dwight War
Thomas Jeferson returned to the national spotlight in 1796 as vice-president and in
1800 when he again sought the presidency against the incumbent Federalist Presi-
dent John Adams. Federalists fought tenaciously to hold the reigns of power and
warned in almost apocalyptic terms of the evils which would befal the nation if it
foolishly elected Jeferson and his political ilk. Jeferson’s own words were used against
him to alert people to the dangerous anti-Christian views he held. Jeferson refused
to afirm the basic Christian tenet of monotheism. He had writen in 1784, “It does
me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no god. It neither picks
my pocket nor breaks my leg.”2 Federalists charged Jeferson with a lengthy list of
ofenses, including immorality and atheism. He alegedly held perverse opinions
about the Holy Bible. Each charge contained a smal seed of truth, and each needed
extensive explanation beyond anything the Federalists chose to ofer in the propa-
ganda campaign of 1800. The argument proceeded along the predictable lines that
America, singularly blessed by God, would sacrifice its biblical heritage if it elected
an infidel president. God would turn his back on a prodigal nation. Jeferson, they
warned, might use the power of his ofice to confiscate the Bibles in America and
declare open war against God-fearing Christians.
True or not, fair or not, such were the Federalist charges ofered for public
consumption against candidate Thomas Jeferson in 1800. The Federalist Gazete re-
duced the election not just to good and bad choices but to a contest between God
and atheism: “ . . . the only question . . . to be asked by every American laying his
hand on his heart is ‘shal I continue in alegiance to God and a religious president
or impiously declare for Jeferson and no God!!’”3 Incumbent President Adams had
caled the Bible “the best book in the world” while Jeferson rejected the miraculous
accounts in the Gospels.4 As a Deist who warmed toward rationalism, miracles simply
made no sense. The Federalist arsenal against Jeferson also involved the Virginian’s
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friendship with and support of Thomas Paine. Paine’s atack on Christianity in The
Age of Reason shocked even some free-thinking skeptics.5 Paine wrote:
Of al the systems of religion that were invented, there is none
more derogatory to the Almighty, more unedifying to man, more
repugnant to reason, and more contradictory in itself, than this
thing caled Christianity. Too absurd for belief, too impossible to
convince, and too inconsistent for practice, it renders the heart
torpid, or produces only atheists or fanatics.6
Jeferson’s guilt by association with Paine, both intelectual and actual, cast
deep suspicion over him in the minds of many Christians. In at least a superficial
way, Federalists could make a case against the “infidel” Jeferson and his party. Fed-
eralist critics of Jeferson included Timothy Dwight, the grandson of Jonathon
Edwards and president of Yale Colege.7 His shril warnings probably discredited the
message he wished to communicate. Most historians have avoided the temptation to
lump al Federalists into a one-size-fits-al union suit. John Adams is best alied with
the moderate Federalists while the vituperative Dwight and his wing of the party are
dubbed “arch-Federalists” or “High Federalists.”8 When Dwight assumed his duties
at Yale in 1795 he found to his uter dismay only a handful of Christians in the
student body. They mouthed the similar political and religious philosophy as Tho-
mas Jeferson and lived openly immoral lives. They repeated the moto of the revolu-
tionaries in France of liberté, égalité, and fraternité, and mocked biblical Christianity.
They worshipped the cult of reason and free inquiry in place of biblical revelation.9
Deeply wounded by the conduct and beliefs of the students, President Dwight did
not despair. He resolved to meet the students’ objections to Christianity in a frontal
assault. He forced students to defend their views as part of his course requirements.
Patiently, Dwight encouraged his students to give ful voice to their philosophy and
then critiqued their skepticism and Deism with an apologetic for Christian Theism.
His persistence eventualy paid evangelical dividends as revival broke out on the
campus of New Haven. The backbone of skepticism was broken at Yale. The revival
spread from Yale to other campuses in the East, and a generation of graduates car-
ried the revival model to their homes and parishes throughout the country.10 Those
converted at the revivals at Yale and other eastern campuses helped form an army
that promoted the Second Great Awakening in the next several decades. Dwight and
others of like mind succeeded in making Deism a felonious crime in Connecticut.
Dwight’s version of the gospel included a mixture of Edwardian Calvinism and Fed-
eralist politics, earning him the title the “Pope of Federalism.”
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Some of Dwight’s students spread into the southern states a gospel according
to the Bible and the political views of their mentor, the vicar of Federalism. Erskine
Clark has argued in Our Southern Zion that the New England-style revival held greater
sway in the genteel low country than the volatile camp meeting style that exploded
in Kentucky. Revivalist graduates of Brown, Yale, and Amherst filed low country
pulpits more often than the bare-knuckle preachers who first heard their cal to
ministry in the Cumberland and Piedmont. Clarke limits his remarks to Presbyte-
rian and Congregational churches because to press the point further is to err.11 Bap-
tist and Methodist pastors in the South felt a greater afinity to the camp meeting
style than the more refined New Haven model of revival.
In November 1800 five men, including Timothy Dwight’s cousin, Aaron Burr
Jr., sought the presidency. Despite their kinship, Dwight despised his cousin’s poli-
tics. The two Republican candidates, Jeferson and Burr, tied with seventy-three elec-
toral votes. The U.S. House of Representatives broke the tie for Jeferson, while Burr
became vice-president. South Carolina was the pivotal state in this election. Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, the candidate from Charleston, had promised the Federalist
Party he would not participate in a split ticket. He honored his promise, while his
renegade second cousin lobbied the legislature in Columbia on behalf of Jeferson.
Thomas Jeferson caled this momentous election “the revolution of 1800.”12 For al
practical purposes the Federalist Party was dead. The consequences for Dwight’s
distinctive brand of politics appeared catastrophic. According to Timothy Dwight’s
apocalyptic world view, the cosmos was crumbling, Christians were on the run, and
Thomas Jeferson was the Devil incarnate.13
After Jeferson’s victory in 1800 Christopher Gadsen of South Carolina wrote
to John Adams in uter despair over the death of political sanity in America: “Our
planet [is] a mere bedlam. . . . Look around our whirling globe . . . east, west, north,
or south, where is the spot in which there are not many thousands of mad lunatics.”14
Though the language sounds like the critics of later Kentucky-style camp meetings,
Gadsen was referring to the preponderance of Republicans.
God and governance in the South
In the ultimate form of one-upmanship, the Federalists had claimed that God was
on their side. Good Christians, they argued, voted Federalist against the infidelity of
Jeferson, Thomas Paine, and the godless philosophy that promoted the French
Revolution. Can we thus conclude that the camp meetings, which originated in Cane
Ridge, Kentucky, and spiled into the Carolinas in the early 1800s, were politicaly
motivated? Did the colapse of the Federalist machine in 1800 contribute to the
subsequent explosion of camp meetings and revivals in the South? Scholars have
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found wide variations in the relationship between religion and politics, depending
largely on the geographical region of the country. The New England states held the
strongest link between church and party afiliation. The history of the Middle States
shows a somewhat weaker connection with virtualy no afiliation between church
and politics during the Great Revival. John Boles, the leading historian of the Great
Revival, found no “direct partisanship among the clergy and political organizations.”15
While Boles’ sweeping survey is impressive, his thesis could be more nuanced. If he
is arguing against a kind of organized conspiracy of camp meetings and revivals he is
certainly correct. It is possible, however, to detect some examples of a fusion of reli-
gious and political goals through the medium of the camp meeting.
At first glance it may appear that the camp meetings were a Federalist crusade
against the growing influence of the Jefersonian world view. At least one scholar has
made this claim though it is aimed only at Timothy Dwight and the New England
revivals.16 There is no southern equivalent to the New England “Pope” of Federalism,
but it raises an interesting question. Were the camp meetings in reality a clever Feder-
alist campaign for God and country? A leter to the editor in the Charleston City Ga-
zete in 1802 raised this very question. The writer reported that those atending camp
meetings debated whether the camp meetings were a “federal coal,” presumably de-
signed to fuel revival fires and bring the country back to God both spiritualy and
politicaly.17 Though it appears tempting, we cannot jump so quickly to this conclusion.
Such an assessment smacks too much of good guys and bad guys with corresponding
white and black hats. The politics of the camp meetings are exceedingly complex and
belie the simplistic equation of God, country, and Federalist politics.
The Federalists’ worst fear came true when Thomas Jeferson won the presi-
dency in 1800, but their most scurrilous predictions about a dreaded Republican
president proved baseless. Jeferson did not confiscate al the Bibles nor did he pro-
mote a campaign against Christianity. Despite the God and country rhetoric spiling
from Federalist pulpits and newspapers, numerical growth suggests that churches
fared much beter under the Jeferson administration than under the previous twelve
years of Federalist leadership. Perhaps people were heeding the apocalyptic predic-
tions of the Federalists. Perhaps the bad news of the Republican victory convinced
people to seek the good news of the Gospel. Federalists lost the political war but
perhaps unwitingly won a spiritual war for the hearts of the people. Richard Furman,
the Baptist pastor in Charleston, delivered a cheerful depiction of conditions in the
country in his 4th of July sermon in 1802. Certainly no shil for the Republicans,
Furman assessed America’s spiritual health a year and a half into both the Jeferson
administration and the Great Revival in the Carolinas:
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God has also smiled on the United States, by granting the efu-
sions of His spirit and grace to His churches among us; and by
extending the influence of vital religion. Perhaps there never was
a period, when the belief of the Gospel-truth, a just atention to
the most important eternal interests of men, and to the honor of
God, were more general on this continent, than at the present
moment.18
Republicanism, or so it seemed, was good for churches and the spiritual wel-
being of the nation. Perhaps the election of the Devil incarnate drove Christians
into the safe arms of the church. This interpretation of the revivals pictures a Feder-
alist circling of the wagons in response to wickedness in high places. An editorial in
the Georgia Republican and State Inteligencer in Savannah captured what Federalists
could only have interpreted as ironic:
The Federalists are actualy impostors and false prophets—they
vowed and declared that if Jeferson was placed in the presiden-
tial chair, that our churches would be demolished, and religion
banished from our happy land. How reverse is the fact? Every
newspaper furnishes us with accounts of the revival of religion in
diferent parts of the Union.19
The writer, after having made his point, could not help but rub some salt into
the Federalist wound by paraphrasing the words of Jesus: “When shal we be purged
of this race of vipers? These scribes, and pharisees, hypocrites, who make long speeches
to scare women and children?”20 The revival, which spread through the South after
the election in 1800, deflated one of the Federalists’ most potent political issues,
while churches in America flourished. The Republicans had unwitingly co-opted
the religious banner. The country was reaping a spiritual harvest that the Federalists
had sown in their jeremiads against the party of Jeferson.
Some Federalists, however, resisted the notion that the church prospered
under the new Republican administration. As the two sides prepared for the Con-
gregational elections in 1802, the Federalist newspaper in Savannah repeated the
familiar refrain of Republican infidelity: “A conspicuous mark of distinction between
the rank [Republican] and the Federalist is, the former’s deep rooted malice against
the sacred doctrines of the Christian religion.”21 The fact that the South found itself
in the midst of a spiritual awakening weakened the Federalist argument, but it did
not soften their atacks against Republicans. A South Carolina writer to the Georgia
Republican found it a bewildering task to sort through the contradictory claims of the
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rival newspapers. The reader seized on a clever political litmus test to guide his selec-
tion in the fal election. Who, the reader asked, did the old Tory party of the Revolu-
tionary War period now support?
If you [republicans] claim them generaly, I shal be made a fed;
but if they are mostly found in the mass of feds, I shal be a true
republican, as I never wil confide in any party composed of them
. . . nor wil I ever trust my life and liberty in the hands of those
who once fought to kil and plunder me.22
The Georgia Republican assured its readers that from New England to the South
“with very few exceptions the old Tories were the most warm supporters of the last
[Adams] administration and are equaly enemies of the present.”23 According to the
Republicans, the Federalists tolerated old American traitors in their ranks. Could
the Federalists stil claim with sincerity that they were the party of God? The Republi-
can also argued that they could rebut the charge of infidelity against them if a census
were conducted in Georgia.
We shal merely remark, of the two persuasions of Christians gener-
aly denominated Baptists and Methodists, there are probably more
than twenty thousand in the state alone, and these with few excep-
tions are [republican]. How they wil receive the charge . . . that al
[republicans] are infidels, we leave for them to determine. 24
The cross-town Federalist rival the Columbian Museum was incredulous that the
Republicans presumed to claim the Baptists and Methodists of Georgia in their ranks
without any proof. Certainly these denominations that promoted revivals would balk
at the Republican label. “Do you not know,” wrote the Museum editor, “that Baptists
and Methodists are professors and believers of religion, and how then can a charge
of infidelity apply to them [?]”25 The editor conveniently ignored the fact that the
evangelical denominations often co-existed, if uncomfortably, with the “infidels” in
the Republican Party. Jeferson, in fact, atracted the alegiance of many southerners,
not for his theology but for his view of governance. Jeferson’s vision of smal govern-
ment and an agrarian, pastoral nation resonated with the independent-minded popu-
lation in the rural South. The shril Federalist charges of “Republican infidelity” did
not necessarily resonate with southerners.
Rev. Henry Holcombe, a Baptist pastor in Savannah, spoke out from both the
pulpit and press against the anti-Christian bias of the Georgia Republican. His entry
into the political fray is interesting because of his bold promotion of camp meetings
and his partisan politics. Holcombe founded a journal titled the Georgia Analytical
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Repository in 1802 in part as a clearing house to promote camp meeting activities.
This short-lived publication deserves a place in both literary and church history as
the first religious periodical in the South and a significant recorder of camp meeting
history.26 John Boles has portrayed Holcombe as patriotic and civic minded but es-
sentialy non-partisan.27 There are actualy two Henry Holcombes, the journalist and
civic-minded pastor on the one hand and the partisan citizen, whose fiery leters
appeared in Savannah newspapers, on the other. Holcombe’s vigorous defense of
Federalism is consistent with his Calvinistic view of man’s falen nature.28 A sinful
nature passed from Adam to al his posterity necessitated a strong government to
protect man from his inherent bent toward sin. Government must be strong enough
to retrain sin as part of its mission under God. Perhaps Holcombe found the Feder-
alist philosophy appealing because, like Calvinism, classical conservatism held a deep
distrust of human nature, though not necessarily one based on scripture. After
Holcombe’s journal folded, his tone turned anything but non-partisan. Jeferson’s
optimistic view of human nature simply did not ring true with Holcombe or his
biblical world view.
The religious debate between the party of Jeferson and the Federalists cen-
tered on definition. The Georgia Republican newspaper interpreted Christianity as a
superior system of ethics, which encouraged morality, liberty, and the love of hu-
manity. This was the true religion. Henry Holcombe believed that he could see
through the deceptive veneer of his Republican opponents. “You speak of the ethics
of the Gospel, and real faith, but is not this to deceive? The simple may think that by
real faith you mean the Christian faith, but . . . you cannot say that you prefer the
Christian’s to the deist’s.”29 Holcombe made it clear that Georgia Baptists were not
in the Republican fold. “You wil find thousands in Georgia who wil resent the insult
you have given religion. . . . [N]o one . . . can read your address without horror; it
would shock Tom Paine.”30
Camp meetings and civil religion
In Charleston the two political parties squared of in the congressional election of
1804. Stil smarting from the humiliating loss of candidate Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney in 1800, Federalists hoped to recover their former glory. The camp meet-
ing revivals would play an interesting role in Charleston and the low country in the
1804 election. The incumbent Federalist candidates in Georgetown and Charleston
districts held their seats by a meager one-hundred-vote margin in 1802. With the
decline of the Federalist party on the national scene it became increasingly dificult
to field credible candidates in many races.31 The party of Hamilton refused to cede
America’s political future to the infidels, however. In a bold ofensive move, the
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Federalists established their own newspaper in South Carolina, and the first issue of
the Charleston Courier appeared 10 January 1803. Alexander Hamilton alegedly sent
Stephen Culen Carpenter as an editorial writer to the Courier to broadcast the Fed-
eralist message.32 As the Fal elections approached, a contributor to the Courier
brought the camp meeting revivals squarely into the political debate. A writer named
“Mentor” warned the voters about the dangerous tactics the Republicans used to
atract voters:
One method adopted to obtain popularity by some who are can-
didates for Congress from this, and probably other states was by
atending camp meetings, mixing freely and indiscriminately with
al enthusiasts, whether white or black, bond or free; embracing
them with a ‘holy kiss’ and caling them Brother and Sister.33
“Mentor” identified an unusual role reversal. The Jefersonian revolution of
1800 had produced a remarkable change. The Federalists, normaly the defenders
and promoters of evangelical religion, now condemned the revivals as thoroughly as
they condemned the Republican candidate for atending camp meetings! The Fed-
eralists were now uncomfortable with the cozy aliance of church and politics by
democratic campaigners. The party of Jefferson had succeeded in the
disestablishment of religion, but was caught practicing a kinder, gentler form of
church/state square dancing. According to the Federalist writer named “Mentor,”
. . . the Republican first endeavored to enlist as many influential
characters in every neighborhood as possible in their interest; to
make them friendly disposed to this enthusiasm, and to be the
subjects of it: and when once they enlist in a cause of this kind
they wil not readily abandon it, for diferent reasons that are very
obvious.34
“Mentor” confessed that he knew what he was talking about because of his
own voyeuristic atendance at several camp meetings in South Carolina. Ten days
later the Courier published another spirited epistle from “Mentor,” which atacked
both camp meetings and Republicans. He feared the Republicans were simply dema-
gogues, using the enthusiasm generated at the camp meetings for political gain.
“Mentor,” in the second instalment, took a more desperate tone:
The public mind—that is, the minds of the majority of the people,
has lately been too much poisoned, and inflamed to admit of so-
ber reasoning and calm reflection. A furious bigot, a hot-headed
enthusiast, who has atended and promoted camp meetings, wil
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be sent to Congress in preference to a man who has the welfare of
his country at heart.35
“Mentor” atempted to link the bodily exercises, enthusiasm and sometimes
chaos of the camp meetings with the anarchic spirit unleashed by the French Revo-
lution. After his description of the “yoke of despotism” imposed on thirty milion
people in France, “Mentor” fused the camp meetings with political radicalism. Ac-
cording to “Mentor” support of camp meetings was to folow the treacherous path of
French debauchery! Both movements alegedly supported brotherhood and equal-
ity. At the foot of the camp meeting cross, class and racial distinctions vanished.
Similarly, French radicals abolished rank and privilege, though in a thoroughly secu-
lar spirit. “Mentor” continued with a warning. “God grant that such revolutionary
scenes may not soon be realized and witnessed in this country; yet I am afraid that
such are the degeneracy of the present times, that none but the most ambitious, hot-
headed, and ignorant, wil be sent to represent us in Congress.”36
Mentor’s warning was given not just to readers in the low country but through-
out the state: “If such a contrast exists between any candidate for Congress from any
part or parts of this state—let the people shew a spirit of independence and patrio-
tism, in fixing their choice, and thereby prevent the reign of anarchy and despo-
tism.”37 The aleged hot-headed, camp meeting-atending-demagogue “Mentor” spoke
of was none other than Robert Marion, the nephew of the famous “Swamp Fox,”
General Francis Marion. Marion, running largely on his famous name, lost in the
previous congressional race to Thomas Lowndes. Federalists had slandered Marion
for his lack of political experience.38 What he lacked in political experience, how-
ever, he made up for in his apparent ability to work a camp meeting crowd and
mobilize it for political purposes. Perhaps the Federalists prompted the camp meet-
ings, but now at least one Republican used the religious assembly for the promotion
of his own political purposes.
The political use of camp meetings by Republicans in South Carolina paid of.
They swept al eight of the congressional seats in October 1804, seven by default for
lack of Federalist candidates. Robert Marion, the “hot-headed” demagogue, defeated
Thomas Rhet Smith, the nephew of John Rutledge, by one hundred votes in a piti-
ful 38 percent turnout of eligible voters. Marion served the district without distinc-
tion until his resignation in 1810.39 Just as Federalist fear mongering about the dangers
of Jeferson failed to materialize in 1800, similar charges in South Carolina appeared
to be so much crying wolf. Despite the high-octane rhetoric of “Mentor,” neither the
country nor South Carolina colapsed under Congressman Marion and the Republi-
cans. The New England and the Kentucky versions of revival prospered in the context
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of the Jefersonian revolution. The revivals also matured in the next decades into a
humanitarian crusade caled the “benevolent empire” by later historians. It began in
the womb of the Jefersonian revolution and prospered under the Jacksonian revo-
lution.
Timothy Dwight’s worst fear in 1800 was a political revolution in American led
by the infidel party of Jeferson. Dwight and the country indeed got a political revo-
lution, and, in the process, the nation got a spiritual revolution at no extra charge.
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George Galphin: Portrait of an
Early South Carolina Entrepreneur
Michael Morris
Historians traditionaly preferred to discuss European contact with NorthAmerica’s indigenous peoples through references to elite European males. In
discussing Virginia conversations soon turn to John Smith and his adventures among
the Powhatan Indians. For Puritan New England no proper review would be com-
plete without mentioning Plymouth’s Wiliam Bradford and Massachusets Bay’s John
Winthrop. In Georgia James Oglethorpe is the standard reference to early contact
between native peoples and Europeans.
Yet how limiting is this practice! It ignores the influence, good and bad, that an
army of fur traders had on relationships with Native American peoples. These men,
most of whom were not cultural elites, chose occupations that brought them into di-
rect, daily contact with American Indians in the southern backcountry. The fur traders
were hybrid diplomats, driven by the desire to both accumulate wealth and serve colo-
nial governments in carrying out policy. Most of these trader-diplomats had Indian
mates and, as with those Indian women, history has assigned litle or no importance to
the role of the backcountry fur trader. Years before the implementation of the British
Indian superintendencies, however, the fur traders were the eyes and ears of the colo-
nial governments, which often needed the trade with Native American peoples to sur-
vive. Colonial setlements, fearing for their safety, felt bound to monitor the various
activities of surrounding Indian tribes through the employ of Indian traders.
Colonial governments first carried out their Indian policies through individual
fur traders, who made reports to and received orders from governors. Few European
males could have had greater contact with Native Americans or more influence over
relationships between the two cultures than these forgoten men. George Galphin
was one such player in the complex Anglo-Indian power structure of the backcountry.
One colonial Indian agent with whom Galphin occasionaly clashed dubbed the Sil-
ver Bluf, South Carolina, resident the “merchant prince of the Georgia forest.”1 His
legendary trade influence extended from the centers of colonial power like Charles
Town and Savannah to his base at Silver Bluf, near present day Augusta, Georgia, on
down to Pensacola, Florida. At his death, his entrepreneurship had accumulated
some forty thousand acres of land, a sizable colection of livestock, and 128 slaves,
including some who were his own children.2
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When these backwoodsmen were of good character, they were of invaluable
aid to the colonial governments. Many of them came from Ireland or Scotland. Some
observers have speculated that they fited wel into Indian culture because they un-
derstood concepts like clan responsibility and retributive justice. George Galphin, a
partner in the trading firm of Brown, Rea and Company, ilustrates how influential
traders could be. Galphin was born in Tulamore County, Ireland, in the early 1700s
to Thomas Galphin, a linen weaver, and Barbara Galphin. He was one of seven chil-
dren.3 In December 1736 he married Catherine Saunderson, a union that evidently
resulted in no children.4 Despite the marriage, Galphin left Ireland in 1737 for the
American colonies without his new bride. By 1745 he was employed by South Caro-
lina as an Indian interpreter.5
He was posted by Carolina first among the Lower Creeks based around the Flint
and Chatahoochee rivers to keep government wel informed about Creek activities.
While among the Lower Creeks he cohabited with a woman, Metawney, and they had
children.6 Galphin’s service was not always above reproach. When he presented a bil
for £467 to the South Carolina Assembly for Indian trade goods, that body found over-
estimates of £114. The assembly also found he had spent another £83 to supply the
Creeks with rum, an expense it did not reimburse.7 Galphin and his employees broke
colonial policy on more than one occasion when it came to trading rum to southeast-
ern tribes and when profit was involved.
In the 1740s Galphin joined the Augusta-based trading firm of Brown, Rea and
Company, a firm begun earlier in the century by Archibald McGilivray, an ancestor of
one Lachlan McGilivray. Daniel Clark, Jeremiah Knot, Wiliam Sludders, and George
Cussings were also original partners. The company employed about twenty
packhorsemen and owned 123 horses. After 1741 the company was controled by both
Patrick Brown, who was licensed to trade with the Upper Creek towns, and John Rea,
who, along with Galphin, was licensed to trade among the Lower Creeks.8
John Rea, also from Ireland, immigrated to America around 1730 and had
made his way to Georgia by 1734. There he began running a trading boat from
Augusta to Charles Town. By 1750 he had entered into partnership with Patrick
Brown to create Brown, Rea and Company.9 Despite the business, Galphin contin-
ued to work “as needed” for diferent colonial governments. In the fal of 1749 he
reported to the commissioners that he had tried unsuccessfuly to stop a party of
Cussita (Creek) Indians from making war on the Cherokees. He also reported that
the French were trying to make inroads among the Cowetas. Galphin noted that the
Cowetas invited him into the square of their town, but he refused the invitation
because they were flying French colors. In fact, Galphin refused to act as a mediator
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for them until they displayed proper British colors.10 His influence among southeast-
ern Indians was formidable and, fueled by his ability to treat them with gifts that
often included rum, it only increased over the years,
Besides his trading firm and government service, Galphin’s most ambitious
scheme was one that brought him together with business partner John Rea in an
efort to sponsor Irish immigrants to America with government assistance. In 1761
Rea, along with ten others, petitioned South Carolina for a grant of 40,000 acres to
be used for townships for Irish setlers. When immigration enticements in South
Carolina expired in 1765, Rea and Galphin began similar eforts in Georgia. The
Georgia venture was timed to coincide with recent land acquisitions. The Creeks
had ceded land to Georgia by treaty in November 1763, which gave the colony land
between the Savannah and Ogeechee rivers, territory Governor James Wright was
eager to extend to setlers.11
Rea and Galphin petitioned Georgia for a bounty payment to cover passage,
setlement, and a ten-year exemption from taxes and rents. Galphin purchased 1500
acres on the Ogeechee River at the boundary of Indian territory. Here he estab-
lished a herd of catle and a trading post. He caled the site “Galphin’s Old Town.”
The bil covering the relocation project passed the Georgia General Assembly in
February of 1764 and opened setlement to Protestant families, who arrived in groups
of forty or more during the next three years.12
The plucky entrepreneur advertised back home in Ireland for immigrants
wiling to relocate to Georgia. A Belfast newspaper of March 1766 noted that Galphin
had a 50,000-acre grant he was ofering in 100-acre plots. Interested people were to
sign up with a Mr. Robert Pooler. The setlers then would be transported from
either Newry or Belfast to Charles Town. Once in the colonies, Galphin pledged to
take the transplants to their plots in his ships free of charge.13 Galphin business
partner John Rea wrote to his brother Mathew back home in Ireland extoling the
virtues of the new lands and asking his brother to spread the word. He told his
brother in September 1765 that he would do everything within his power to help
the immigrants, and he bragged about the enviable lack of taxes in the colonies.
Rea asked his brother to encourage large families and tradesmen to immigrate. He
recommended bringing along a cleric and a teacher, both scarce commodities in
Georgia. While he sang the praises of Georgia, Rea was honest about its shortcom-
ings. He told Mathew he would not “advise any person to come here that lives wel
in Ireland, because there is not the pleasures of society that there is there, and the
comfort of the gospel preached, no fairs nor markets to go to but we have greater
plenty of good eating and drinking. . . .”14
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Relocation to the new lands in Georgia was slow, due to the rivalry of the South
Carolina setlement plan. Galphin and Rea petitioned the Georgia Assembly for a three-
year extension in 1768 partly because the immigration enticements of the rival Caro-
lina setlement were due to expire in that year, and the partners felt their venture
would then prosper. The home government actualy began to discourage these ven-
tures; they were luring Protestants away from their deliberate planting in Catholic Ire-
land and draining merchants and craftsmen away from the local economy.15
Setlers began to arrive in 1768, and Governor Wright of Georgia designated
their land “Queensborough.”16 Galphin continued to advertise in Ireland for the
Queensborough setlement. By 1768 he was describing it as a “growing and flourishing
province, where industry is amply rewarded.”17 The resetlement ofer now cost one
guinea (twenty-one shilings) per passenger, but the standard plot remained 100 acres
and was tax free for ten years. Galphin supplied each head of household with milk cows
and horses until such time as they could buy their own. A subsequent ad mentioned his
partner, John Rea, and noted that both he and Rea had done wel by coming to America.
They were, according to the ad, both men of “opulent fortunes.” Galphin’s business
acumen was acute, albeit subtle. One can only imagine that many transplant families,
when financialy able, would prefer purchasing their loaned livestock from Galphin
rather than starting out with new animals. The 1768 ad sought some two hundred
persons anxious to come to Queensborough.18 By June of 1768 twenty-six setlers had
registered individual grants. Many evidently immigrated for the enticements mentioned
in the ads. A group of Irish emigrants leaving Belfast in December 1769 aboard the
Hopewel plainly stated their reasons for relocation; the taxes in Ireland were high enough
to render pay for even the best jobs insuficient for living.19
Despite the eventual influx of setlers, the Queensborough setlement became
problematic due, in part, to its location. The former owners, the Creeks, had no com-
punction about crossing over onto the land, which violated the Euro-American, but
not Indian, concept of private ownership. Often the Creeks stole livestock, which sub-
sequently made some interesting circuits through the backcountry. In 1772 an em-
ployee of the superintendent of Indian afairs, Creek agent David Tait, wrote to
Superintendent Stuart complaining about George Galphin’s employees within his ter-
ritory. He noted that Francis Lewis, a Galphin employee, plied the Creeks with rum,
which he traded for deer skins, then used his deer skins to buy more rum. With rum,
men like Lewis bought the horses the Indians had stolen from nearby setlements like
Queensborough. Tait complained biterly that Lewis had kept the Creek town of
Tuckabatchie drunk for a week and had used his drunken customers to rough up any
rival traders in the area.20 Thus Galphin’s business associates were actualy encouraging
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theft from his own Queensborough setlers, puting profit over regional stability. Not
surprisingly the Queensborough Irish took maters into their own hands. In October
1771 setlers pursued the Creeks and detained them, kiling one. In December of that
year, a Creek man kiled setler John Cary with whom the Indian had lodged for the
night. Galphin himself tracked the assailant along with his slaves. The Creeks appre-
hended the murderer and put him to death in front of Indian traders.21
Not surprisingly, these events did not make it into Irish newspapers, which con-
tinued to advertise Queensborough. In fact 1772 was one of the years of heaviest
migration, with some thirty ships transporting colonists. The last of these ships to reach
Georgia was the Waddel, which landed at Savannah on 26 February 1774. Unfortu-
nately Queensborough continued to struggle along until the American Revolution.
The dislocation resulting from the war and from the sale of Loyalist lands speled the
end for the il-fated community, although land from one setler was confiscated to
build the new state capital, Louisvile.22
Like al businessmen, Galphin had to worry about the competition. In this
case the competition came from a younger generation of traders trying to make a
profit in a gluted market. Members of this new generation of Indian traders were
bold and unabashed in their determination to prosper. The older generation, how-
ever, was not without finesse. They often extended so much trade credit to the south-
eastern Indians that to pay their bils, the Indians were forced to cede land to the
government. The government, in turn, would sel the land and direct the proceeds
back to the traders. The Creeks and Cherokees owed several traders a debt of such
magnitude that, to cancel it, the merchants proposed a sizeable cession of land from
the Indians. Compounding the problem, the Creeks believed the Cherokees were
ofering to transfer land that realy belonged to the Creeks.23 In November 1771 the
powerful “Gentlemen of Augusta,” otherwise known as Brown, Rea and Company,
got involved in the mater. George Galphin, Robert McKay, James Jackson, and An-
drew McClean wrote to John Stuart, the superintendent of Indian afairs for the
Southern District, warning that the overabundance of Indian traders in the 1760s
had ruined the market and adding that unless it improved, traders would quit the
backcountry, leaving the Indians under supplied.
Stuart was a representative of the British crown to Indian peoples. He was
answerable to the commander in chief of British forces in America and was charged
with an agenda alternating from maintaining the peace with tribes to mobilizing
them for warfare against enemies of the British. Since it was trade goods that bound
the tribes to British policy, diplomatic ties would be broken if trade goods and gifts
ceased to flow. After giving voice to their leverage, the Indian traders stated their
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wishes. They noted that the contested land was too close to Euro-American setle-
ments to be of any use to either Cherokees or Creeks. They asked the government to
accept the cession and to sel the land to Virginians who had been migrating south
in growing numbers in search of fresh farm lands, their own having been drained by
tobacco production.24 Governor James Wright of Georgia lobbied the hardest to get
the home government to agree to the cession. He told his superiors the area’s noto-
rious problem of horse theft was alone was reason enough to increase the bufer
zone between Georgia setlers and the Creeks.25 In December 1772 the government
authorized him to sign such a treaty, and in June 1773 the treaty itself was signed in
Augusta. With the cession, modern Lincoln, Wilkes, and Elbert counties and parts
of Franklin, Greene, and Oglethorpe counties were al brought under Georgia con-
trol. George Galphin helped to ensure the cooperation of the Creeks in this mat-
ter,26 fuly planning to be among the traders to receive funds from government sales
of that land. His share was £9,791. 15. 05.27
Problems on the ceded land did not abate. Vigilante action by the Irish setlers
prompted a Creek retaliation in December 1773 and brought about the deaths of sev-
enteen English subjects in the area. Governor Wright punished the Lower Creeks in a
fashion readily understood by native peoples. To stop the flow of products on which
the Indians were so dependent, he ordered a trade embargo. George Galphin chose
not to comply with this order. A year later Creek agent David Tait wrote to Superinten-
dent Stuart teling him Galphin had continued to trade during the entire embargo.28
For Galphin, business in the backcountry often superseded diplomatic concerns.
With the advent of the American Revolution, John Stuart’s job changed dra-
maticaly. Before the war, the superintendent was in charge of enforcing trade regu-
lations, handling disputes between the two cultures, and promoting peaceful relations
between the southern tribes and Euro-American civilization. After the war began,
the superintendent was expected to extinguish tribal conflicts and mobilize the Indi-
ans against the colonials, a dificult task after pursuing contrary goals for so long. As
negotiations between colonial oficials and the British government deteriorated,
colonials began to spread rumors that Stuart was enlisting the help of both the Chero-
kees and Catawbas against the colony of South Carolina.29
The backcountry had been a training ground for many would-be Indian trad-
ers. Given the glut in numbers of traders reported by petitioners over the years, it is
not surprising that many sided with Patriot forces. Like the Loyalist Indian traders,
those who chose the Patriot side had lived and worked in the backcountry al their
lives; when the war came, they, like the Loyalist traders, used their expertise with
Native Americans in behalf of their cause. Such an occurrence posed yet another
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threat for Stuart. In December 1775 Stuart notified Secretary of State Dartmouth
that the Continental Congress had named three former traders to act as superinten-
dents for the Patriot cause in the southern district. George Galphin, Edward
Wilkinson, and John Rea, members of the powerful Brown, Rea and Company, had
traded in the backcountry for years and were traveling to meet counterparts named
as northern Patriot agents.30 The Continental Congress also appointed John Walker
and Wilie Jones of North Carolina as the remaining agents.31
Initialy, both sides tried to keep the southeastern tribes neutral in this con-
flict. Here Galphin may have felt conflict between his diplomatic function and his
desire for profit on the trade. Like al savvy traders, he knew that only a steady flow of
trade goods could maintain that neutrality. Galphin wrote to Continental Congress
delegate Henry Laurens in February 1776 noting his dismay that the Congress had
stopped the Indian trade. He bluntly reminded Laurens that without the deerskins,
merchants would send no trade goods, and without trade there was no tribal loyalty.
Galphin told Laurens he was “. . .verry sensible that no individual shou’d reap a
benefit at this time, but there is the greatest necessity for suplying the Indians at this
time to keep them peaceable, . . .”32
Galphin further said that if he did not have suficient merchandise, the Lower
Creeks would view him as a liar and would eventualy turn against the Patriots. Be-
fore he would alow that disastrous chain of events to occur, he would resign his
position. The Patriot agent also reminded Laurens that John Stuart was Galphin’s
enemy and had been looking for ways to strike at him since the 1773 Creek and
Cherokee land cession. He closed by reminding Laurens of an upcoming meeting
between Stuart and the Creeks and Choctaws in which he expected the Loyalist agent
to hold sway with an impressive showing of gifts.33
Galphin’s message of potential disaster and of his own possible departure was
not lost on Laurens, who responded quickly with a leter on 14 February 1776 not-
ing his shipment to Galphin of a supply of gun powder to go along with whatever
goods and rum Galphin could muster to maintain Creek loyalty. He heartily encour-
aged Galphin to retain his post despite the hardships and mentioned the future
rewards of liberty and rest for al Patriots in a not-too-distant future.34
Galphin continued to discuss the dilemma of maintaining Indian alegiance
without trade items. On 26 October 1776 he wrote to an acquaintance speaking of
the dificulty of keeping the Creeks calm. Galphin, like al trader-diplomats, knew
that regular gift dispersals helped ensure Indian cooperation. He believed that Loy-
alist agents were already at work mobilizing the tribes against his side.35 Patriots in
Carolina accused Stuart of manipulating Indians against the colonials as early as the
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summer of 1775. In reality Stuart was not ordered to do so until September of that year
by General Thomas Gage, commander-in-chief of British forces in America.36
 In December 1775 Stuart passed those orders along to Alexander Cameron,
his deputy among the Cherokees. Stuart said he had been ordered to use the various
backcountry tribes to “distress” those colonies in rebelion, but he did not interpret
this order as authorization to atack backcountry residents indiscriminately. Rather,
Native Americans were to help Loyalist forces direct atacks on Patriots. Finaly
Cameron was given explicit instructions to counter at al costs the actions of Galphin,
Wilkinson and Rea, the rival Indian agents, and to apprehend them if possible.37
Stuart’s apprehension at the threat posed by rogue Indian agents was wel founded.
Like al who traficked in the backcountry trade, they knew what best motivated the
Indians—the threat of cessation of trade. In fact in September 1775 George Galphin
told the Creeks the Patriots were fighting the Loyalists because the “Great King” wanted
to withdraw trade from the Indians. Further, Galphin told them their friend Stuart was
old and sick, implying they could not count upon him much longer.38 Stuart felt com-
peled to employ his own propaganda to ofset the Patriot agent’s.
Through David Tait, Stuart informed the Creeks that there was indeed a
dispute between the Euro-Americans in their lands but that it did not concern Indian
peoples. Tait told them that Stuart promised to keep the trade open, but, in return, he
expected them to remain loyal to the king and to ignore talks given by the Patriot
agents.39 In early September 1775 the Patriot agents tried again. Members of the Geor-
gia Council of Safety told the Lower Creeks that the war had erupted because the
“Great King” demanded more money from the colonists than they could pay and had
sent soldiers to colect it.40 Such a tactic may have been employed to strike a sympa-
thetic chord with the Creeks by making Patriot problems analogous to Indian prob-
lems with credit and forced land cessions like the Queensborough setlement. Loyalist
agents, however, were not unskiled at striking responsive chords with the Indians ei-
ther. Alexander Cameron told the Cherokees that had it not been for the British gov-
ernment, the Patriots would have stripped the Indians completely of their land. Carolina
Patriot Henry Laurens felt that Cameron could not have selected a more destructive
charge to make to the Indians about the Patriots and so ordered Edward Wilkinson to
do al in his power to counter Cameron’s eforts.41
In March of 1776 Stuart notified Major General Henry Clinton of the status
of Indian afairs in the backcountry. He wrote that the race to control the Indian
tribes was a swift one. Patriot Indian agents were just as familiar to the Indians as
were his own men and were often beter supplied with funds with which to treat
them. Biterness crept from between the lines of the leter as Stuart blamed the
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success of the Patriot agents on the lack of power given his ofice in the years pre-
ceding the war. Speaking of Galphin specificaly, Stuart noted he had amassed a
sizable fortune from trading with the Lower Creeks for many years. Galphin’s fa-
miliarity with them alone would not have been such a threat in the 1770s had “he
not . . . been employed by Sir James Wright [of Georgia] and Lieutenant Governor
Bul [of South Carolina] to interfere in Indian afairs, and to carry whatever point
they had in view.”42 Stuart stated that Robert Rea, an Augusta trader licensed by Sir
James Wright, was being employed by the Continental Congress to distribute am-
munition among the Creeks. Finaly he noted that Edward Wilkinson, a trader of
long standing among the Cherokees, had been an employee of Lieutenant Gover-
nor Bul.43 Colonial governors had stubbornly used traders as independent agents
for years; now, as independent agents like Galphin became pivotal players in the
Revolution in the backcountry, the chickens had come home to roost.
In January 1777 Stuart, in a leter to George Germain, noted the efects that
both the competing Indian agents and the war were having on the backcountry tribes.
He observed that the Creeks and Cherokees were prevented from hunting by rebel
incursions into their homelands. Both were unable to pay old debts or to purchase new
items, and both had become entirely dependent on the government dole. Stuart’s
expenses increased as he hired more agents to oppose Patriot agents like Galphin.44
Galphin worked to keep the Creeks loyal to the Patriots and invited them to
Augusta regularly for conferences to strengthen ties to his side. Galphin’s work was
hampered by anti-Indian groups among his own Patriot side. The work of these
groups often prevented him from obtaining the loyalty or at least neutrality of the
Creeks. A group of Georgians led by Thomas Fee atacked a Creek delegation bound
for Augusta and kiled one of the tribe. The Creeks turned to George Galphin for
satisfaction, and when he could not turn over or punish the murderer, some of the
Creeks sided with Loyalists led by David Tait.45
The merchant-turned-diplomat continued to pursue the Creeks. He invited
them back for a second meeting at his Old Town plantation. His goal was to at least
create factions among the Creeks if he could not separate them entirely from the
British. On 17 June 1777 some four hundred Creek warriors met the Georgia Indian
commissioners in conference. Loyalist agents like Tait, Cameron, and Stuart often
told the southern Indians that the Patriots had no gifts or merchandise to sel—the
mark of an unworthy aly to many tribes. Indian delegates at the conference told
Galphin they would require merchandise to take back with them to show their people
that Loyalist propaganda was indeed false.46 Galphin promised to send merchandise if
the Creeks would drive Loyalist agents from their lands.47 One delegate, Handsome
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Felow, declined a Patriot ofer of a visit to Philadelphia but asked Galphin for a tour of
Charleston, which the backcountry diplomat arranged under his protection.48
By the summer of 1777 the strain of trying to conduct Patriot diplomacy and
earn some profit began to show in Galphin’s correspondence. He wrote to Henry
Laurens in July of that year complaining about Georgians who wanted a Creek war.
Galphin estimated their reasons ranged from desires for pure revenge against the
Indians over property losses to true Loyalist sympathies. He complained that “some
of those vilians has thretned to shute me as I went back & forwd to the frontier . . .”
The Patriot agent waxed biter when he told Laurens that his hopes for an easier life
had been dashed by the war, which had brought him more trade problems than ever.
Galphin noted that if it were not “. . . for these damed vilains upon the frontier I
should tacke plasure in serving my contrey .”49
George Galphin’s influence and ability were both formidable and wel known
to both sides in the conflict. Loyalist forces viewed him as threat enough for Indian
Superintendent Stuart to fund an assassination atempt on his life. In the fal of 1777
Lieutenant Samuel Moore led a group of Florida Loyalists who camped out near
Silver Bluf awaiting the right moment to atack the Patriot agent. They struck an
outbound Creek delegation, which they believed to be under Galphin’s escort, as it
headed for home. They mistook Captain John Gerard for Galphin and kiled him.
Their real target had remained at his Silver Bluf base. Similarly the Creek delega-
tion survived the atack and made it back home to Oakfuskie.50
If the war efort endangered George Galphin’s life and his fortune, Patriot
authorities at least sang his praises as they updated him about the war efort. In a
September 1777 leter Henry Laurens thanked him for his work on behalf of Geor-
gia, South Carolina, and the United States and urged him to maintain the efort. To
that end Laurens acknowledged Galphin’s importance to be such that al Patriots
had to pray for his continued good health and life.51
Atempts on his life did not deter the eforts of the Patriot Indian agent. He met
the Creeks again at Old Town in November 1777 and treated some three hundred fifty
people. Galphin praised them for driving Loyalists from their land and emphasized the
need to maintain their vigilance. Galphin further reminded them of just how powerful
the Patriot army was. In September 1776 it had leveled the Lower, Middle, and Overhil
Cherokee towns in retaliation for their support of the Loyalists.52
 Just prior to the British invasion of Georgia, Creek agent David Tait dispatched
a band of Loyalist Creeks to atack Patriots and their Indian alies. These Indians
atacked Handsome Felow’s band, who turned to George Galphin for an explana-
tion. Galphin told them that Loyalist John Stuart had ordered this Indian atack on
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Patriots to make the Georgians angry enough to turn against al Indians near Geor-
gia territory. Galphin’s words prompted Handsome Felow’s band to launch con-
certed atacks against Loyalist subjects and Indians to such an extent that they had to
evacuate the backcountry for a time. It was never easy for Indian traders to sway a
tribe—Galphin’s presence and influence was remarkable if he could convince bands
within the same tribe to fight one another.53
Ultimately any Indian agent, whether Patriot or Loyalist, was only as good as
his supply line of merchandise. When the flow of Galphin’s goods slowed to a trickle,
Loyalist elements convinced the Creeks to atack Patriot targets. In July 1778 the
Creeks atacked and kiled numerous Georgia citizens of Queensborough. The Indi-
ans destroyed both homes and livestock before radiating outward to atack outposts
along the Satila and Altamaha rivers in Georgia.54
The Creek atack put George Galphin in an uncomfortable position and brought
his diplomatic duties and his financial desires once more into direct conflict. Patriot
oficials ordered him to punish the Creeks by cuting of their already paltry stream of
trade items. Galphin complied begrudgingly. He wrote Continental Congress delegate
Henry Laurens and admited that his setler neighbors, “. . . threatned to kil me & the
Indians too if I supplyd them.”55
Despite failed supply lines, his diplomatic skil and reputation was such that Loy-
alist oficials dealt with him directly during the struggle for the southern backcountry.
Britain’s Lieutenant Archibald Campbel wrote to Galphin in 1778 asking for Galphin’s
renewed eforts to keep Indians loyal to him neutral. Campbel then put Galphin un-
der surveilance and captured a Patriot party, which included Galphin’s son, as it headed
into South Carolina ostensibly to mobilize Indians against the Loyalists. On the couri-
ers, the British found leters from Galphin to both the Creeks and other British sub-
jects encouraging a general rebelion against the British. The dual role of merchant
and Indian trader was often a conflicting and costly one for George Galphin. British
forces in the southeast ofered to manumit slaves who joined their cause. In 1778 some
ninety slaves deserted the Galphin estate and joined Lieutenant Campbel’s forces.56
Both sides competing for Indian loyalty experienced measures of success. In a
leter to George Germain, Stuart noted that despite the eforts of George Galphin in
the backcountry, the Loyalists had persuaded a group of Cowetas (Creeks) to harass
Patriots on the Georgia frontier by atacking a fort there and driving of a herd of
horses. Simiarly, a group of Cherokees had gone to atack the Virginia frontier but
had returned home in want of supplies.57
Ironicaly neither George Galphin nor John Stuart would live to see the war’s
end. Loyalist Indian agent John Stuart died on 21 March 1779. In the summer of
40
The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association 
1779 Germain appointed Alexander Cameron and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas
Brown, a Loyalist from Augusta, Georgia, as dual superintendents for West and East
Florida respectively.58 Similarly, the war efort ended for George Galphin soon after
as wel. He died at Silver Bluf, South Carolina, on 1 December 1780.59 Although
Galphin died before seeing the war’s end, his eforts had assured an incomplete
loyalty between the southeastern Indians and the British. His death also provides a
fiting opportunity to review a somewhat unusual family life as wel as the impressive
material possessions accumulated during a life’s work in the backcountry.
The dual career of businessman and diplomat might lead some to imagine
that George Galphin had litle time for friends and family. Nothing could be further
from the truth. No woman other than Catherine Saunderson claimed the legal title
of Mrs. George Galphin. Despite that mere technicality, George Galphin cohabited
with at least five women in the backcountry long enough to produce children. Rachel
Dupre, a white woman, had two children by Galphin, a son named Thomas and a
daughter named Martha, both with the surname Galphin. Sappho, a slave, was the
mother of Galphin’s daughters Rachel and Betsey, both slaves at Galphin’s death.
Rosa, a slave, was the mother of Barbara, who was also a slave at Galphin’s death.
Galphin also had children by at least two diferent Indian women. Metawney, the
more wel-known, gave birth to Judith, John, and George. Nitchuckey, the less wel-
known partner, was the mother of Rosa, also a slave at the time of her father’s death.60
George Galphin rewarded his heirs in varying degrees of largesse. He was less
generous with the mothers of his children than he was with his children. Thomas
Galphin, son of Rachel Dupre, received 4350 acres of land plus £50 from sales of the
ceded land. He inherited twenty-five slaves and both a grist and saw mil. Further, he
inherited one half of the catle at Galphin’s Old Town and items of furniture. His sister,
Martha, received two lots in Augusta, 1050 acres, the remaining one half of catle from
Old Town, fourteen slaves, eighteen horses, furniture, and one-third of the residue of
the estate. Like her brother, she received £50 from the sale of the ceded land. Their
mother, Rachel, received an inheritance tied to her status as a single woman and for-
feited if she married.61 She further received a suit of mourning clothes at the time of
Galphin’s death.62
Judith, John, and George, the children of the Creek woman Metawney, were
also remembered in the wil. Daughter Judith received the home in which she lived
on Silver Bluf, 300 acres of land, £50 from the ceded lands claim, eighteen horses,
seventeen slaves, and assorted furniture. John received 1700 acres and £50 of the
ceded land money. He also received eighteen horses and half ownership in a saw
mil on Town Creek. John inherited twenty-one slaves, assorted guns, furniture, and
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one-third of the residue of the estate. Galphin’s namesake, George, received 2000
acres of land, £50 of ceded land funds, the old Brick house, seventeen slaves, eigh-
teen horses, the other half of the saw mil on Town Creek, and assorted furniture.63
For Galphin’s black family, the inheritance was slightly diferent. Rachel and
Betsy were the daughters of Sappho. At Galphin’s death any of his legatees who were
enslaved were to receive their freedom. Rachel, who outlived her father, received
her freedom at that time. Likewise Betsy was to be manumited and receive, in addi-
tion, livestock, a pair of slaves, and land. A codicil in the Galphin wil reveals that she
died before her father, and he redirected her inheritance to others.64 Barbara,
Galphin’s daughter by the then deceased slave Rose, was manumited at her father’s
death and inherited twenty slaves, 300 acres of land, £50 from ceded land proceeds,
eighteen horses, and assorted furniture.65
Daughter Rosa was Galphin’s child by the Indian woman Nitchuckey. Despite
her Indian heritage, she was enslaved during Galphin’s life and only upon his death
did she receive her freedom and a smal inheritance.66
Galphin’s wil provided for certain heirs in other ways. Proceeds of the Galphin
estate were to be used to clothe, feed, and educate Thomas and Martha Galphin,
children of Rachel Dupre; Judith, John, and George, children of Metawney; and
Barbara, daughter of Rose. They were to be sent to school in either Charleston or
Savannah. Finaly, Barbara, Galphin’s daughter by Rose, was also to be educated out
of her father’s wil, but Rachel, the daughter of Sappho, was not.67
Like most wils, the Galphin document contained contingency plans and codi-
cils. If his primary heirs died, the estate was to be divided among his five sisters in
Ireland. The wil reveals a generosity somewhat at odds with his sometimes risky
actions as an Indian trader. For example, he provided, at his death, £50 sterling to be
divided among al widows within thirty miles of Silver Bluf. Galphin also provided
the same amount to be divided among the poor of Enneskilen and Armagh in Ire-
land. Finaly, he bequeathed £10 sterling each to the orphan children he raised.68
To summarize the life of such an individual is a daunting task. Galphin, the
young man, left Ireland behind and entered colonial service, lured to new lands by
low taxes and the opportunity for wealth. He began to acquire both land and power-
ful trade associates in Brown, Rea and Company. Galphin, the entrepreneur, was
partner in not one but two setlement ventures to bring other Irish into South Caro-
lina and Georgia, and he made profits from both these projects. As an Indian trader,
he pursued policies that encouraged Indian indebtedness, which accrued to his own
profit, and he sometimes hired disreputable subordinates, whose actions inflamed
the south Georgia setlement of Queensborough. During the great war, he worked
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to secure the loyalties of his associates, the lower Creeks, and his influence was such
that the British could never fuly count upon the southeastern Indians in their plan to
reclaim the South. With such a life ordinary men might have found no time for a
family—not so with George Galphin. Like his business ventures, his family life was a
complicated afair. That family life is stil legendary today in the central Savannah River
area. Perhaps the most fiting characterization for George Galphin is indeed the one
that British Indian agent David Tait gave him so very long ago. What description could
be more fiting than the title “merchant prince of the Georgia forest?”
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The Dawn of Modern Electronic Television
Nat Pendleton
Television, like any modern invention of complexity, did not simply appear—itevolved. Much of its technology was and stil is based on previous inventions as
wel as methods used by radio. It is not within the scope of this study to present the
history of the telegraph, telephone and radio-sufice it to say that each of these tech-
nologies built upon its predecessor. That such was the case can be noted in the fact
that the first telephones were briefly referred to as “speaking telegraphs.” During
the first years of radio communication, terms like “wireless telegraphy” and “wireless
telephony” had likewise been common. And in the 1920s, when experimenters first
dabbled in transmiting moving pictures, the popular press and hobbyist magazines
used names like “radio with pictures” and “radio movies.”
The beginnings of television make for a complicated yet fascinating story. Per-
haps the story’s complexity is what has kept any details of television’s origins out of
most of the textbooks, while histories of other inventions—like the telegraph, tele-
phone or automobile—have been simplified, popularized, and turned into legend. It
is not possible to atribute honestly the “invention” of television to a single individual or
corporation, nor can one say that it was “invented” in a given year. Television’s evolu-
tion is marked instead by a series of milestones; several inventors, scientists, artists,
financiers, corporations and even nations have contributed to its progress.
First, this study wil focus on early international eforts to establish a func-
tional television service that brought clear and steady black-and-white pictures to the
public on a regular basis. Second, it wil look at various stations, their programming,
and the public’s reaction to “this new wonder.” Third, it wil review both primary
printed sources and recent scholarly research in order to present a brief synthetic
overview of the pre-1950 history of the medium. Television with high-quality recog-
nizable pictures and regularly scheduled broadcasting was achieved in the late 1930s.
Great Britain, Germany, and the United States led the industry, folowed by France,
the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan. In al of these countries limited experiments were
conducted and sporadic broadcasts aired. The method used in each country’s sys-
tem in the later half of the 1930s was completely electronic. That is, the studio or
other program images were scanned by an electronic camera, transmited, and then
received by cathode ray (picture tube) television receivers. Television today works
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under these same principles, albeit using many improvements such as color, stereo
sound, and closed captioning.
Before this modern, al-electronic system was developed, mechanical systems
had been utilized. Based on series of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
inventions by such luminaries as Alexander Graham Bel, Paul Nipkow, C. Frances
Jenkins, and John L. Baird, these mechanical systems used spinning discs with a
spiral of holes passing in front of an electric eye to create a scanned image. The
pulses were transmited and received by a bulky set that used a disc with an identical
spiral and a flickering neon bulb. The discs in both the studio’s camera and in the
receiving set would run at the same speed. The receivers produced images with any-
where from 30 to 60 lines of resolution—1 line per hole in the scanning spiral of the
disc. In comparison to the 525 lines used by American television today, this was,
needless to say, a very blurry and low-definition picture. But between 1928 and 1933
the novelty was so great that sets were actualy sold and several businesses—mostly
existing radio stations—set up studios and broadcast crude programs.
The mechanical system ultimately failed because the novelty of its low-quality
pictures soon wore of. Low quality programming, with images that could not easily
be seen and often looked like silhouetes, could not sustain the sales of new sets nor
atract advertising dolars.1 By 1933, during the depths of the Great Depression, the
five-year experiment had come to an end as the last stations shut down their studios,
and many television pioneers went back to their laboratories. Indeed, by the end of
1930 RCA had already seen the writing on the wal:
Television must develop to the stage where broadcasting
stations wil be able to broadcast regularly visual objects in
the studio, or scenes occurring at other places through re-
mote control; where . . . these objects or scenes . . . [wil be]
. . . clearly discernible in milions of homes; where such
devices can be built upon a principle that wil eliminate ro-
tary scanning discs, delicate (temperamental) hand controls
and other moving parts . . . 2
Although many might view mechanical television as a “false start,” it laid much
of the necessary groundwork, especialy in studio design and programming con-
cepts, for the future method of al-electronic, higher definition television. “In many
ways, electronic television did not develop simply paralel to the mechanical method,
but often climbed upon its shoulders.”3
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Electronic television also climbed on the shoulders of radio broadcasting. It
comes as no surprise that British television became a state-run afair. Just as with the
BBC state-run radio, no advertising was used, and revenue came instead from the
listener and viewer who had to pay an annual licensing fee or tax to have their set.
The case was similar in Germany for radio, but whereas the British had managed to
sel about 20,000 television sets from 1936 to 1939 around the London area, the Nazi
government, under the auspices of the post ofice, chose not to sel sets to consum-
ers.4 Germans could watch television in Fernsehstuben—special dimly-lit TV viewing
theaters—located adjacent to several post ofices around the Berlin area.5
In the United States television operations were at first subsidized by the corpo-
rate proceeds of their parent organizations but with the final intention of introduc-
ing advertising, as with radio, when the FCC gave its approval. Thus companies like
RCA, GE, Philco, Dumont, or Zenith al ran television studios in the late 1930s and
early 1940s financed by the proceeds of their radio and electronics industries. A total
of nine television stations operated in the United States before its entry into World
War II. Each station was considered an investment in future technology, and no
profits were made until the late 1940s.
It is important to point out that, although in competition with each other,
much of the early television technology and patents were shared among the various
American companies, the British, and the Germans. One German technical journal
ilustrated how television cameras covered the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games.6  The
journal gives details of how both Vladimir Zworykin’s Iconoscope camera pick up
tube and Philo Farnsworth’s Image Dissector camera pick up tube were adopted and
operated in German cameras. In 1936 Zworykin, a Russian Jew, was working for RCA
labs and Farnsworth, a Utah Mormon, was working with Philco. Both would have
been persecuted for their religious and ethnic backgrounds in Nazi Germany, and
yet their inventions made television cameras possible in al countries.
It has been reasonably argued that the Third Reich used the 1936 Olympics as
a great propaganda stage. The presence of large Fernsehkanonen or “television can-
nons” at the side of the stadium’s track could not help but atract international pub-
lic atention due to their six-foot length. Although the al-electronic system had only
been perfected to 180 scanning lines of resolution,7 the Nazi government was eager
to get their new, stil-not-fuly-developed technical achievement into public view.
Whereas other countries confined their lower definition pictures and early experi-
ments of the mid-1930s to the laboratory, the Nazi propaganda machine was wiling
to parade the crude 180-line pictures before the public.
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The German system did improve, and by the fal of 1937 a 441-line system was
in operation.8 This standard remained in efect in Berlin until 1943, when the televi-
sion tower there was destroyed in an air raid. Even more surprising is the fact that
the Germans took their television system to occupied France. From 1942 until their
retreat in 1944 the Germans broadcast live programs (mostly cabarets), newsreels,
and short films from their confiscated French-made transmiter on the Eifel Tower.9
During the war both the Berlin and Paris transmiters were used almost exclusively
to televise programs for wounded soldiers.10 There were about five hundred French-
made and about a hundred German-made television sets in Parisian hospitals.11
In England the BBC operated a 405-line station at the Alexandra Palace in
northern London. Public programming started on 2 November 1936. The British
claim this to be “the world’s first regular public high definition television service.”12
The term “high definition” was used in contrast to the earlier low definition images
achieved by the defunct mechanical scanning systems. In many ways the BBC’s claim
is true. Although RCA and Philco in the United States were transmiting 343- and
441-line images from 1935 to 1938, the service was not yet public. No American sets
went on sale until 1939.  And the Germans, although they publicly demonstrated
their system, continued to broadcast at 180 lines until late 1937, which did not qualify
as “high definition” transmission. Because the British sold about twenty thousand
sets al tuned to their single station, their service was truly public. Sadly, the station
was ordered to shut down on 1 September 1939, at the outbreak of World War II.
Fear that the Luftwafe could use the BBC’s VHF transmiter as a homing beacon
prompted this move. The station remained of the air until 1946, but during the war
much of its staf remained busy as radar developers and technicians. Although Brit-
ain had only the one BBC television station in London, that station was an exem-
plary leader with many “firsts” in both programming as wel as live, remote coverage:
Between 1936 and 1939 the English television audi-
ence had seen variety, drama, music, and educational
programs from the television studios. They had seen
the Coronation procession of King George VI, plays
telecast directly from the stage of London theaters,
the English Derby from Epsom Downs, the Oxford-
Cambridge boat races, tennis at Wimbledon, and
many other outstanding events.13
What set the United States apart from the other nations involved with television
development was the fact that several competing companies with no governmental
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financing were involved. Whereas Germany, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union
had only one government-run station each, the United States had a total of nine on
the air shortly before and during the war; three in New York City, two each in Los
Angeles and Chicago, and one each in Philadelphia and Schenectady.
As noted before, most of these early television stations, both in Europe as
wel as in the United States, had already conducted experiments during the late
1920s and early 1930s using mechanical scanning disc systems. As the science de-
veloped and improved, these stations switched over to al-electronic systems and
concentrated on increasing both the number of lines and the rate of scanning to
improve the quality of the picture. The first al-electronic American systems in 1932
used only 120 scanning lines at twenty-four frames per second. This produced a
blurry image with visible, thick scanning lines and a noticeable amount of flicker.
RCA transmited from both their Camden, New Jersey, laboratories as wel as from
atop the Empire State Building to a handful of experimental television receivers
located within a few miles of both areas.14  Both Philo Farnsworth and the Philco
Corporation operated stations in Philadelphia. Philco placed its studio and trans-
miter right in its Tioga Street radio factory, and Farnsworth eventualy joined Philco.
In Los Angeles Don Lee operated a private TV station that paraleled these experi-
ments back east. He financed the operation from his nine-station radio network on
the West Coast.
The number of scan lines quickly increased to 240 lines in 1933, and a great
improvement was observed in 1934 when a system using 343 lines at thirty frames
was introduced by RCA. This 343-line system—and Philco’s slight variation of 345
lines—were the first to employ interlacing. By interlacing, first the odd numbered
lines are scanned and then the even ones are scanned. By interlacing and scanning
at the faster rate of thirty frames (or 30 complete scans of both odd and even lines),
al noticeable flicker is removed.
 The year 1936 marked the first public demonstrations of television. As al-
ready mentioned, the Germans televised the Olympic games of that year in Berlin
using their 180-line system and the English inaugurated their 405-line service. In the
United States RCA, Philco and Don Lee al started giving public demonstrations to
the press and various radio executives. It had commonly been thought up until this
time that television was a secret technology with many jealously guarded trade se-
crets and patents. It now became apparent that most of the patents were, in fact,
shared. Although several components were indeed patented or secured through
trade and purchase, it would have been as dificult to patent a television set or the
concept of television as it would have been to patent an automobile.
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The demonstrations of 1936 used the 343-line system and not more than 1000
people saw any of them. In July 1936 when RCA held its first demonstration exclusively
for radio executives, there were only three television receivers in the area15 outside
of those few in the studio. By November 1936 there were only about forty to fifty
experimental television sets in the New York area, and both Philadelphia and Los
Angeles had even fewer. Al public demonstrations were by invitation only, and from
1936 until the spring of 1939 the three pioneer television stations were literaly broad-
casting to themselves. When public demonstrations were given, it was usualy the
press, radio executives, and the FCC who were invited.
Not al the demonstrations went without criticism. Although the pictures were far
superior to the outdated mechanical scanning systems seen only a decade or less be-
fore, they were stil smal. “The greenish-hued pictures measured 7½ by 10 inches on a
screen caled ‘the largest yet employed which is capable of commercial adaptation.’”16
The smal “greenish-hued pictures” were a result of phosphors used in the early picture tube.
It was always noticed by even the most casual of observers, most of whom had grown
accustomed to large-screen black-and-white motion pictures. Although a green picture had
been fine for laboratory experiments, public displays were another mater. One re-
porter observed the improvement made by Philco in February 1937 in Philadelphia:
Also, the greenish tint that has characterized televi-
sion pictures in the majority of past demonstrations
has been overcome. Black and white advances
telepictures closer to the cinema, but television has a
long way to go to equal the movies in clarity. The
sound part of the television show, however, is already
equal to the best broadcast receivers . . . [and] the
pictures, now measure 7½ by 10 inches. There can be
no doubt that television must eventualy ofer larger
pictures to possess real entertainment value and to
lure the eye as do the movies.17
The brighter, larger pictures did not come until the early 1950s. The early
picture tubes were made of delicate glass and were limited to a smal size due to their
delicate structure, a vacuum, and risk of implosion. With few exceptions, a twelve-
inch diagonal picture was the largest available, and many sets used nine- and five-
inch tubes. Another reason early television may have failed to “lure the eyes as do the
movies” was because of early experimental production values. The same reporter
commented on this at an earlier demonstration made by RCA in November 1936:
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These modern television machines have entertainment
value, al who watch agree, but even during a forty-
minute demonstration it is noticed that spectators be-
come restless, especialy if an act is on the screen too
long. The eye is not as ea msy to entertain as the ear.18
He went on to write that newsreels and short films were the most popular
programs viewed. One can easily draw the conclusion that films were superior be-
cause they were previously edited and ready to show. Television performances, on
the other hand, were live and did not flow as smoothly as film for several reasons,
among them a lack of editing, too few cameras, long pauses, and lack of ability by
production staf to keep the action moving. What resulted were often stilted images
caused by not enough camera movements or changes. Viewers often saw the same
person standing or singing with no change for several minutes. Eventualy these
criticisms made by viewers, especialy newspaper reporters, were heeded, and the
production quality increased dramaticaly in the subsequent years as television be-
came available to the public.
Technical standards also improved. In late December 1936 Philco moved up
to 441 lines, folowed by RCA in January 1937 and Don Lee later that summer. This
441-line standard was adopted throughout the United States and remained in use
until 1 July 1941, when the 525-line standard, stil in use today, was adopted.
The original intent of these field tests and pioneering broadcasts was to estab-
lish a commercial television system. As the standards evolved, RCA and Dumont in
New York were especialy eager to manufacture and sel television sets. In 1939 RCA,
GE, Dumont, and a handful of others introduced the first sets for public sale in the
New York area. RCA, parent corporation of NBC at the time, announced that its
station would initiate a regular telecasting schedule commencing with the opening
of the New York World’s Fair on 30 April.19 With the gradual increase of the number
of television sets, the interest in broadcasting spread to other corporations. Philco,
which up to then only had conducted field tests, commited to a regular schedule in
October 1939. General Electric, which had previously conducted mechanical televi-
sion experiments in the 1920s, resumed broadcasting in Schenectady, New York, in
November 1939 using the new 441-line standard. GE pioneered television relay and
in 1940 joined RCA and Philco in the first network telecast—the Republican na-
tional convention in Philadelphia. The program was televised in Philadelphia by
Philco, relayed over a coaxial cable by AT&T to New York City, and broadcast there
by RCA’s NBC station. General Electric picked up the NBC signal on a huge, rhombic
antenna and retransmited the program in Schenectady. Other uses of this pioneering
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three-station network included coverage of King George VI’s visit to New York City,
parades, and sporting events.
Each station made a series of contributions to either the technology or studio
production techniques or to both. RCA and Dumont led in technology and pio-
neered many firsts in the production field. The iconoscope pick up tube was one of
the key devices used in most cameras until 1945, when RCA introduced the far more
sensitive image orthicon. General Electric developed studio lighting. CBS in New
York, WBKB (belonging to the Balaban and Katz theater chain) in Chicago, and
Don Lee in Los Angeles al developed studio production techniques. Lee started
sporadic broadcasts in the early 1930s, but maintained ten hours per week of live or
film programs as early as 1939.
Philadelphia’s Philco station added much to television circuitry technology,
and along with RCA’s NBC station in New York pioneered live remote coverage.20
Starting with the 1940 fal season Philco covered al home footbal games played by
the University of Pennsylvania at Franklin Field. It also placed cameras in Conven-
tion Hal, as previously mentioned, to cover the 1940 Republican national conven-
tion. Philco even instaled a camera and relay in the tower of City Hal and broadcast
the 1 January 1941, Mummers’ Parade.21 Although outdoor and remote coverage
was only for special events, the five hunderd to one thousand Philadelphians who
did have a television set during the early 1940s were able to enjoy about ten and later
twenty hours per week of programming, mostly consisting of films or amateur acts
from the studio.
New York City was the most active place for prewar and wartime television. Not
only did the city have a large, Broadway-based talent pool to draw from, but by 1941
it possessed three competing stations: CBS, NBC, and Dumont.
Thousands of set-owners throughout the world—in
London, Berlin, Los Angeles, and other major cities,
have witnessed television performances in their own
homes, but last Tuesday [1 July 1941], for the first
time in history, more than one program was available
to any television audience.22
The first of July 1941 also marked the FCC authorization of commercial televi-
sion and the ful conversion to the 525-line standard. Most of the nine stations were
now broadcasting over 20 hours per week and some had plans for expansion. Don
Lee had filed for a permit to build in San Francisco and NBC had plans to go on the
air in Washington, D.C., by 1 January 1942 and in Philadelphia by 1 June of that
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same year.23 Delays in paperwork and, more significantly, the United States entry
into the Second World War postponed those plans. The circumstance that commer-
cial service had started, however, and the fact that TV sets were being sold and exist-
ing stations were looking towards expansion and network-building al indicate that
television had finaly arrived.
Although World War II put American television on hold, it did not kil it. Sta-
tions were authorized to broadcast four hours of programming per week in an efort
to keep the fledgling industry alive. Further, they “did their part” in the war efort by
televising air raid drils, first aid lessons, military maneuvers, films, the occasional
sporting event, and live drama. The war brought many technological improvements
to television, mostly through radar and microwave developments. Starting in 1946
the number of stations and new television sets began to increase, and a boom fol-
lowed that lasted wel into the 1950s.
This is just an overview of television’s start. Although most of its prewar history
remains hidden from the general public’s eye, the sources do exist. More research
awaits, especialy in areas that may highlight some of the lesser-known ventures such
as the stations in Chicago, Los Angeles, or overseas. Each made their contribution
and thrived on each other’s competition. More importantly, they set the foundation
for what became nationwide and worldwide television.
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The Value of Chinese Immigrants During the Building of the
First American Transcontinental Railroad, 1852–1869
Grady Powel
In 1882 Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, barring Chinese immigra-tion to the United States. In the debate over the bil, two distinct political sides
emerged, both of which cited economic evidence to support their opinions. Exclu-
sionists in favor of the bil argued that Chinese immigrants depressed regional
wages and stole jobs from Euro-Americans. Opponents of the bil countered with
evidence of the industrial advancement made possible by Chinese labor and con-
tended that exclusion would only compound economic problems.
The economic discontent addressed by the bil originated in California, where
the majority of Chinese in America had immigrated in search of gold. California
was also home of the Central Pacific Railroad Company, the epitome of mid-nine-
teenth-century capitalism, and a firm that had employed 10,000 Chinese workers
during the building of the first American transcontinental railroad from 1865 to
1869. It was against such capitalist conglomerates and the Chinese they employed
that labor party leader Denis Kearney ralied a national exclusion campaign that
eventualy led to the Exclusion Act. But was exclusion of the Chinese economicaly
justifiable? While the answer in 1869 depended greatly upon how one felt about
the transcontinental railroad, contemporary labor theory suggests the Chinese did
not cause the economic disruption that angered native workers. Rather the Chi-
nese were a minority ethnic group falsely accused while the actual culprit, industri-
alization, went free.
Previous studies do support a claim that the Exclusion Act had litle economic
justification, but they do not ofer a clear application of basic economic theory to
Chinese immigration, nor do they show how this theory values Chinese participa-
tion in the labor market.1 This study wil use the modern labor theory of immigra-
tion economist George Borjas to evaluate the labor market impact of Chinese
immigration in California and to test the anti-Chinese claims that led to the Exclu-
sion Act.2 Borjas posits that although immigration harms some laborers, it may ulti-
mately result in a positive national economic return known as immigration surplus.
Immigration surplus occurs only under specific labor market conditions, conditions
that may be beter understood in light of a brief historical background of the Chi-
nese immigration to California and the building of the transcontinental railroad.
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Chinese Immigration
Chinese immigrants began to arrive in California en masse in 1852, four years after
gold was discovered in Coloma, California. Arriving in California they joined the
thousands of Americans and new European immigrants who had rushed west struck
with gold fever. Between 1850 and 1860 the state’s total white population increased
approximately 350 percent, from roughly 90,000 residents to over 320,000.3  The
gold rush was exceedingly welcome news in China, where, in the wake of the eco-
nomic ravages of opium and the Opium Wars (1840–1841, 1856–1860), the average
Chinese worker struggled to earn enough money to survive. These conditions made
the risk of leaving China against an imperial ban worthwhile to thousands of men
who could expect to earn a smal fortune for their families after a couple of years of
mining.4 To leave China, emigrants sailed to Hong Kong where they booked passage
to San Francisco, often on overcrowded merchant ships and mail steamers. Because
so many emigrants could not pay for their tickets abroad, they signed contracts with
mining companies that would deduct the cost of passage from future wages. Political
opponents of the Chinese later construed this contract labor system as “coolie” or
slave labor, but almost al Chinese came to America voluntarily.5 The rate at which
Chinese arrived in California fluctuated generaly with the prosperity of the mines,
but more immigrants arrived in 1852 (20,026) and 1854 (16,084) than in any of the
other years in the nineteenth century.6
Upon arrival in California the immigrants usualy went straight to the mines.
Although some did set up businesses to cater to their felow foreigners, by 1860
approximately 62 percent of the Chinese in California (24,282 out of 39,433) were
miners.7 The majority of mines in the 1850s and early 1860s were smal, easily acces-
sible placer mines that could be worked by individuals or by smal groups of men
using rudimentary equipment like picks, shovels, and pans. Water was the most es-
sential component, and although white miners initialy accepted Chinese immigrants
as their number increased along crowded riverbanks and streamsides, white hostility
against the Chinese grew. To avoid the violent conflicts that often erupted, Chinese
reworked mines white workers had abandoned.8 In addition to such racial preju-
dice, the Chinese faced discrimination arising from laws that protected the rights of
native white miners. In 1852 the California legislature levied a tax of three dolars
per month on Asian miners. A year later this tax was raised to four dolars, and in
1856 a bil was passed that increased the tax by two dolars every two years.9 Despite
these economic setbacks, many Chinese, wiling to work long days for relatively smal
profits, earned enough by mining to send money to their families back in China.
Widespread profitability did, however, continue until 1863 when mine depletion
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and several years of severe weather caused a mass exodus from surface mining. Chi-
nese and American miners alike flocked back to large cities like San Francisco and
Sacramento in search of work.
The Transcontinental Railroad
Work would be on its way, this time via the federal government, but Congress was stil
debating the amendment to a transcontinental railroad bil that would open up thou-
sands of jobs. On 6 May 1862, ten years after the first legislation was proposed, Con-
gress had passed the first Pacific Railroad Bil, ensuring federal financial support for
the construction of a railroad that would unite the east and west coasts. The bil
provided for the Central Pacific to build track eastward from Sacramento to the
California border and simultaneously organized the Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany to build westward from an undetermined location along the Missouri River.
The Central Pacific Railway Company was originaly organized by railway visionary
Theodore Judah, primarily to receive the expected federal bid to build the western
half of the railroad. The Central Pacific began construction as soon as the bil was
passed. By the end of 1863 it had built track eighteen miles eastward. Due to the
inception of the two railroad companies, costs of materials like iron rose signifi-
cantly and almost caused bankruptcy from the start. Further government action would
be necessary to relieve the companies’ capital constraints, and in 1863, while thou-
sands of miners were abandoning their exhausted claims, Congress was considering
how to efectively amend the bil.
The original bil appropriated funds for the construction of the railroad al-
most exactly according to a plan introduced by Judah. The government would grant
the railroad companies bonds valued at $16,000 per mile for track laid on flat land,
$32,000 for track laid across foothils, and $48,000 per mile for track laid across
mountainous terrain. The bonds would be issued after forty miles of acceptable track
had been laid. Furthermore, the Central Pacific would forgo its subsidies if it did not
complete fifty miles in the first two years and fifty miles each folowing year.10 The
corporations were also granted 6,400 acres of adjacent land per square mile and
mineral rights. To generate capital the companies were to sel bonds and were to
repay them later partly by transporting federal mail and troops to fight the Ameri-
can Indian Wars.
In 1864, Congress agreed on an amendment that alowed government bonds to
be issued upon construction of twenty- instead of forty-mile sections of railroad. The
amendment also reduced the par value of stock from $1000 to $100, doubled land
grants, and permited the Central Pacific to build further east to an unspecified loca-
tion.11 The bil’s vagueness in distinguishing beginning and ending points for the
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railroad would engage the two railroad companies in a race for profit, a competition to
see who could build the most track and secure the most federal bonds. So the Central
Pacific was in a hurry to get construction underway. Immediately after the state of
California agreed to purchase 1,500 Central Pacific bonds for $1.5 milion on 2 Janu-
ary 1865, J. H. Stobridge, the Central Pacific’s construction superintendent, sent across
the country advertisements for 5,000 white laborers to start building the railroad.12
The Central Pacific and the Chinese, 1865–1869
Unfortunately for Stobridge only 800 half-hearted workers responded, hardly enough
to start construction. The undersupply of workers was in part due to the high wages
prevailing in the mining industry, a condition that was compounded by the general
dificulty workers had in migrating west. It was the Chinese in California left unem-
ployed by the mining exodus that would eventualy fil the gap, but both Charles
Crocker, a partner and construction supervisor, and Stobridge were hesitant to hire
any Chinese. They feared they would drive of white workers and would be unable to
bear the physical strain. Workers were necessary to continue though, and when a
group of Irishmen threatened to strike, Stobridge agreed to hire fifty Chinese for a
trial period. The trial proved a success, and over the next four years the Central
Pacific relied primarily on Chinese labor to build the railroad. In 1869 Chinese em-
ployment peaked at 80 percent of the company’s 12,500-man workforce.13 On the
line Chinese were initialy employed at menial tasks, but after their assimilation to
railroad work they were assigned more dificult and dangerous jobs.
Immigration Labor Theory
The Chinese were essential for building the railroad, but from an economic perspec-
tive, it was their impact on the native labor market that is most important and the
hot question that led to exclusion. Borjas’s immigration surplus theory atempts to
quantify the efect immigrants have on a native economy. His model is based on the
basic law of supply and demand but extends to consider “al of the possible channels
through which immigration transforms the economy.”14 Borjas stresses, “the skil
composition of the immigrant population—and how the skils of immigrants compare to
those of natives—determine the social and economic consequences of immigration
for the country.”15 The model measures how immigrants afect national gross domestic
product, or GDP. While GDP data was not recorded in the nineteenth century, the
essential components of the model remain historicaly applicable.
Basic labor market analysis begins with an understanding of the supply and
demand for labor. In a competitive labor market firms’ demand for labor may be
calculated by the number of workers they wish to hire at a given wage rate. Firms
hire workers at a wage rate equal to the value of the productivity of the last worker
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they hire, or the value of the marginal product (VMP). Due to the law of diminishing
returns to labor, a firm stops hiring workers when the value of a worker’s productiv-
ity drops below the cost of hiring the worker. Therefore, in a static market, al work-
ers are paid a wage equal to the VMP of the last worker. How immigration afects this
equilibrium market depends on the skil level of the immigrants.
Immigrants are substitutes to native labor when their skil levels match those
of natives. Substitute immigration redistributes wealth from “native workers who
compete with immigrants to those who hire and use immigrant services.”16 This oc-
curs in a series of sequential events. When substitute immigrants enter a country,
competition for the number of available jobs increases. Average worker wages conse-
quently fal because workers choose to accept less pay in order to secure scarce jobs.
A drop in worker wages means less labor costs for firms that, in turn, realize greater
profits. Increased revenue to firms tends to drive product prices down. Lower prices
pass benefits on to natives who consume immigrant products and services. Although
native workers who compete with the immigrants do lose income, firms and consumers
reap greater benefits, and the nation as a whole experiences surplus of spending power.
These efects of substitute immigration, however, occur only in the short-run.
In the long run firms and workers have time to react to changes in the labor market,
a process Borjas describes as voting with their feet. For example, if one firm is highly
profitable in a region where immigration has lowered the cost of labor, then more
firms wil relocate to that region. More firms, however, cause an increase in demand
for workers, and wages are driven back up. Native workers also vote with their feet,
moving away from regions where wages are depressed, again causing an increase in
wages due to decreased competition for jobs. This reactionary behavior theoreticaly
difuses the impact of immigration across the nation and “in the end natives may
neither be beter of nor worse of because of immigration.”17 An immigration sur-
plus may exist temporarily before al market participants have had time to adjust their
behavior according to changes in the market. The question then remains; does immi-
gration have any enduring impact on a native economy? Borjas posits, “Immigration
surplus arises only when immigrants are suficiently diferent from natives.”18
Immigrants whose skils do difer significantly from those of natives are comple-
mentary to native labor. Complementary immigrants cause an increase in native
wages due to specialization. Specialization occurs when generaly less skiled immi-
grants replace skiled native workers who occupy unskiled jobs. As more unskiled
immigrants arrive, the demand for skiled workers, like supervisors, increases. Na-
tive laborers therefore leave unskiled jobs and essentialy become more productive
as they fil newly-created skiled jobs that command a higher wage. For example, an
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experienced native factory worker becomes more valuable to a firm when it begins
to hire inexperienced immigrants. The native worker might be promoted to train or
manage new workers and would most likely be paid more. Unlike substitute immi-
gration, complementary immigration transfers wealth from the firm owners, who
now pay a higher wage, to the native workers, who now earn more. The firm also
experiences an increase in productivity because al workers produce at a level closer
to their ful-skil capacity. Increased productivity leads to economic growth, poten-
tial jobs, and greater wealth for a majority of market participants.
To summarize Borjas’s theory, the economic impact of immigrants depends
on the degree to which their skils difer from those of natives. If immigrants are
substitutes to native labor then natives as a whole wil experience a short run surplus.
Owners who employ immigrants and consumers of immigrant services benefit while
native workers who compete with the immigrants lose income. This surplus, how-
ever, theoreticaly dissipates as firms relocate to the region where labor is least expen-
sive. In the case of complement immigration, the native country experiences an enduring
surplus due to worker specialization. Specialization creates more wealth to distribute
throughout the native country by increasing worker productivity. Although firms suf-
fer short-term profit loss, in the long run everyone potentialy benefits.
In 1998 Borjas estimated that the immigration surplus in America was about
$8 bilion, or less than a $30 increase in the yearly income of each native-born per-
son.19 He stressed that this surplus was nearly insignificant, concluding that the na-
tional economic impact of immigration is minimal. Two important factors weighed
heavily on Borjas’s 1998 calculation: not every labor market participant responded
to recent changes in the market, and immigrant workers filed diferent roles in the
economy, some as substitutes and some as complements to native workers. Any num-
ber of individual stories could be told, and Borjas admits:
In the end, any interpretation of statistical correlations between
immigration and the labor market outcomes of native workers . .
. requires a story. This story would indicate how immigration al-
ters the economic environment, and thereby afects the employ-
ment opportunities of particular groups of native workers.20
In appreciating the value of Chinese immigrant labor, it is important to under-
stand both the theory and the story to which it is applied.
The story of the Chinese employed by the Central Pacific actualy begins in 1852
when the first Chinese arrived in California. The immigrants were relatively unskiled
working-age males who had never worked on a railroad and could not speak English.
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By 1870 Chinese immigrants made up about 10 percent of California’s population but
nearly 25 percent of the labor force.21 While the number of immigrants is significant,
Borjas is chiefly concerned with how their skils compare with those of natives. Were
Chinese immigrants substitutes or complements to native railroad workers?
The Chinese as Complements
An analysis of the Central Pacific’s work force before and after the entrance of Chi-
nese immigrants in 1865 clearly shows that the Chinese were complements. First,
consider the impact of Chinese on the demand for native workers. In a Congres-
sional hearing caled to address the immigration issue, Stobridge testified, “white
labor increased very much after introducing Chinese labor.” The number of white
workers on the payrol increased from 800 to over 2,000.22 More white laborers came
to the railroad because the Central Pacific needed more skiled workers and in order
to get them was wiling to ofer higher wages. Unskiled white workers earned $35 a
month plus room and board (Chinese only earned $31 a month) while skiled white
workers could earn between $74 and $130 per month.23 This is a direct result of
specialization, and in his testimony Stobridge exemplifies how it occurred: “We made
foremen of the most inteligent of the white men, teamsters and hostlers.”24 Prior to
the employment of immigrants these workers performed unskiled tasks that were
eventualy dominated by the Chinese.
While Seward goes so far as to say, “the white man in California wil prove
himself able to outdo his competitor in almost al, if not absolutely al, the fields of
rivalry,” the Chinese actualy equaled the productivity level of white workers in al
except for the most technical tasks, such as carpentry, masonry, and driving teams of
horses.25 The general physical stature of European workers alone distinguished them
for the heaviest work, and the Chineses’ lack of adequate English made organizing
technical work, such as designing a bridge, dificult. This evidence suggests that the
Chinese were considered less skiled than the white native workers and were there-
fore complements, a conclusion supported by the increase in demand for native
labor and in native wage rates. The complementary relationship between Chinese
immigrants and native white workers increased productivity of the Central Pacific
and generated more wealth for the entire railroad industry. In this case railroad
workers benefited relatively more than the railroad owners, who sacrificed profits to
pay higher wages to specialized white workers.
This final conclusion is not readily apparent because the owners of the Central
Pacific, nicknamed the Big Four, accrued fortunes from their railroad investments.
According to complement immigration theory they should have profited less due to
increased wages, and in relative terms, they did. The Central Pacific owners would
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have profited more had the Chinese immigrants been substitutes to the white na-
tives. Al workers would have been more productive, and skiled worker wages would
have been lower. Instead the owners lost potential profits in amounts that do not
compare with the actual profits realized. These capitalists and other big business
owners in similar labor markets understandably argued that the Chinese were abso-
lutely necessary to the growth of the California economy. Richard G. Sneath, presi-
dent of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, claimed, “Without Chinese labor,
I don’t think there would have been half of the material wealth in this state.”26 In
1862 the editors of the Sacramento Union, a major California newspaper, viewed Chi-
nese as a “positive element that resulted in widened and multiplied forms of labor
for whites” and often defended their economic role.27
Argument for Exclusion—The Chinese as Substitutes
Native laborers and smal producers on the other hand argued for the exclusion of
Chinese, claiming they depressed wages and displaced native workers.28 Early on
these workers had the support of the California legislature, which passed legislation
like the 1862, “Act to Protect Free White Labor Against Competition With Chinese
Coolie Labor, and to Discourage the Immigration of the Chinese into the State of
California.” This act levied a capitation tax of $2.50 per month on most Chinese
residents.29 Further racial prejudice stereotyped Chinese as enemies of native work-
ers. “As soon as the Pacific Railroad is completed” a journalist in Chicago’s Workingman’s
Advocate wrote in 1869, “Chinamen wil begin to swarm through the Rocky mountains.
. . . Men who can work a dolar a day. . . are a dangerous element in our country.”30 Such
anti-Chinese sentiments were widespread in America up to 1869.
Economic theory has shown, however, that native railroad wages were not de-
pressed but inflated. So on what economic ground did the agitated anti-Chinese
workers stand? Racial prejudice was certainly a catalyst, but the fact that anti-Chinese
fervor fluctuated in response to the strength of the California economy points to the
actual cause of native unrest. During the building of the transcontinental railroad
there were few colective uproars against Chinese labor. The California economy was
relatively stable, and the Central Pacific employees were far from any population
centers. In 1869, however, a minor recession struck causing mass unemployment
among generaly skiled white workers. This recession was closely folowed by the
completion of the railroad and the subsequent release of thousands of Chinese work-
ers, who again returned to the cities. The Chinese though were not a cause of the
recession but rather a visible minority caught in the middle of large shifts in the
national economy. California was rapidly industrializing, and advancements in manu-
facturing technology had reduced the value of skiled labor. The falout in demand
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for skiled workers was especialy apparent in the mining industry where ownership
of mines had shifted from independent placer miners to large companies that could
aford capital to purchase heavy digging equipment.31 The machines replaced the
skiled workers and made room for more unskiled workers. So while many skiled
white workers lost their jobs, Chinese immigrant wages actualy increased.32
The fact that large manufacturers employed these Chinese did not escape
Denis Kearney. In a fiery 1877 speech to the Workingmen’s Party of California, he
made an important emotional connection between Chinese labor and the growing
capitalist economy: “The capitalists who employ Chinese are robbing the working
people with their system.” Kearney carried his “Chinese Must Go!” campaign nation-
wide, rounding up vote-seeking politicians who would eventualy press the Chinese
Exclusion Act.33 It was this direct connection of Chinese workers to the evolving
capitalist economy that was the economic basis of the anti-Chinese argument. The
problem was compounded by the close association of the Chinese with the Central
Pacific, the epitome of capitalism in the 1860s and 1870s due to “its virtual mo-
nopoly, . . . its gargantuan land grants, its incomparable economic power and politi-
cal influence, and its rising revenue amidst general economic downswing, [which]
made it a fiting target of social protests.”34 Native workers were sufering not at the
hand of Chinese immigrants but rather at the invisible hand of capitalism.
Troubleshooting
These conclusions do ofer a modern perspective on the economic issues of the
Chinese Exclusion Act, but we must keep in mind how diferent the modern Ameri-
can economy is from that of 1869. The most significant diference lies in labor mo-
bility. Borjas’s model assumes that participants in the labor market are able to vote
with their feet, therefore difusing the economic efects of immigration in one par-
ticular region throughout the national economy. During the building of the trans-
continental railroad, however, few firms could aford to relocate, and few workers
could aford to move, mostly because passage west was so dificult—a problem the
transcontinental railroad would soon aleviate. Similarly, limited communication in
the nineteenth century prevented more immediate responses to labor market fluc-
tuations. The cost of transportation and communication kept not only workers and
capital from flowing into California but also present workers and capital from leav-
ing.35 So had there been competition between Chinese and native workers, wage
depression and native job displacement would have been more severe in 1869 than
is shown by the data and observations Borjas’s model is based on.
A lack of federal market regulation in the 1860s is another significant difer-
ence. It alowed the formation of a unique railroad industry in which the Central
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Pacific acted as a partial monopolistic monopsony, or a firm without competition for
its product or its workers. Another peculiarity was the company’s labor supply of
immigrants. At times it was nearly inelastic, meaning a large drop in wages would not
afect the number of workers wiling to work. This occurred due to the dificulty
Chinese workers had in leaving the railroad labor camps. Once workers had traveled
a hundred miles along the railroad bed there was nowhere to go, regardless of work-
ing conditions. In the one instance when Chinese workers went on strike, Crocker
suspended rations for a week until the hungry strikers finaly gave in.36 An ironic
consequence of the monopsony firm and an inelastic labor supply is that, although
immigrant workers did receive lower wages than their white counterparts, the Cen-
tral Pacific paid higher wages to Chinese workers than did any other industry.37 This
unique market structure, now prohibited by federal anti-trust laws, alowed the Cen-
tral Pacific to employ the most eficient means of production despite economic and
human rights violations. Remarkably the entire project was completed seven years
ahead of schedule, on 10 May 1869 at Promontory Summit, Utah.
Conclusion
The completion of the first transcontinental railroad marked a new era in America’s
industrializing economy, one that would bring more opposition to the Chinese who
helped facilitate its growth. The Chinese immigrants who worked on the Central
Pacific railroad were complements to native railroad workers, and their labor al-
lowed native workers to realize higher wages through specialization. Market special-
ization stimulated the expansion of the railroad industry and the west coast economy.
Furthermore, the Chinese played an irreplaceable role in the construction of the
transcontinental railroad not only by providing their labor at a discounted wage but
also by working under extremely harsh conditions. While whites handled much of
the skiled labor, Chinese immigrants risked their lives and died to complete the
hardest sections of the railroad. Their most courageous work was done while scaling
the Sierra Nevada Mountains where they blasted roadbed along sheer clifs, tun-
neled through solid granite in severe winter conditions, and cleared miles of forests
and rocks to make way for the railroad that would later be heralded as the “greatest
engineering feat of the nineteenth century.”38 When blasting the summit tunnel of
the Sierra Nevadas, Chinese workers were put up against a team of imported Cor-
nish workers. Although the Cornish workers were paid wage premiums, the Chinese
accomplished more on a daily basis.39 This is an example of the real contribution the
Chinese made to the railroad, a contribution Leland Stanford, governor of California
and Central Pacific partner, stood by: “Without Chinese it would have been impos-
sible to complete the western portion of this great National highway.”40
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The railroad also brought more capital to California, and it aggravated griev-
ances of the labor movement against the Chinese. Kearney and his Workingmen’s
Party proposed “to rid the country of cheap Chinese labor . . . by al the means in
our power,” and they did.41 In 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed on a wave
of unjustified economic claims that Chinese laborers were substitutes to native labor.
The Chinese were scapegoats for the economic depression in California—a depres-
sion that folowed the building of the first American transcontinental railroad and
was caused by a reduction in the demand for skiled labor due to industrialization.
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The Memory Palace of Lorenzo Johnson:
Pedagogy and the Art of Memory in the Nineteenth Century
Kevin Brooks Sheets
In 1846 Lorenzo Johnson published Memoria Cyclopedia, a manual for the art ofmemory.1 His book included techniques to help the student and autodidact memo-
rize mountains of information. The memory system that he advocated would, he
said, help individuals remember such facts as the birth years and ages at death of al
the founding fathers and the reigns of the kings and queens of England.2 His tech-
nique used a system of sounds and articulations. He assigned numbers to each of the
sounds of the English language. Thereby the numbers in a date, for instance, could
be translated into their corresponding sound. From the sounds Johnson devised a
simple phrase that reminded him of the event in question. For example, the sounds
corresponding to 4-0-0-4 were, respectively, Re-Ze-Ze-Re from which Johnson con-
structed the phrase: “Arose the Sire.” Hence, anyone desiring to remember the al-
leged biblical date of creation could simply recal the litle phrase which reminded
him of God’s sovereignty, translate the sounds into their corresponding numbers,
and arrive at 4004 B.C.
While Johnson’s system seems cumbersome and labored, it nevertheless sug-
gests the importance of memory training to nineteenth-century Americans. Johnson
went on to write Memoria Technica, a manual for students, a year after Memoria
Cyclopedia appeared.3 No doubt he knew that the pedagogy in schools emphasized
the ability of a student to memorize. Indeed, the recitation, by which a student re-
cited the previous day’s lessons, was the most common feature of the nineteenth-
century classroom.4 That education emphasized such skils reveals quite a bit about
educators’ notions of the brain’s physiology. Johnson himself seems to have shared
their ideas. His memory system therefore provides an inviting glimpse into the nine-
teenth-century science of the mind.5
Johnson’s art of memory depended on two things: the “vivid impression” and
“association.” The ability to recal an event or other miscelaneous fact was, as he said,
“in proportion to the strength of the impression it makes on the mind.”6 Memoriza-
tion depended on how sensitive the mind’s retentive faculty was. The stronger the
impression a fact or event made, the more likely it was that the mind would retain it.
Consequently his system’s goal was to discover the “surest method of deriving the
most vivid impression of al that we wish to retain.”7 Johnson meant by impression a
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mental picture or some visual association. Hence the image of God in His glory
rising to His majestic heights was a potent image that triggered a catchphrase (“Arose
the Sire”) which, when translated, revealed the date of creation.
To ilustrate his system of impression and association, Johnson constructed a
memory palace, a mental visual world organized into what he caled “rooms.”8 Two
rooms, one upon the other, each included four wals, a floor, and ceiling. He divided
each into nine spaces, and each space was numbered. To help remember a space’s
position, Johnson contrived a series of “prompters and symbols.” Using the system of
articulations that was the key to his entire system, he assigned “tidy quail” to the first
space on the first wal. The “te” and “de” sounds both represent one in his system, so
“tidy” indicated that the quail was to be found in the first space on the first wal.
Similarly, “shot eagle” indicated 61, or the first space on the sixth wal, the sixth wal
being in the Upper Room directly above the first wal in the Lower Room. (The “sh”
sound representing 6 and the “te” sound, again, representing 1). Johnson insisted
that for the system to work, the symbols had to be made “perfectly familiar.”9 The
dividends for such training were “paid” in improved memory ability. For example,
Johnson ilustrated that in order to remember that Philadelphia had the nation’s
second largest population, one need only associate a “new cricket” with the city,
perhaps by visualizing a cricket hopping along the city’s famous Market St. or by
having Wiliam Penn, the city’s founder, seated atop a cricket. The numeric corre-
spondence for “new” was 2; in Johnson’s memory palace, he placed a cricket in the
second space on the floor. Hence, a “new cricket” was always associated with 2. By
imagining a “new cricket” participating in the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional con-
vention, for example, one could instantly recal that the city ranked second in popu-
lation.10 The memory palace, outfited with al manner of crickets, ladders, quails,
and larks organized into their proper spaces, provided a mental map for arranging
information for quick recal.
No doubt there was a parlor game quality to demonstrations of astounding
recal, but memorization was esteemed more for its instructional value than for en-
tertainment. Johnson’s system, while complex and exhausting, nevertheless reminds
us of the value educators atached to such skils. It is worth noting that Caroline
Goodale’s education at the Newton Normal School (Massachusets) in the late 1840s
emphasized mastery of facts. The journal that she kept during the spring and sum-
mer of 1849 records the lectures she heard and the lessons she was taught. She
reported in May that her “geography lessons are very interesting; Miss Henderson
described Connecticut to us today.” In June she enjoyed a lecture on mahogany.
Later, her teacher described to her class the physical features of North America and
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explained the derivation of the name of its sister continent in the hemisphere. “It
was caled South America,” she learned, “because it is south of North America.”11
One probably did not need a memory system like Johnson’s to master such facts, but
that schools taught this way reveals the extent to which they esteemed an education
of information. Not surprisingly, the demonstrations Johnson used to recommend
his system included memorizing facts: the year of coronation of each of the English
monarchs, for example.
Memory training was an important element of nineteenth-century pedagogy.12
Teachers in common schools as wel as in coleges taught by using the recitation.
There were obvious practical benefits to recommend it. In the common school class-
room of the early republic, as Carl Kaestle indicates, teachers resorted to memoriza-
tion because it helped them keep order in the class. Students worked quietly
memorizing passages from their reader in order to recite them before the class when
caled upon.13 Lines of poetry, rules of grammar, and passages from the Latin and
Greek classics were learned by this method. Wiliam Gardiner Hammond, a student
at Amherst in the 1840s, described the routine used in his Latin class. “The students
sit in alphabetical order,” he began, and the rol is caled at the commencement to
see if al are present. As one or another is caled by the tutor, he rises in his seat and
goes on til the tutor bids him stop. The tutor marks each recitation with a number
denoting its degree of merit, and the general average of these setles the student’s
standing. But this is kept secret from them.14
In the 1880s Wiliam Lyon Phelps described a similarly leaden experience in
Greek. Boys recited their translations of Homer while the professor acknowledged
their progress. Having spent a year in the “monotonous routine” translating parts of
the Iliad, Phelps said the instructor surprised him when he ended the semester by
saying, “again without any emphasis, ‘The Poems of Homer are the greatest that
have ever proceeded from the mind of man, class is dismissed,’ and we went out into
the sunshine.”15 Harvard students in the 1820s made similar complaints. One said
that the “teacher was there, not to teach, but to give marks to each student.”16 The
recitation was essentialy a passive exercise for the instructor. He merely listened to
hear if a student stumbled.
 Historians have been inclined to use the complaints of students to indict the
pedagogy of memorization common to nineteenth-century schools. Indeed the repu-
tation of nineteenth-century education sank low in the next century as “progressives”
like John Dewey disparaged rote training in favor of more active learning models.17
Writing in the 1950s Richard Hofstadter characterized the era of the antebelum col-
lege as a “great retrogression” because of its moribund curriculum and its emphasis on
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the rote memorization of Latin and Greek classics.18 Consequently, historians have
looked back with a bemused glance at the poor lads of the nineteenth century who
endured such a harrowing and sufocating experience.19 In this context Lorenzo
Johnson looks less like a serious educator and more like a Barnum curiosity on dis-
play at the American Museum between the Feejee mermaid and General Tom Thumb.
Tossing Johnson’s memory system onto the dusty relic shelf of a historical
society, however, misses the point. Memory matered to nineteenth-century educa-
tors, and not merely because it kept students silent. Memorization served a legiti-
mate educational function and was in keeping with the expectation
nineteenth-century educators entertained about the purpose of education. It is hu-
bris to suggest that nineteenth-century educators emphasized the recitation (with its
reliance on rote memorization) because they were not clever enough to imagine
anything else. Rather, they esteemed memory training because they saw such skils as
compatible with an essential educational goal: to “furnish the mind” with useful
knowledge.
Educational reformers and polemicists spoke often about “furnishing the
mind,” a pregnant phrase they used to depict their pedagogical aim. Jaspar Adams,
the newly-instaled president of Geneva Colege, urged his students in 1828 “to fur-
nish your minds with useful learning.”20 Educators envisioned the mind as an empty
room into which knowledge would flow. Knowledge became part of a boy’s “mental
furniture,” said Rev. Joshua Jones, principal of King Wiliam’s Colege in the Isle of
Man. It helped him to “expand and invigorate his mental powers.”21 Beginning with
a Lockean blank slate, a boy pursued education to stock his mind with an inventory
of useful facts. Of course, determining what knowledge was of most worth became
the topic of considerable debate. One essayist worried that if the mind was not filed
with “valuable furniture, it wil be crowded with lumber, it wil be the repository of
trifles, of vanities, and perhaps of vices.”22 He urged boys to study the Latin and
Greek classics. In any event, the impetus was to fil the empty vessel with knowledge,
and a sure way to accomplish that task was to train the memory.
Johnson was versed in the language of “mental furniture.” His language reso-
nated with the psychology of the mind common among nineteenth-century educators.
He wrote of the mind’s “retentive faculties” and about the importance of “impressions”
being made upon it.23 Yet, while the mind became a warehouse for knowledge, it also
actively organized the information it gathered. A person’s ability to remember bits of
poetry and Latin tags picked up from Cicero could be strengthened. The mind was
often likened to a muscle; exercise made it stronger.24 Johnson believed that this tech-
nique provided the “workout” necessary for the mind’s continued growth.
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The importance of such an efort cannot be overemphasized. Formal institu-
tions, including the schools and coleges, and informal pursuits of knowledge both
cultivated the skil of memorization. The use of commonplace books is entirely un-
derstandable in this context. In the colonial period and wel into the nineteenth
century, students and self-improvers relied on the commonplace book to record
quotations they liked and wished to use later. The pursuit of knowledge represented
the efort of individuals to atain the distinguishing marks of a gentleman or lady.
Their key characteristic, besides their moral grounding, was their sociability, a trait
most easily demonstrated in the art of conversation. Young men and women vied for
reputations among the drawing room set, and they cultivated their memories to
supply themselves with afternoon eloquence. A person was judged by how wel in-
formed he or she was.
Richard Bushman has linked the wholesale consumption of printed material
in the antebelum period with the cultural imperative to become “respectable.” As
he notes, the fictional Captain Truck was quite taken by his hostesses’ familiarity
with ships. “The cultivated person,” Bushman said, “knew something of virtualy ev-
erything.”25 Similarly, Joseph F. Ket links the same impulse to self-culture or self-
improvement.26 Young men, for instance, joined literary societies and debating clubs
and atended lyceum lectures in the hope of adding to their stock of knowledge. As
Ket suggests, it was the display of learning that motivated such young men as Isaac
Mickle Jr. As a member of the Washington Library Society in the 1830s Mickle en-
gaged in self-improvement by reading. In his diary he recorded useful quotations
that he might later employ in his own writing.27 Such motivation to respectability
and self-culture encouraged young men and women to cultivate the powers of memo-
rization. Their reputation for amiability depended on the efortlessness of their con-
versation.
While memorization was important to the art of conversation, its use in the nine-
teenth century was tied to the larger purposes of education. Education was about mas-
tering the stock of the world’s knowledge, or at least the choicest bits of wisdom that
comprised the elements of civilization.28 Consequently, an educated person was one
who had mastered the store of knowledge that other educated persons considered
worth knowing. It is teling that prior to the twentieth-century reform of colege re-
quirements, a bachelor of arts degree implied that its holder had mastered the classical
curriculum. Often caled the “cultural degree” by its partisans, the B.A. denoted a per-
son with broad learning in the arts and sciences, an educated person in the sense that
one knew certain things.29 (By contrast, B.A. degrees since the early-twentieth century
have been conferred on individuals who have accrued the requisite number of “credit
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hours.”) As education became identified more with time spent sharpening intelec-
tual skils and less about mastering specific bodies of knowledge, the importance of
memorization declined.30 This is to suggest not that memorization is irrelevant to
contemporary educational schemes but only that the context that privileged memo-
rization in the nineteenth century has evaporated.
Lorenzo Johnson’s memory system, while curious to our modern sensibility,
was perfectly in keeping with the goals of nineteenth-century educators. Memory
training was more than a novelty; it aided the student and autodidact. Schoolteachers
imparted knowledge by requiring students to memorize their textbooks and recite
lessons in front of their coleagues. The point was not to torture them but to “furnish
their minds” with knowledge. It was a goal shared by self-improvers who pursued knowl-
edge on their own. Such men and women embraced the art of memory because they
needed such skils to help them accumulate information they could use in social
setings. As respectability included the afability demonstrated by one’s easy but in-
formed conversation, they would have found a system such as Johnson’s to be more
help than hindrance. It is perhaps teling that we have made into a “trivial pursuit”
the knowledge of miscelaneous fact that Johnson esteemed. His contemporaries no
doubt used such miscelany as the “mental furniture” of a wel-appointed mind.
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 The Emperor’s New Clothes: President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,
the 1968 Student Movement, and the Crisis of Mexico’s
Institutionalized Revolution
Julia Sloan
The “hegemony of the state is also exactly what is most fragile about the state,precisely because it does depend on people living what they much of the time
know to be a lie. . . . ‘hegemony’ is the intelectual equivalent of the emperor’s new
clothes.”1
The popular children’s story about an unsuspecting emperor duped by an
unscrupulous tailor into thinking he had a fine new set of clothes is loosely analo-
gous to the political situation in Mexico in 1968. Like the fabled emperor, the youth
of Mexico had been led to believe something that turned out to be false. They had
been led to believe that their president and their government embodied the prom-
ise of the Revolution of 1910 and continualy endeavored to make that promise a
reality for al Mexicans. When the politics of one man, President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,
laid bare the dichotomy between this closely held belief and the true nature of every-
day Mexican life in the 1960s, the hegemonic discourse of institutionalized revolu-
tion that sustained the post-revolutionary state became as transparent as the emperor’s
new clothes. When this happened, the stage was set for a crisis.
That crisis came in the summer of 1968 when tens of thousands of university
students, joined by representatives of several other sectors of Mexican society, took
to the streets to protest the authoritarian nature of the Diaz Ordaz regime. This
movement lasted for months and culminated in a brutal massacre by government
forces of an estimated four hundred students in a public plaza just ten days prior to
the opening of the Olympic Games in Mexico City. To comprehend the gravity of
the situation, the level of student disilusionment, and the threat posed to the legiti-
macy of the Mexican state, we must juxtapose the values of Mexican revolutionary
nationalism with the character and conduct of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.
Implicit in the Mexican political system was a belief in progress through revo-
lution, whether violent or institutionalized. In the decades after the armies had laid
down their weapons, progress through revolution came to mean change undertaken
through government action based on the ideals of 1910 to achieve what years of
violence had failed to accomplish, namely social justice for al Mexicans. To that
end, the “revolutionary family” fashioned a corporatist state in which key sectors of the
Mexican population were brought into the government and given a vested interest in
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its success. The peasantry and the working classes were central to this new corporate
government, much as they had been to the course and character of the Revolution
itself. Thus, much of the nationalistic rhetoric extoling the idea of institutionalized
revolution concerned the historic role of these two traditionaly oppressed groups and
the commitment of the Mexican government to create for them a brighter future.2
The progress toward this brighter future encountered a series of stumbling
blocks from the late 1950s through the 1960s as the political climate in Mexico
changed. After reaching new heights of revolutionary nationalism in the mid-1930s
and folowing a series of significant reforms that helped to legitimize the idea of
institutionalized revolution, Mexico had entered a period of prosperity in the 1940s
known as the economic miracle. During this boom revolutionary idealism had given
way to fiscal conservatism as the leadership of the ruling party shifted toward the
right and away from the foundations of its popular support. When the economic
miracle began to wane during the late 1950s and early 1960s, public discontent with
the government began to increase, as did conflict within the ruling party itself. Gustavo
Diaz Ordaz situated himself squarely in the conservative, anti-reformist wing of the
party, which put economic concerns above social programs, courted foreign invest-
ment, and suppressed labor agitation.3 Though these eforts eventualy would make
Diaz Ordaz one of the most reviled men in Mexico, they first made him one of the
most powerful.
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz’s career as a conservative politician had begun long be-
fore he assumed the presidency in 1964. Born into a prominent but poor Oaxacan
family, the ambitious young Diaz Ordaz went into government service after complet-
ing his education. His early career included a brief tenure—from 1938 to 1939—as
vice-rector of the University of Puebla when, ironicaly, an episode of serious student
unrest disrupted the university and troubled its young administrator. Diaz Ordaz’s
harsh handling of this student agitation and his unwavering assertion that the con-
flicts were started by outside agitators proved eerily prophetic of his later dealings
with striking groups. Lacking a long-term interest in academe, however, this son of a
schoolteacher moved into politics and won a congressional seat in the state of Puebla.
From there he made his way up the political ladder, securing a position in the Senate
and a series of cabinet posts, the most important of which was secretary of the inte-
rior in 1958.4
From this post as the most powerful person in the cabinet of President Adolfo
Lopez Mateos, his long-time friend, Diaz Ordaz worked to limit the influence of
organized labor through strict enforcement of a controversial article of Mexico’s
penal code, commonly known as the Law of Social Dissolution. Originaly enacted in
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1941 to protect Mexico from fascists and nazis, this statute prohibited any activity
that might undermine national sovereignty. Broadly construed, this law could apply
to everything from labor union activity to works of art, and its language was vague
enough to give those who used it the power to act unfetered by constitutional re-
straints. Diaz Ordaz used Article 145 most efectively against striking railroad work-
ers whose work stoppage in 1958 threatened to cripple Mexico’s transportation system.
Diaz Ordaz’s interpretation of the Law of Social Dissolution made union activity,
colective bargaining, and strikes ilegal because of their alegedly anti-government
character. This enabled him to arrest the railroad workers’ leaders and end the strike
forcefuly. Public outcry against such heavy-handed government repression was loud
and long lasting, however, both because the Mexican constitution specificaly pro-
tected the right to strike and because the plight of labor figured so prominently in
the rhetoric sustaining institutionalized revolution.5 A decade later, with the princi-
pal leaders of the railroad strike stil languishing in jail, the students took up their
cause as wel.
Prior to the 2000 presidential election, the choice of a chief executive in post-
revolutionary Mexico had always involved an electoral charade undertaken by the
ruling party to confirm the incumbent’s chosen successor. In 1964 Gustavo Diaz
Ordaz was the chosen successor of Adolfo Lopez Mateos. He should have been able
to win the presidency with widespread popular support and virtualy no opposition.
But his handling of the railroad workers’ strike during his tenure as secretary of the
interior, had earned him many enemies who proved quite vocal in their criticism of
his candidacy.6
 Diaz Ordaz’s critics likened him to the hated Porfirio Diaz whose dictatorship
had been overthrown by revolutionary forces in 1910. Implicit in this comparison
was the suggestion that Diaz Ordaz, like Don Porfirio, worked against the Revolu-
tion and thereby against the people of Mexico. Such criticism could have been dev-
astating for the oficial candidate of the Party of Institutionalized Revolution (PRI).
Pointing out that a shared surname was not the only thing these two men had in
common, leftists leveled serious charges against the validity of the electoral process
and the implications for the future of democracy in Mexico. When Francisco Madero
campaigned against Don Porfirio in 1910, he had raised the cry for “efective suf-
frage and no reelection.” In 1964 journalists resurrected this revolutionary slogan
and hurled it at candidate Diaz Ordaz in biter condemnation of the holowness of
institutionalized revolution. The left-wing publication Politica led in this campaign
against Diaz Ordaz, and its writers and cartoonists were merciless in their atacks.
The historicaly powerful, highly symbolic, and strongly emotive phrase “efective
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sufrage and no re-election” not only led people to associate Diaz Ordaz with Porfirio
Diaz but also addressed the serious issues plaguing the Mexican political system.7
After nearly five decades of institutionalized revolution Mexico stil lacked truly
participatory democracy and an open and honest political process. Though Diaz
Ordaz had not yet been elected president, his critics voiced a serious condemnation
of the political status quo in likening his impending election to the protracted dicta-
torship of Don Porfirio. Critics believed that the voice of the people, if not their
actual votes, had been taken away because the PRI had co-opted organized labor
and peasant groups through corrupt party bosses and local oficials. The under-
handed tactics used to suppress the railroad strike and to reassert government con-
trol over the unions were stil fresh in people’s minds and seemed paralel to their
sense of disenfranchisement and inefective sufrage. Similarly, the resurrection of
the 1910 slogan “no re-election” reflected the need to inject new blood into the
political system to avoid the abuses typical of the Porfiriato. Diaz Ordaz was certainly
not new blood. Rather than representing a step toward a more democratic future,
Diaz Ordaz’s candidacy personified a step backward into Mexico’s dictatorial past.8
In the tense political climate of the mid-1960s, any atempt to run a presiden-
tial campaign with this kind of negative press hiting newsstands weekly was no easy
task. The result was a long embarrassing campaign. Diaz Ordaz was forced to hide
his anger, defend the authoritarian policies in his past, and commit himself to a
more democratic future. He believed strongly in the power of public ofice, how-
ever, and in the idea that public oficials were above everyday citizens and thus de-
serving of absolute respect and obedience. He believed that to maintain a high level
of respect and ensure domestic tranquility it was acceptable and possibly even a
good thing for people to fear their leaders. Thus, to be compeled to justify his ac-
tions and alow his critics to ridicule him represented an afront to the personal
power and prestige he believed came with being the minister of the interior, the
oficial PRI presidential candidate, and certainly the next president. Despite this,
Diaz Ordaz did try to improve his image with wel-crafted campaign speeches and
carefuly choreographed campaign stops. He embraced the ideals of institutional-
ized revolution, employed the mythic ideology of revolutionary nationalism, and
endeavored to associate himself with the icons of each. He also published a series of
pamphlets detailing his positions on a variety of topics, including the youth, women,
and lo mexicano.9 Nevertheless, the hypocrisy of his public pronouncements vis-a-vis
his private policies did not escape the atention of leftists, journalists, and students.
Despite the unprecedented level of criticism leveled against the oficial candi-
date, Diaz Ordaz emerged victorious in the 1964 election. His situation, however,
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failed to improve markedly. The respect that journalists, opposition groups, and
political rivals had traditionaly aforded the president eluded Diaz Ordaz, and his
early days in ofice proved as trying as those on the campaign trail. The serious
divisions that existed within the ruling party had been worsened by the contentious
campaign, and Diaz Ordaz took ofice during a time of instability in Mexico and
around the world. Both factors would afect his sexenio. It should be noted as wel
that many of the problems Diaz Ordaz faced had their origins in previous adminis-
trations. To blame him for these problems would be unfair, but to suggest that his
handling of them only exacerbated pre-existing tensions and worsened already
troublesome situations would not. The series of middle-class social protest move-
ments that took place between 1964 and 1970 al stemmed from structural problems
in the changing Mexican economic and educational systems. The severity of these
protests, however, and the threat they posed to the legitimacy of the ruling party and
its sustaining ideology of institutionalized revolution were the product of President
Diaz Ordaz’s authoritarian tendencies.10
Physicians comprised the first middle-class group to confront President Diaz
Ordaz. During 1964 and 1965 doctors went on strike to protest low wages, poor
working conditions, insuficient benefits, and the like. Doctors during this period
worked for the state but were outside the government-sponsored labor unions be-
cause of their white-colar professional status. Despite this and despite their level of
education and training, they took to the streets, demanding concessions not unlike
those demanded years before by their blue-colar compatriots during the railroad
strike. President Diaz Ordaz’s response also was not unlike is response in 1958, the
major exception being the absence of violent repression against the doctors. It was
one thing to pummel the heads of working-class railroad men and quite another to
do so to middle-class physicians.11
 The doctors placed their demands in a revolutionary context. They praised
the ideology that caled for quality health care for al Mexicans. They extoled the
advances in the post-revolutionary educational system that had alowed Mexico to
develop a highly professional medical community. They criticized the government,
however, for promoting an ideology that suggested institutionalized revolution would
provide for the medical needs of the nation by training a generation of capable
practitioners without creating the medical infrastructure to sustain their eforts. In-
stitutionalized revolution had failed to live up to not only the needs of the poor but
also the expectations of the middle class. In 1964, Mexico City doctors took Presi-
dent Diaz Ordaz to task for these shortcomings. Four years later university students
would do the same. After refusing to negotiate with the doctors, President Diaz Ordaz
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used the Law of Social Dissolution against them, declared their protest ilegal, arrested
their leaders, and appealed to their sense of Hippocratic duty to convince them to
return to work. The strike accomplished litle; only modest gains were made gradualy
through a series of negotiations.12 After the strike ended Diaz Ordaz ignored the deep-
ening structural and ideological fissures within Mexican society that the doctors’ ac-
tions had exposed. In 1968 he would have to address these tensions again.
The origins of the youth rebelion grew from a number of political, economic,
social, and ideological issues that by 1968 has become intolerable. Essentialy the
youth believed institutionalized revolution had failed them and indeed had failed al
Mexicans. These failures were both individual and systemic. The personal ambitions
of middle-class university students were unrequited, and the poverty, inequality, and
injustice in their society continued. The idealism of youth combined with years of
ideological education in the public schools ran headlong into the realities of life
under an authoritarian President. The origins of the student crisis can be best char-
acterized thus:
University students in particular do not belong to the
ranks of the urban poor or the rural peasantry, and
they do not protest because they are hungry or land-
less. But, their discontent is based in part on the fact
that these conditions exist. Many of them have been
indoctrinated thoroughly in the historical ideals of the
Mexican Revolution and they become angry when they
perceive the gap between the oficial professions of a
revolutionary mystique and the performance of the
national elite. It is indeed ironic that the Mexican lead-
ership has been too successful in implanting revolu-
tionary ideals in this generation of young students. The
students are surrounded by slogans stressing revolution,
reform, and social justice. They are steeped in an edu-
cational system and a social mythology which exalts
Benito Juarez, Emiliano Zapata, and the oil expropria-
tion of 1938. As they look around, however, they see
their leaders folowing policies which are diametricaly
opposed to the professed ideals.13
For the students, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz came to symbolize al that was wrong
with Mexico. They took up the rhetoric of institutionalized revolution, the cal of
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such popular icons as Francisco Vila, Emiliano Zapata, and Lazaro Cardenas, and
they pledged their solidarity not just with the railroad workers and the doctors but
with al the people of Mexico. In this fashion the students began a popular insur-
gency against their government in general and their president in particular.
Student strikes had been common in Mexico from the late 1950s. They typi-
caly concerned only university issues and had minimal impact on those not directly
involved. In 1968, neither the issues students raised nor the tactics they used were
new. What was new was the violent repression by government forces under President
Gustave Diaz Ordaz. Deaths of classmates and the military occupation of campuses
incited many students further, fueled their indignation, and deepened their disilu-
sionment. Violence in the streets, beatings, deaths, and disappearances intensified
the movement and channeled its hostility toward Diaz Ordaz and those who did his
bidding.14
Protesting students were equaly concerned with the constitutional implica-
tions of the brutal repression directed against them by the Diaz Ordaz administra-
tion. While the Mexican legislature, opposition politicians, law school professors,
and countless journalists debated the validity of the Law of Social Dissolution, the
students took to the streets demanding both its immediate repeal and the release of
al political prisoners, including the leaders of the 1958 railroad strike, who had
been incarcerated for more than ten years. To these two demands, the student lead-
ers formulated four more. Two concerned the government’s ability to repress its
citizens, and two targeted the government’s repressive activities to date. Specificaly,
they caled for the disbanding of the hated corps of riot police known as the granaderos,
the dismissal of the two oficials in command of the granaderos, the government’s
acknowledgment of its guilt in precipitating the violence of the summer and fal,
and the payment of restitution to al injured parties. Restitution included reimburse-
ments to schools and universities for damages done to their campuses during granadero
and army atacks and occupations, provisions for those injured during the street-
fighting, and payment of indemnities to the families of those kiled by government
forces since July.15 These six demands clearly show that while the students were con-
cerned with the future of their nation, they focused their movement not on abstract
ideals of democracy, social justice, and institutionalized revolution but rather on the
tangible problems that resulted from the unfulfilment of such ideals.
Diaz Ordaz’s response to these demands and to the student movement in
general did litle to help his political position or his personal reputation. He un-
derestimated the intensity and influence of the student movement and responded
inconsistently. He first refused to negotiate with the students and used force to
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suppress them. When this failed, he became more conciliatory. Finaly he reverted
to repression. He tried to discredit the movement first by associating it with interna-
tional communism orchestrated from Havana and Moscow and then by associating
it with United States imperialism, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
U.S. Central Inteligence Agency. These eforts had litle impact on public opinion
and likely harmed more than helped his administration. He then tried to convince
Mexicans that the students intended to disrupt the Olympic Games and embarrass
Mexico with the whole world watching. Though the student leaders publicly denied
this, the aleged threat to the Olympic Games became the oficial justification for
repression.16
From late July through September Mexico City police forces, then riot troops,
and eventualy federal army units from other parts of the country atempted to con-
tain the student insurgency. But with each passing week the numbers of students
who had been kiled or wounded or who had disappeared increased, and the move-
ment intensified. Workers, peasants, journalists, university faculty members and ad-
ministrators, and especialy middle-class parents began to question a government
that atacked young people in the streets of the capital city. As casualties mounted
and opposition grew, Diaz Ordaz’s public position—the use of the Law of Social
Dissolution and ful-scale military repression to protect the Olympics—became un-
tenable.
Finaly Diaz Ordaz agreed to a public dialogue with the students in Septem-
ber. By later September, after much delay and wrangling over details, it appeared
real progress would soon be made. Army troops withdrew from the campus of the
National University, and a long-absent sense of optimism began to return. The stu-
dents scheduled a public demonstration for the night of 2 October at the Plaza of
the Three Cultures in the Tlatelolco district of Mexico City to discuss the events of
recent days, celebrate the withdrawal of the army, and plan for the future. During
the meeting, which was atended by thousands of people, including local residents,
foreign journalists already in town for the Olympics, opposition groups, and stu-
dents, military troops poured into the plaza firing automatic weapons. Helicopters
overhead shot into the crowd, and snipers targeted their victims from the windows
and rooftops of nearby buildings. When it was over, an estimated four hundred people
were dead, hundreds more wounded, and more than one thousand arrested.17
President Diaz Ordaz made no oficial public comment about the massacre,
and the government maintained a strict silence that only in recent years has been
broken. Public opinion held the Diaz Ordaz administration responsible for the mas-
sacre, and the fragmentary documentary evidence available to historians today is
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contentiously debated. What we do know is that the families of the dead and wounded
subsequently began to rebuild their lives, the jailed student leaders eventualy went
free, the Olympics opened with a flurry of patriotic activity on 12 October, ten days
after the massacre, and passed without incident, and in 1970 Diaz Ordaz’s hand-
picked successor, Luis Echeverria, won the presidency and became one of Mexico’s
most popular recent presidents by distancing himself from the person and policies
of his predecessor.
In conclusion, the hegemonic discourse of institutionalized revolution that
sustained the Mexican political system came under fire in 1968 in large measure
because of the actions and persona of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. Student dis-
content with the government coalesced around Diaz Ordaz both because of his sym-
bolic significance as the antithesis of a revolutionary leader and his use of authoritarian
policies to stifle popular protest. The railroad strike, the doctors’ strike, and the use
of Article 145 were the sparks that helped to ignite a powder keg of pent-up hostility
in 1968. The students rejected the hegemonic discourse of institutionalized revolu-
tion and refused to continue to live a lie. During the course of their movement the
students exposed the dichotomies that existed between the rhetoric that legitimized
Mexico’s one party government and the reality of life under its rule. Thus, with the
faith that sustained it gone, the ilusory image of institutionalized revolution be-
came as transparent as the emperor’s new clothes.
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DALTON AND THE REBIRTH OF THE ARMY OF
TENNESSEE
Louis P. Towles
It was the afternoon of 25 November 1863, and the Confederate Army of Tennessee was in disorderly retreat into northern Georgia. The force that had previously
contested the fields of Perryvile, Stones River, and Chickamauga so stubbornly had
colapsed now on the slopes of Missionary Ridge. The army’s losses, 75 per cent of
whom were prisoners, numbered nearly 7000 men. This exceeded the 6000 casual-
ties sufered by the assaulting Union columns. Likewise devastating was the loss of
more than a third of the army’s artilery and the bulk of its caissons, wagons, equip-
ment, and supplies. Even more shatering was the realization that the army’s com-
mander, General Braxton Bragg, was at fault.1
Earlier that fal of 1863, while in the midst of a campaign to capture Chata-
nooga, Bragg unwitingly had initiated the sequence of events that would lead to this
defeat. A quarrelsome commander by nature and never inclined to forget a slight,
he had implemented changes he felt would have reduced conflict within the army.
He had transferred senior and popular commanders who disliked him, had reshufled
the composition of many of his brigades and divisions to undercut his chief detrac-
tors, and had sought to intimidate those opponents who remained with the army.
Thus engrossed in a personal war he had failed to keep his men adequately fed and
sheltered. Even worse, with morale dropping, desertions increasing, and units in disar-
ray, he had divided his command and sent a part against Knoxvile. As a result he had
retained fewer than 35,000 soldiers to defend a seven-mile front against as many as
100,000 federals. He had also overlooked the most obvious signs of impending con-
flict—military actions on 27 and 29 October, increased enemy movements, and fre-
quent sheling. Instead of recognizing the obvious, on 19 November he had signaled
the end of campaigning by ordering the construction of winter huts and camps.2
“No one apprehends any danger of [the Union forces] atempting to advance,”
wrote Captain John S. Palmer of the 10th South Carolina. “General Bragg has begun
to furlough prety freely. I think it a capital idea.” And when the batle came five days
later no one was more surprised than Braxton Bragg. If being taken unaware was not
serious enough, he compounded his errors by failing to lay out adequate defensive
works, to give proper direction to his subordinates, and to coordinate the defense. As a
result Union soldiers easily broke through hastily constructed works. “Gray clad men,”
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wrote one Union combatant, “rushed wildly down the hil and into the woods, tossing
away knapsacks, muskets, and blankets as they ran . . . in ten minutes al that remained
of the defiant rebel army that has so long besieged Chatanooga was captured guns,
disarmed prisoners, moaning wounded, ghastly dead, and scatered, demoralized fugi-
tives.” Only a stubborn defense by Patrick Cleburne’s division at Tunnel Hil and
Ringgold Gap saved the army from complete destruction.3
It now remained to be seen how many “demoralized fugitives” would make it
to Rocky Face, a hastily selected natural abutment in front of Dalton, Georgia. For
the soldiers who arrived at the destination, it was then a mater of what leader could
keep them together, restore their faith in the “just & right cause,” and rekindle the
confidence of the army in itself. Would this reconstituted force be capable of de-
fending Georgia and the al-important rail junction at Atlanta? And would the Army
of Tennessee also be able to resume the ofensive, drive Union forces back, and
reassert control over Tennessee’s grain fields and recruiting grounds, as Confeder-
ate President Jeferson Davis required?4
To examine the efectiveness of reconstructing the shatered army, the only
such efort ever atempted by Confederate authorities, it would be necessary to ana-
lyze the entire army’s conduct through the rebuilding process and to evaluate its
actions in the Atlanta Campaign, which folowed. Since such a task is too massive for
a single article, a simpler path, the monitoring of one unit, has been taken. This
study, therefore, folows Brig. Gen. Arthur M. Manigaults brigade, explores al avail-
able sources regarding its soldiers’ actions and opinions, and determines both how
the brigade responded to the rebuilding process and how it performed in the field.
Manigault’s command, a composite brigade, was typical of the Army of Ten-
nessee. Its regiments—the 24th, the 34th, and 28th Alabama and the 19th and 10th
South Carolina—were recruited in 1861, brigaded at Corinth in 1862, and placed
under the command of Colonel, later Brigadier General, Manigault in early 1863. A
part of Thomas C. Hindman’s division, this brigade was the best-driled unit at Corinth,
had fought wel in the Perryvile campaign and at Stone’s River, and had drawn
praise for its performance at Chickamauga. Yet these same troops were also impli-
cated in the colapse of 25 November. Soldiers from the 24th Alabama had aban-
doned the brigade and their own position on the Ridge after Deas’s and Holtzclaw’s
Alabama brigades had broken before advancing blue columns. Consequently Ala-
bama troops and anyone associated with them were now indiscriminately labeled as
cowards and greeted derisively by hoots of “Yaler-hammer, Alabama! Flicker, flicker,
yaler-hammer!” Seeking to blame others for his own negligence and grasping at
straws, Bragg placed on Manigault’s men part of the blame for the debacle.5
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Contrary to Bragg’s misinformation, the brigade, with the exception of mem-
bers of the 24th, had neither broken nor abandoned the field precipitously. To the
contrary, it was Col. Wiliam F. Tucker’s Mississippi brigade and Brig. Gen. Zachariah
Deas’s Alabama regiments to Manigault’s immediate left and right that had first given
way. In the break that resulted, Manigault’s men fel back a quarter mile only after
Union soldiers turned Tucker’s captured cannon on them. At this point the brigade
reformed and remained in its position until dark, guarding one of the several av-
enues of escape. The survivors then forded Chickamauga Creek and joined the re-
treat. It was a sad occasion, for 634 members of the unit, many of them prisoners,
remained behind.6
Because they were helping to cover the army’s withdrawal, Manigault’s regiments
did not reach Rocky Face, forty miles distant, until the afternoon of 27 November. The
men, part of the army’s nearly 29,000 who successfuly reached their destination, were
tired, dispirited, and often without clothing, shoes, blankets, food, or weapons. Due to
the almost constant rain they had struggled over roads that were litle more than muddy
quagmires by day and sheets of ice by night. The soldiers were also compeled to cross
swolen rivers and creeks that were beginning to ice.7
Dalton, a smal town on the Western & Atlantic Railroad, did litle to relieve the
feeling of despondency. The town was only a defenseless railhead ninety-six miles from
Atlanta, bereft of food, ammunition, or shelter for the incoming soldiers. The brigade
troops, like the rest of Bragg’s men, had to sleep in the icy woods without tents and
covering for weeks as they constructed shelters. An oficer of the 24th Alabama was
quick to note he was not very happy when he had “to sit up al night at the root of a tree
by a sorry fire and a freezing rain faling upon me al the while.” Stil, Manigault’s
soldiers were more fortunate than most. At least they had arrived to find hot food
waiting because their brigade commissary had heard the reports of the rout and had
hastened his wagons and cooks to Dalton to prepare and cook rations.8
Although Joseph E. Johnston later observed that Dalton had “litle to recom-
mend it,” for it had neither “intrinsic strength nor strategic advantage,” the town
nevertheless became the winter headquarters of the army. Campgrounds for each
division were carefuly selected within a three to five mile radius of the setlement to
provide quarters for men and animals together with exercise yards for regiments
and larger units. “Very comfortable quarters,” wrote Capt. John S. Palmer, were con-
structed three miles south of Dalton to compensate for “the deficiency of tents.”
But the size and type of hut difered. Most resembled “chicken coops” with simple
four-post construction. Because many companies did not possess a single axe, they
had to borrow such tools and work, often at night, while others were not using them.
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Each hut, however, possessed a good clay chimney and a large fireplace that made
the “domicile as comfortable a place as one could desire.”9
Bragg was relieved of his command in early December, and Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston replaced him three weeks later. Johnston arrived to find his army much
smaler than reported, poorly fed, and inadequately equipped. One veteran indi-
cated that its primary fare, bacon and cornbread, was less nutritious than that nor-
maly given to slaves and would in time cause scurvy among the troops. The general
was briefed on Bragg’s failings, on the later’s atempts to discredit many of his ofic-
ers, and on the discord among units. Like many others at Dalton and in Richmond,
he was apprehensive about the “confidence level” (or morale) of the army and could
agree with historian Irving A. Buck that “troops may be defeated without their mo-
rale being destroyed, so long as they have the consciousness that it was only the
fortune of war and not for bad conduct on their part, or even that it was through
mistakes by their leaders.” Knowing that both of these things had transpired and
that a “sulen, dangerous demoralization” could folow, Johnston moved as quickly
as possible to restore the “élan and the self-respect” of the men. It was necessary,
however, that he not be too openly critical of his predecessor because a number of
his soldiers and oficers stil remained supporters of Bragg. Accordingly, when some
brigades cheered the new commander, he acknowledged their accolade. But when
the soldiers of Hindman’s and Stevenson’s divisions neglected to ofer the same
recognition, he feigned not to notice.10
Taken aback by the living conditions he saw, Johnston pushed for their im-
provement. He wired Richmond to expedite the shipment of additional food (rice,
potatoes, and sugar) and clothing to Dalton. He sought the cannon, weapons, am-
munition, and draft animals necessary to make the Army of Tennessee campaign-fit.
In this fashion and by his frequent visits to the camps Johnston, or Old Joe—as he
came to be caled, gradualy won the respect and often the admiration of his men.11
Families from across the South were even quicker to respond than the govern-
ment in Richmond. By the end of December boxes of clothing, carpet, woolen blan-
kets, shoes, nuts, and tobacco were arriving and continued to come until the need
was met. “Treats,” like sausage, spare-ribs, fresh hams, potatoes, dried fruit, cofee,
onions, buter, fruits, brandy peaches, and cakes were much in demand; strangely
enough, “a litle salt and soap” were more sought after because “the later is hard to
be got while the former is dealt out very sparingly to us.”12
As soon as adequate food and shelter were available, the preparation of the
army began. Dril, previously litle stressed in the Army of Tennessee, now received
daily atention. Companies, batalions, regiments, and brigades were driled twice a
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day for a total of three hours and were al inspected on Sunday. Divisions and corps
with their artilery, ambulances, and supply wagons were reviewed at least once a
month. Hindman’s division, for instance, was maneuvered on 16 March. The entire
corps under Lt. Gen. John Bel Hood (Hindman’s, Stevenson’s, and Stewart’s divi-
sions) went on display the day after. On 9 April Lt. Gen. Wiliam J. Hardee (an au-
thority on dril) had his corps (Bate’s, Cheatham’s, Cleburne’s, and Walker’s divisions)
perform a sham batle. “Solid lines of infantry would move up within a few paces of
each other & fire whole voleys into each others face,” wrote one observer from
Manigaults Brigade. “It was very exciting & the soldiers enjoyed the sport very much.”13
Even more impressive were the grand reviews. On 4 February Johnston exhib-
ited his entire force for the first time. “It was the largest parade of troops ever had on
one field in the Confederacy [to date],” wrote Col. Newton Davis. “It was truly a mag-
nificent sight. The field was about two miles long & we had three lines across it.” Stil
more majestic was the review of 20 April, when Joe Johnston paraded “forty to fifty
thousand” infantry. “It is the opinion of al who are capable of judging that the Confed-
eracy never had any beter & perhaps never so good & wel disciplined an army as we
have here at present,” wrote Davis. “Al are in good health & fine spirits, cheerful &
sanguine of success when they are brought to meet the enemy again on the field.”14
While both the construction and maintenance of fortifications and the repair
of local roads and bridges were also required, there was ample time for leisure. Read-
ing (including newspapers and novels), socializing, games (including bul-pen, town
bal, leap-frog, cat, wrestling, and basebal), and visits by family and friends were al
encouraged. Because many of Manigault’s oficers were masons, the brigade con-
structed a lodge and met nightly. Singing was a frequent pastime, and it was not
unusual for groups to go from cabin to cabin serenading the occupants. On the
evening of 4 February, for instance, oficers of the 24th Alabama and a “brass band
from a Tennessee Brigade” (probably Brig. Gen. Alfred J. Vaughan’s) provided
Manigault with “some music.”15
Snowbal fights, including batles between regiments and even divisions, were
another form of recreation. Among the most memorable of these was a mammoth
struggle between Hindman’s and Stevenson’s divisions on 23 March. According to
Robert A. Jarman, the day began when Edward Walthal’s Mississippi brigade “routed”
Zachariah Deas’s Alabama brigade with snowbals and took possession of their camp.
After a brief truce, the two brigades formed “in line of batle with field oficers mounted”
and atacked, routed, and captured Manigault’s brigade. The three units soon united
and moved against “Stevenson’s division with a regular line of batle, skirmishers thrown
out and al. . . . Charge after charge was made with only snowbals, and you could have
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heard the yeling and halowing for miles.” Years later few would recolect that this
was a winter of abnormaly cold weather, with frequent snow storms, freezing rain,
impassable roads, and bone-chiling winds. Instead, most soldiers joined Johnston in
remembering Dalton fondly for its “pleasant days.” It was, without question, the best
winter quarters the army ever had, and the dril, work, games, and other activities
were important factors in the rebonding of the army.16
Positive changes also enhanced confidence. Regiments that had lost heavily
were reinforced, reorganized, and, if need be, consolidated. Brigades and divisions
were restructured to reverse the damage done by Bragg’s vendeta, and reinforce-
ments alowed Johnston to create new commands. He upgraded the commissary,
supply, medical, and transportation systems, reorganized the artilery, and improved
unit marksmanship. In June 1864 Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, who had helped to create
the Army of Tennessee, marveled that he had “never known the army to be so wel
clad and shod and fed . . . or so wel organized or so easily handled.” Lt. Col. Irvine
Walker of the 10th South Carolina observed that the “discipline and organization
[were] . . . perfected during this season of rest.”17
In addition to logistical and organizational changes, Johnston won praise for
his generous policy regarding furloughs. The plan alowed every soldier at least
one ten-day trip home, with as many as 5000 men absent at a time. It also permited
Manigault, his regimental commanders, and his oficers to take their first leaves of
absence from the war. In the process, as Captain Palmer observed, the policy
“brought in a good number of men” because it alowed an immediate furlough for
anyone who could furnish a new recruit. Alongside these new men, the sick, the
wounded, and even those who had “overstayed their leave” were welcomed back,
and by late April 1864 these and many other smal changes minimized dissension
and divisiveness. Morale was dramaticaly improved, and even the staunchest pro-
Bragg men, including Major Generals Wiliam H. T. Walker, Edward C. Walthal,
and Joseph Wheeler, Brig. Gen. Manigault, and Col. Newton Davis, gave Johnston
his due. “Our army here, I think, is in beter spirits that I ever saw it,” indicated
Davis on 11 March, “and al seem to have the utmost confidence in their com-
manding general.” Johnston, who had worked tirelessly to restore the army, was
beginning to be compared to the much-lauded Robert E. Lee and was now cheered
by troops whenever he appeared among them. Only one thing seemed to bother
the men: “Genl. Johnston keeps his own secrets & no body here knows what he
intends to do.”18
Nevertheless, Johnston’s policies had prepared the men. By 6 May 1864 (that is,
at the beginning of the spring campaign) Johnston had roughly 45,000 infantrymen
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and artilerymen, 4000 cavalry, and 111 cannon. His infantry was divided into seven
divisions commanded by Stewart, Hindman, Stevenson, Bate, Cheatham, Cleburne,
and Walker; each fielded 5000 to 7000 men. These divisions were combined into two
corps, the first under Hood and the second under Hardee. A third corps under
Polk, containing 20,000 men in three divisions (commanded by French, Loring, and
Walthal), was expected from Mississippi within the month. Al units were also ap-
proaching pre-1863 strength. Hindman’s division, for instance, reduced to 4945
efectives on 3 December 1863, was back to 6760 soldiers by 30 April 1864. Of this
number, 1838 men belonged to Manigault’s brigade. To add to this, bragged one
observer, there was “very litle sickness,” and the men were “beter satisfied, more
cheerful and contented than I ever knew them to be.”19 Thus in three short months
Johnston was wel on the way to accomplishing his major goal of refiting, reorganiz-
ing, and rebuilding the army. It remained to be seen, though, how wel it would
perform on campaign.
Unfortunately for Johnston, his opponent, Maj. Gen. Wiliam T. Sherman,
had a force of 110,000 men in three armies that was beter prepared, supplied, and
equipped. In artilery Sherman possessed a two to one advantage in cannon, and if
rifling and caliber were counted, the advantage was closer to three to one. In cavalry
his edge was more than two to one, and in infantry, his strongest branch, the Union
general possessed more than twice Johnston’s initial manpower, with one of his three
armies larger than Johnston’s total force. Likewise, the equipping of some Union
troops with Spencer, Henry, and Smith and Wesson repeating rifles (with magazines
that held seven to sixteen shots) increased Sherman’s advantage and made it more
dificult for Johnston to engage the enemy on an equal basis.20
The campaign that began at Dalton (7–12 May) failed to produce a major
tactical victory for either federal or confederate forces. Heedless of his own strength
in troops and materiel, Sherman refused to engage Johnston’s army at Dalton be-
cause it was too strongly fortified. Instead Union soldiers flanked the position by
moving west of Rocky Face and south through Snake Creek Gap. To protect his
supply line Johnston withdrew his army to Resaca (13–15 May) and prepared fortifi-
cations that Sherman assaulted on 14 May. Unable to capture these and stung by two
counteratacks, one by Carter Stevenson and the other by Alexander Stewart, Sherman
again resorted to a flanking movement, a maneuver that he subsequently utilized
repeatedly during the campaign. This time he forced Johnston to retreat via Calhoun
(17 May), Adairsvile (18 May), and finaly Cassvile (19 May). When a batle failed to
materialize at the latter town, the Army of Tennessee continued its retreat to
Cartersvile (20 May), Ackworth (23 to 24 May), and New Hope Church (25 May).
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To redeem sulied reputations, Manigault’s men, like the rest of the army,
were anxious to engage their enemy, but they were remarkably patient. The men
disliked “retrograde” movements, but they cast the blame on Sherman for trying
“to avoid a general engagement” and for “making every exertion to get to our
rear,” instead of meeting them on an open field. Cassvile, however, was a test of
their revitalized wil. Johnston announced on the 19th at Cassvile that he was pre-
pared to fight, but when Hood and Polk counseled retreat, he complied. Capt.
John S. Palmer of the 10th South Carolina was stunned and angry that Johnston
would again direct the “il-fated” army south, and it made Newton Davis’s heart
“bleed to see the destruction of property [by Sherman’s army].” He momentarily
questioned what he was sacrificing his efort for. “I am completely tired out, dirty,
sleepy & in a bad condition generaly. It has been sixteen days since I changed my
under-clothing & I reckon I am the dirtiest man you ever saw.” Both men could
only think “that Bragg would either have fought the enemy or been in Atlanta and
fortified it by this time,” and that “Johnston has been outgeneraled [again].” But
confidence was so high that the Army of Tennessee did litle more than complain.
The men had confidence in their commander, a fact that Maj. Thomas Taylor of
the 47th Ohio corroborated. “His [Johnston’s] army exhibits less demoralization
than any army I ever saw that has retreated so far,” wrote Taylor. “ We find very few
stragglers, take very few prisoners.”21
In the two months that folowed, Johnston showed himself to be a master of
retreat and trench warfare. Constant entrenching in red clay, a month of rain, deadly
sniper fire, and minimal rations strengthened rather than weakened the wil of the
brigade to fight on. “We have learned to sleep in rainy weather, in mud and water as
sound and wel as in dry and pleasant weather,” wrote one participant. Another com-
mented that Johnston was managing “admirably” despite his limited resources and
manpower; it was “perfectly astonishing how wel our men have stood this trying
campaign.” Stil another expressed himself even more forthrightly.
For nearly three months we have been retreating, but
the morale of the army was beter than when the cam-
paign opened. . . . We had seen the retreat conducted
without the loss of even a broken wagon wheel, and
we had unlimited faith in the generalship of old Joe.
. . . We were wiling to fight at any time and place he
said so, believing that he would not ask us to fight
unless the advantages were clearly on our side.22
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Among the most dificult to convince, however, was the brigade’s commander.
Manigault admired Braxton Bragg’s general eficiency and reluctantly gave Johnston
credit for reforms at Dalton. As late as Resaca the general indicated that even though
his current commander fought wel, Bragg “would have managed the retreat [much]
beter.” Stil, the fact that Johnston’s “superior generalship . . . proved correct in
every point” at last brought Manigault into line with his men, and he, too, accepted
that their commander “had given the men a reliance in their own superiority and a
certain belief that they would eventualy beat the enemy, save Atlanta, and recover
the country as far north as Chatanooga.”23
Less patient than his adversary, Sherman launched exploratory assaults on
Stewart’s division at New Hope Church and on Cleburne’s division at Pickets Mil
on 25 and 27 May. When these were repulsed, Johnston instructed Wiliam Bate to
atack Dalas on 28 May. The failure of this thrust, even though wel executed,
discouraged Johnston, and he resorted to additional defensive lines, the first at
Lost Mountain (4–18 June), a second at Kennesaw Mountain (18 June–2 July), and
the third along Nickajack Creek (5–9 July). Two further batles, at Kolb’s Farm (22
June) and at Kennesaw Mountain (27 June), were costly but inconclusive. By mid-
July Johnston and his army were positioned just north of Atlanta.24
Johnston’s plan “to keep up the spirit of his army” by a skilful defense had
kept Sherman at bay but had failed to protect north Georgia or meet the ofensive
expectations of Jeferson Davis. Accordingly, on 17 July the commander was re-
moved. It was a crushing blow to brigade and to army morale. “It seemed impos-
sible,” Capt. John Stoney Porcher penned, but “it was true.” James T. Searcy could
not understand the logic behind the action. “General Johnston knows best,” he
wrote. “As long as our armies are intact and efective we have a country. The terri-
tory is not the thing to judge by in regarding our strength.” Yet while soldiers might
protest, shun their new commander, and threaten not to serve, the deed was irre-
vocable. Richmond was not interested in the opinion of the army.25
It was even more of a “calamity,” noted Manigault, that John Bel Hood re-
placed Johnston. Although brave, he was “totaly unfit for command of a corps,”
much less an army, and to replace Johnston at a critical point in a major campaign
was a “hasty and il-judged” move that “contributed materialy to the downfal of
the Confederacy.” Others expressed almost identical doubts. “Gen. Hood . . . was
rash to a criminal extent,” concluded Sergeant Pit Chambers, and “we judged him
to be lacking in those higher qualities that fit one for handling an independent
army.” When Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, was
consulted on 12 July regarding the proposed change, he noted “Hood is a bold
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fighter,” but “careless.” Lee added, “I am doubtful as to the other qualities neces-
sary [for command].”26
Regretfuly for Hood, the window of opportunity—eight days—was brief, and
in that time he failed to win the confidence of the men. His credentials from Vir-
ginia, high casualties, and recent failures—Resaca, Cassvile, and Kolb’s Farm—pre-
ceded him, and his first order that “we would henceforth fight no more from
breastworks and rifle pits,” a way of saying that the men would atack, failed to “reas-
sure” Johnston’s soldiers. Hard-fought batles against the federals at Peachtree Creek
on 20 July at Bald Hil on 22 July, and at Ezra Church on 28 July left nearly 12,000
dead, wounded, and captured, more than his predecessor had lost in the previous
three months. The brigade, demoralized and disheartened, now began to conclude
that their commander’s “headlong way . . . costs more than it comes to.” According
to Col. Irvine Walker of the 10th South Carolina the “struggle . . . the lives lost, the
sufering inflicted, had al been for nothing,” and many men were coming to the
conclusion that they had “done their best and lost.” A fourth and final atack at
Jonesboro on 31 August was litle more than a sham. The men were used up, “wholy
disorganized,” and acted more like “a mob in an open field.” According to Maj.
Thomas Taylor of the 47th Ohio, the advance was “the least determined of any I ever
saw them make.” Manigault agreed, noting that the “men did not behave as wel as
on any previous occasion,” and he continued, bluntly, “[the men] have long since
lost confidence in their leaders.”27
Although not destroyed, the Army of Tennessee was now al but finished as an
efective military force. Reduced to less than 30,000 men, a force equal to that which
had retreated to Dalton on 27 November 1863, it had lost over 30,000 men by death,
capture, and desertion in less that two months, had been defeated in four open
batles, and was again without equipment, food, and supplies. Even worse, it remained
under the command of Hood, who would complete its ruin by December 1864 at
the batles of Spring Hil, Franklin, and Nashvile.28
A definitive history of the army or the entire Georgia campaign, for that mat-
ter, was not the purpose of this study. The real goal was to determine, in microcosm,
how Bragg’s shatered army was rebuilt and how efective it became. The evidence,
as seen through the eyes of one brigade, suggests that the work at Dalton was wel
done, and that the Army of Tennessee improved as a fighting force while under
Johnston’s command. Although the testimony of those involved also suggested that
Joseph E. Johnston was not able to develop the ofensive potential of the army as wel
as he might have, most agreed that he had maintained his troops’ morale and confi-
dence in him, preserved the army, and kept casualties to a minimum.29 Contemporary
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Union and Confederate opinion agreed that his generals—Bate, Brown, Cheatham,
Clayton, Cleburne, French, Hardee, Stewart, Walker, and Walthal—had performed
wel ofensively during the campaign. Some historians suggest that if Johnston had
been beter served by two of his corps commanders, Leonidas Polk and John Bel
Hood, the Confederate ofensive capability would have enhanced.30 By contrast, af-
ter Hood ultimately achieved complete command of the Army of Tennessee, he led
it from one defeat to another and lost the confidence of the men. As Robert E. Lee
had pointed out, Hood usualy “tried to do too much with too litle in too short a
time,” was “careless,” and “lacked the high order of talent” to command an army.
Those who remained with him did so for two reasons: for the cause, not the gen-
eral,” and because Joe Johnston had, in retrospect, done his work wel.31
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History and the Persistence of Memory:
Observations on the World War I Memoirs
of Vera Britain
Joyce A. Wood
Sources that provide rich fruit for the historian’s work are found in personal mem-oirs. These accounts of historical events are a major underpinning of much his-
torical work; yet questions of their reliability and accuracy persist. World War I mem-
oirs have been an important element in the discussion focusing on the war myth that
dominated much of the writing on World War I during the 1920s and 1930s. This
paper wil survey the thinking of prominent commentators on the subject of World
War I memoirs such as Paul Fussel, Samuel B. Hynes, Peter Liddle and Modris
Eksteins. It wil then draw on the thoughts of these commentators to make some
observations on memory and the most prominent women’s war memoir of the inter-
war years, Vera Britain’s Testament of Youth, published in 1933.1 Was her memoir less
reliable as an accurate rendition of the experience of volunteer nurses because it was so
much a part of the literary fashion of the day? Did time alter her perspective?
Memory in war literature
The British generation that participated in World War I was a largely literate group of
people who made up the “immense civilian armies” who “were more articulate than
actual fighters have ever been before.”2 Literacy of some fashion had reached much of
the population of Great Britain, and people wrote leters and diaries, sustaining a wide-
ranging newspaper and publishing industry.3 This was the first time so many literate
persons had personal experience of war.4 Initialy the recording of war experiences
tended to be in the form of more-easily-managed short pieces such as poetry; longer
prose works such as H. G. Wels’ Mr. Britling Ses It Through were writen by those not yet
involved in active service.5 Series of books treating the war as adventure or as a kind of
travelog were at times thinly veiled eforts to encourage people to support the war
efort by contributing money or volunteering for some type of active or support ser-
vice. Examples include Ian Malcolm’s War Pictures Behind the Lines and E. Charles Vivian
and J. E. Hodder Wiliams’ description of Red Cross work, The Way of the Red Cros, both
published in 1915, and Granvile Barker’s The [British] Red Cros in France.6
According to Grabole, Spear and Walace, accounts of personal experience in
the war can be divided into “four distinctive periods,” Accounts writen during the first
period, caled “First Impressions,” were overlaid by the emotional responses, the ro-
manticized idealism and heroism, and the limitations such as censorship imposed by
102
The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association 
the conditions of the war.7 The second period, “Lul,” folowed the end of the war
and lasted from 1919 to 1926 as people sought to put the experiences of the war
behind them and return to what was caled “normalcy.” Such traumatic experiences
could not be excised through suppression, however, so from 1927 to 1930 novels and
published diaries began to appear, leading to what these authors caled a “Boom” in
public interest and in publications about the war. This third period, touched of by
Erich Maria Remarque’s Al Quiet on the Western Front, included works by Siegfried
Sassoon and Robert Graves as wel as the first by a woman, The Forbidden Zone, in
which Mary Borden described her nursing experiences.8 Many of these books were
pacifist in tone, characteristic of the books writen in the fourth period, defined as
“Aftermath,” which ran from 1931 to 1938.9 Historian Jay Winter identifies the works
in the last category as “one of the most enduring legacies of the war.”10
Personal accounts of war experiences such as memoirs or, more indirectly,
novels produced in the “Boom” years raise an interesting question. How much of
this writing accurately reflects the experience of the war and how much of it shows a
developing mythology of the war?11 Paul Fussel’s study of war literature, The Great
War and Modern Memory, ignited a searching appraisal of how accurately these liter-
ary products reflect actual experience.12
Folowing the war it was hard for many participants to remember the precise
flow of events, even with the presence of leters and diaries. It is Fussel’s character-
ization of personal accounts or memoirs that is particularly cogent to the argument
of this study. He cals the memoir “a kind of fiction, difering from the ‘first novel’ .
. . only by continuous implicit atestations of veracity or appeals to documented his-
torical fact. . . . The further personal materials move from the form of the daily diary,
the closer they approach to the figurative and the fictional.” He warns that readers
have overlooked the “fictional character” of memoirs because they are on a “knife-
edge” between traditional war writing and a modern irony that creates a “renewed
body of rituals and myths.”13 To look at Britain’s autobiography with Fussel’s char-
acterization in mind raises the question of how much of Britain’s wartime memoir
reflects her actual experience and how much is part of the “ritual and myth” that
built up in the literary world in the late 1920s.14
Fussel’s “knife-edge” between “the realistic and ironic modes” is the basis on
which Jay Winter evaluates Fussel’s claims that this writing is a new kind of litera-
ture. Winter observes that popular books such as Robert Graves’ Goodbye to Al That
were both autobiographical and fictional, dealing with the clash between the hopes,
dreams, and expectations the soldiers carried into the war and the harsh, nearly-
inexpressible realities they were trying to communicate through traditional means.15
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Rather than seeing one new form of literature, that of “modern memory” or “Mod-
ernism,” Winter sees two—a “literature of separation,” expressing the gulf between
those who had experienced the war and those who had not, and a “literature of
bereavement,” commemorating the people and the life they had left behind.16
Another perspective on modernism” and the myth is ofered by Modris Eksteins
who sees these ideas as products of the post-war period. He argues that postwar litera-
ture “is lacking in balance” and that the positive aspects of the war experience of the
soldiers were subsumed by an overemphasis on negative disilusionment. This disilu-
sionment came from the failure of the peace; from a sense of isolation on the part of
the veteran, which was generated both by his experience on the front and by values on
the home front that were changing and undermining the nineteenth-century verities
that had motivated his sacrifice; and from the efects of wartime propaganda, which
had blurred reality with utopian visions and imagination. Language sufered a loss of
meaning, and irony became the means of expression for wartime experiences. Thus
the soldier turned inward, and the war became an individual nightmare. The result was
Remarque’s Al Quiet on the Western Front, which Eksteins describes as “more a comment
on the postwar mind” than on an entirely personal experience.17 The flood of “Boom”
books touched of by the success of Remarque’s book and a subsequent movie was a
case of showing “how . . . many people shared his . . . postwar frustration” rather than
exposing the “truth of the war” as so many avowed.18 To put it another way, the war “was
swalowed by imagination in the guise of memory.”19
Another contrast to the myth is clearly highlighted by Peter Liddle, who consid-
ers it a “serious mistake” to see the “hypersensitivity” and “universal disilusionment” of
the war poets as typical of the atitudes of the men fighting the war. This concept:
may be politicaly and socialy ‘atractive’ to support certain the-
ses, but it is patently untrue. There were those of course who came
to question their earlier high ideals, there was an almost universal
war-weariness, and after the war, there was the depression of awak-
ening to the fact that a beter world had not been built. This cer-
tainly spawned retrospectively a biter resentment at the waste of
war, but the dominant characteristic in any general assessment of
how the British soldier viewed his presence overseas 1917–18 would
have to be his readiness to stick it out.20
Samuel Hynes’ study of World War I, A War Imagined, connects these various
perspectives on war accounts and provides a thoughtful overview as wel. Hynes
emphasizes the war’s influence as an “imaginative event . . . that altered the ways in
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which men and women thought not only about war but about the world” and was
“perceived as a force of radical change in society and in consciousness.” The change
was so deep it led to a sense of discontinuity between present and past to create what
he cals the “Myth of the War,” by which he means :
not a falsification of reality, but an imaginative version of it, the
story of the war that has evolved, and has come to be accepted as
true . . . a tale that confirms a set of atitudes, an idea of what the
war was and what it meant.
The “Myth of the War” came to ful flower in the late 1920s, and, according to
Hynes, changed litle in subsequent years.21 He summarizes its fundamental con-
cepts in this fashion:
. . . a generation of innocent young men, their heads ful of high
abstractions like Honour, Glory, and England, went of to war to
make the world safe for democracy. They were slaughtered in stu-
pid batles planned by stupid generals. Those who survived were
shocked, disilusioned and embitered by their war experiences, and
saw that their real enemies were not Germans, but the old men at
home who had lied to them. They rejected the values of the society
that had sent them to war, and in doing so separated their own gen-
eration from the past and from their cultural inheritance.22
This becomes the critical component of the development of the definition of
“modern” folowing the war.23 Hynes, however, sees the patern taking shape before
the war began. A contentious spirit exhibited in the culture and events of the pre-
war years belies the image of a stable, secure world, or, as Hynes observes, “nostalgia
is bad history.”24
Hynes also sees a contribution to the development of the “Myth of the War”
from women’s experience in the war. Many young women like Vera Britain were
eager to do their part as the war opened but were frustrated by their initial exclusion
from the war efort. As their role, especialy on the home front, took on occupations
that had been largely closed to women, however, they were hopeful they would be
rewarded with rights and a wider range of opportunities.25 These rewards did not
materialize as was hoped, and although there were greater opportunities and free-
doms, Hynes observes that women’s writings were “biter, sad, cynical, wistful, lost”
with “a feeling of personal failure, of worthlessness and waste.”26 Since there were by
1921 one and three-quarter-milion more women than men, a traditional future of
marriage and family was nebulous as wel.27
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Vera Britain
To “tel my own fairly typical story as truthfuly as I could against the larger back-
ground. . . . ” So Vera Britain explains her agonizing decision to publish her war
experiences in the foreword of her classic Testament of Youth, her account of one
woman caught in the maelstrom of World War I. Since it was first published in 1933,
this work has often headed the list of voices chosen to characterize the generation of
men and women who lived through the “Great War” and struggled to come to terms
with its losses and impact. Her chronicle of a sheltered Edwardian girl whose deeply
afecting war experiences became the catalyst for the creation of the wel-known
post-war writer and public figure who was active in pacifist and feminist causes has
retained its appeal.
Vera Mary Britain, (1893–1970), was born at Newcastle-under-Lyme in Staford-
shire, England. Ambitious and dissatisfied with the life of the typical middle-class
young woman, she pursued her dream to atend Oxford University, where she began
her studies at Somervile Colege in October 1914. In the meanwhile, her beloved
brother Edward had introduced her to his school friends, Victor Richardson and
Roland Leighton. The friendship with Roland blossomed into romance and by Au-
gust 1915 the two were engaged. Meanwhile World War 1 had broken out in August
1914, and her brother and his friends enlisted in the army. Under these circum-
stances, Vera became restless with academic life and left Oxford in 1915 to begin
nursing as a Red Cross Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) volunteer, first in a hospi-
tal near her family’s home in Buxton, then at 1st London General Hospital,
Camberwel.28 An anticipated reunion with Roland for the Christmas holiday in 1915
turned into devastation when she received news of his death from wounds. Strug-
gling with her grief, Vera returned to nursing and in 1916 volunteered for an over-
seas posting on Malta. In 1917 when she learned that Victor Richardson had been
blinded in the fighting, she broke her contract and returned to London, determined
to marry him. He, however, died shortly after her arrival, and her grief was further
compounded by the death of Geofrey Thurlow, another close friend of both Vera
and Edward. Because Edward had been sent to the Western Front in France, Vera
then went to France to nurse at 24th General at Étaples. In April 1918 she again had
to break her contract, this time to return home to care for her sick mother. While
there, news came that Edward had died in action in on the Italian front in June.
Heartbroken, Vera went back to nursing, signing on at Queen Alexandra’s Hospital
in England, where she remained through the end of the war and until her contract
expired in April 1919. Later that year she returned to Oxford, and folowing her gradu-
ation, she established a literary career in London and married George Caitlin in 1925.
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When war memoirs became popular in the late 1920s, she used her diaries and leters
to write Testament of Youth, which has remained the most acclaimed and best known
of her numerous publications.
Conclusion
Vera Britain’s publishing experience folows the literary patern previously described.
During the war she wrote diaries, leters, and poetry, even publishing a volume of verse
entitled Verses of a VAD in 1918.29 The period after the war when she was completing her
degree at Oxford she later described as a time of isolation in which her war experiences
hung heavily on her life amidst disinterest among those around her. She expressed
these experiences in an unpublished novel,30 but it was during the 1928–1929 “Boom”
period previously mentioned that she decided to write her autobiography with its paci-
fist overtones.31 It was published and, according to Robert Wohl, wel received by the
public because “it made explicit, as no other war book had, the narrative sequence
within which many English survivors of the war had come to perceive their past.”32
Since Britain’s Testament of Youth is considered part of the “Boom” and myth
literature, can its reliability be questioned by the aforementioned criticisms? Cer-
tainly the book shows a heavy dependence on her wartime leters and diaries—many
of which are stil extant in the Vera Britain Archive at McMaster University and are
printed in published editions as wel33—and she uses extensive quotations to sup-
port her account. There are, however, discrepancies. For example, in the book, she
speaks causticaly of the rules and regulations aboard the Britannic; in contrast, in a
leter to her parents writen at the time, she voiced agreement with those rules.34 In
her leter, she may have been obscuring her true feelings to reassure her parents. On
the other hand, when she wrote the book, she may have been reflecting a mind
changed by her overal war experience. Nevertheless, these are opposite positions.
One of the readily visible features of Britain’s account is the biter and disilu-
sioned tone. This can be discerned in the folowing passage:
Only gradualy did I realise that the war had condemned me to live
to the end of my days in a world without confidence or security, a
world in which every dear personal relationship would be fearfuly
cherished under the shadow of apprehension; in which love would
seem threatened perpetualy by death, and happiness appear a house
without duration, built upon the shifting sands of chance. I might
perhaps have it again, but never again should I hold it.35
The negative, inward-looking, and gloomy atmosphere of her account spends
litle time on the positive aspects of her experience, which shows, according to Jean
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Pickering, that the perspective of 1929 “predominates” despite Britain’s eforts “to
indicate her youthful outlook.”36 A personality study done by Abigail J. Stewart,
Carol Franz, and Lynne Layton comparing Testament of Youth with its source docu-
ments found that Britain’s account accurately reflected “her major preoccupa-
tions at the time.” The “course of her experience did difer,” however, for they
found that there were more “‘ups and downs’” than she remembered and that her
preoccupations were not necessarily focused in the direction she remembered. For
example, “she underestimated the consequences of Roland’s death for her preoc-
cupation with identity.” The authors go on to observe that “it may always be that
the past appears—or even should appear—as more coherent and consistent than it
felt at the time.”37
Henriete Donner, on the other hand, atributes the tone of Testament of Youth
as less a product of the “transforming force” of the war than one of hindsight or the
feeling of let-down that folows the cessation of an intense commitment.38 Overal it
would appear she is not as guilty of creating Fussel’s “fictional character” or using
Eksteins’ “imagination in guise of memory” as she is of filtering her experience
through the lens of the “Myth of the War” vision of her day.39
Interestingly, Britain herself increasingly became distanced from the power-
ful emotions that fueled her war memoirs. As early as around 1939, in preparing a
foreword for an atempted publication of her diaries, she observed that:
To-day I feel only a remote family relationship with the girl who
lived in Buxton & went to Oxford . . . I have survived the sad litle
ghost of 1917 suficiently long to know that the blackest night—
though it never ceases to cast its shadows—may stil change, for
long intervals of time, to the ful sunlight of the golden day.40
In conclusion, in assessing the reliability of memoirs, one should beware of
the twentieth-century tendency to see “negative appraisals . . . [as] the only honest
ones.” Dorothy Goldman echoes that warning in Women Writers and the Great War
when she speaks of the “danger for the postwar critic of privileging the cynical above
the sentimental as a vehicle for truth.”41 As seen in Britain’s case, memoirs can be
shaped by the literary fashions of the day, and the prudent historian considers this
when using the obvious riches of this resource.
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 A Notice to Contributors Concerning Style
The editorial commitee invites submission of manuscripts from authors of papers presented at the annual meeting. On the recommendation of reviewers
and editors, manuscripts may be published in The Proceedings of the South Carolina
Historical Association.
In general, manuscripts should not exceed 4500 words, about eighteen pages
(double-spaced) including endnotes. As soon as possible after the annual meeting,
authors should submit two paper copies and one electronic copy to the editor for
review. The electronic copy must be submited on a PC-compatible diskete writen
in MS Word 6.0+ for Windows or WordPerfect 5.2+ for Windows. The electronic text
should be flush left, unformated, single spaced, and saved as “text only.” Paginate
your paper, double space the text, and indent the first word of a new paragraph only
on the paper copy. Al copies should use 12 point type in the Times New Roman
font. Do not include a title page, but instead place your title and name at the top of
the first page. Please use margins of one inch throughout your paper and space only
once between sentences. Indent five spaces without quotation marks al quotations
five or more lines in length.
Documentation should be provided in endnotes, not at the foot of each
page. At the end of the text of your paper double-space then type the word “endnote”
centered between the margins. List endnotes in Arabic numerical sequence, each
number folowed by a period and space, and then the text of the endnote. Endnotes
should be flush left and lines single-spaced. If your word-processing program de-
mands the raised footnote numeral, it wil be acceptable. Foreign words and titles of
books or journals should be italicized. For the rest, The Proceedings of the South Caro-
lina Historical Association adheres in maters of general usage to the fourteenth edi-
tion of The Chicago Manual of Style.
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Minutes of the seventy-first annual meeting of the SCHA
3 March 2001
The seventy-first annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Associationconvened on the campus of the University of South Carolina in Columbia on
Saturday 3 March 2001. Registration opened at 8:30 A.M. at the South Caroliniana
Library.
Approximately seventy (70) members and guests registered for the meeting on
an unseasonably warm, rainy day in the Palmeto State’s capital city. The presenta-
tions sessions, organized by Calvin Smith, began at 9:00 A.M. in Flinn Hal, adjacent
to the USC Horseshoe.
Session 1 (9:00–10:00 A.M.)
A. Reconstruction and Civil War. Louis P. Towles’ “Manigault’s Stalwarts: The 10th
South Carolina in the Atlanta Campaign.” Ron Cox served as session chair.
B. Colonial Era: Traders, Pirates and Ideas included three papers: Michael Morris
presented “George Galphin: Portrait of a Carolina Indian Trader and Entrepreneur,”
Michael Smith presented “Blackbeard and the Meaning of Pirate Captaincy,” and
Judkin Browning presented “Creating a Rhetorical Currency: The Dissemination of
Enlightenment Thought in Colonial Newspapers before the Revolution.” The ses-
sion was chaired by Charles Lesser.
C. History and Memory was chaired by Fritz Hamer and included “History & the
Persistence of Memory: World War I Memoirs of Vera Britain and Ruth Whitaker”
by Joyce Wood, “Rol of Honor: World War II Stories of Piedmont’s Greatest Genera-
tion,” by Don Roper and “The Memory Palace of Lorenzo Johnson” by Kevin Sheets.
Morning coffee break was held from 10:00 A.M. until 10:15 A.M.
The Poster Session commenced at 10:15 A.M. and lasted until 12:30 P.M. in the MMS
Reading Room of the Caroliniana. Exhibits included “Promoting History through
WEB-based Audio-Video Programs” by Bil Schmidt and “Columbia, SC” in the Black
America Series (Arcadia Publishers) by Vinnie Deas-Moore.
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Session 2 (10:15–11:15 A.M.)
A. Politics, Piety and Plagues featured “Voting for God: The Politics of South Caro-
lina Camp Meetings” by Dale W. Johnson and “Charleston Catholics and the Yelow
Fever Epidemics of 1838 and 1854” by Susan King. Sean Busick chaired the session.
B. Women, Students, and Reform, chaired by Lisa Stefen, included “Alice Norwood
Spearman Wright’s Network of Lady Activists and Clubwomen” by Marcia Synnot,
“To Whom Much is Given, Much is Expected: White Southern Women’s Activism in
the Civil Rights Movement, 1950–1965” by Courtney Tolison, and “The Emperor’s
New Clothes: President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, the 1968 Student Movement, and the
Crisis of Mexico’s Institutionalized Revolution” by Julia Sloan.
C. Gilded Age and Populism featured papers on “The Value of Chinese Immigration
during the Building of the 1st American Transcontinental Railroad” by John Powel
and “Maintenance of Honor & Manhood: Southern Conservatism & Agrarian Pro-
test in SC, 1870–1890” by Scot Poole. The session was chaired by Michael Nelson.
D. Medium, Message, and Segregated Sports was chaired by Joseph Stukes and fea-
tured papers on “The Dawn of Modern Electronic Television” by Nathaniel Pendleton
and “Intimacy and Subordination: Southern Colege Footbal and the Culture of
Segregation, 1890–1930” by Andrew Doyle.
From 11:15 to 11:30 A.M., participants enjoyed a coffee break.
Session 3 (11:30 A.M. –12.30 P.M.)
A. South Carolina and Slavery was chaired by Ken Peters and included papers on
“Urban Slavery: Slave-Hiring in Charleston, 1800–1860” by Jackie Booker and “Manu-
mission in South Carolina: the Carmile and Irvine Experience” by Alexia Helsley.
B. Identity, Names, and Remembering was chaired by David Hess. Papers presented
were “From Agrarian to Industrial Emphasis: A Model for the New South” by Wayne
Chilcote, “Eighteenth & Nineteenth Century SC Names Transferred to West-Central
Alabama” by Stanley Rich, and “Memory Jugs: Memorial or Whimsy?” by Rodger
Stroup.
C. European Transformations: Ancient and Modern featured papers on “The Last Wil
and Testament of Remigius of Reims” by Chris Beckham and “The Creation of Consid-
erable Bad Feeling: Efect of the Soviet Abduction Campaign in Alied Occupied Vienna
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on American-Soviet Relations, 1945–1950” by Ralph Brown. The session was chaired
by Robert Figueira.
Luncheon and business meeting (12:45–2:15 P.M.)
Folowing the morning session, the SCHA held its annual luncheon and business meet-
ing at the Clarion Town House Hotel, located at 1615 Gervais Street in Columbia.
President’s report
SCHA President Fritz Hamer caled the business session to order at 1:15 P.M. He
welcomed al atending, apologized for the rain, but noted that at least it was not too
cold. He then ofered thanks to those who helped organize today’s meeting, espe-
cialy Alen Stokes of the Caroliniana Library. He also thanked Nat Pendleton, Robin
Copp, and Jane Hamer. He reminded everyone of the reception in the Reading
Room of the Caroliniana folowing the afternoon session.
Fritz noted that Marvin Cann was unable to be present today but pointed out that
he has served as editor of the SCHA Proceedings for the past three years, and the
organization certainly owes Marvin much thanks for al of his hard work in puting
them together. He also thanked Stephen Lowe and Robert Figueira for taking over
as co-editors for next year. Rodger Stroup of the SC State Archives has volunteered
his staf to help with the process.
Fritz concluded by thanking al who presented papers today, and expressed his
hope that presenters wil submit them within next couple of months to get the edit-
ing process going.
Treasurer’s report
Barely able to conceal his glee, Bil Brockington admited that he stood before the
group with mixed emotions . . . joy and happiness. After ten years as treasurer of the
Association, he announced that he is stepping down and turning his duties over to
Rodger Stroup. Thus, he noted, “I have no real report.”
Members received the annual report in their last newsleter, and should notice
that we took in as much as we spent. Bil noted with satisfaction that when his tenure
began, the Association had between five and six thousand dolars and today has
around $17,000. He refused to take credit for the fiscal soundness of the Associa-
tion, however, “’cause al I do is process info you give me.”
The Association should be proud, he continued, noting that he is a member of
another organization that folded due to lack of continuity, lack of new blood. “As
long as you encourage your coleagues and students to participate,” he said, “we wil
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be vibrant and viable. No organization is stronger than its members, but it’s up to
you.”
“I truly believe there is a place for the SCHA,” he continued, “but it’s up to you.
Our membership presently fluctuates between one hundred and one hundred fifty.
This is partly due to the US Postal Service’s inability to handle bulk mail. We have
made constant efort to keep you informed, but again it’s up to you. That’s the net-
work we hope the SCHA wil be for you. I have enjoyed being treasurer. I’m not
going away, but it’s been a real pleasure.”
Fritz then reiterated his thanks to Bil for his work over the last decade.
Secretary’s report
Ron Cox gave a rather disjointed, rambling report, having had dificulty with his
laptop computer in keeping up with the happenings of the meeting. He apologized
again for the “missing” winter newsleter, although some members raised their hands
when he asked if said issue had been received. It is stil a mystery as to what hap-
pened to that particular bulk mailing.
The summer issue of the newsleter wil be out in late June. Ron encouraged
members to keep sending him information (roncox@gwm.sc.edu) because this is an
excelent way of leting our coleagues know what we al are up to. Although we are a
smal state, we need to keep our connections with one another.
Ron thanked everyone who has submited such information and who has made
comments —pro or con—about his publishing of the Newsleter. He concluded with a
promise to continue to give it his best eforts.
Old and new business
Fritz discussed the location of next year’s SCHA meeting. We have been deliberating
on this, and financial issues have been a primary concern. The meeting wil be in
Charleston, and we have been talking with the Colege of Charleston. Amy McCandless
has suggested that we might be able to have the meeting at the Lightsey Center in
Charleston, and is hoping to get some backing from the colege to hold it here.
“Plan B” would be to use classrooms. Amy has assured Fritz that she is in a beter
condition as Associate Provost and that may influence the decision on geting fund-
ing from the colege. We should know for sure by mid-to-late spring. Fritz then of-
fered thanks to Amy for trying to coordinate al of this despite her other duties. The
date for the meeting should be 2 March 2002.
Fritz then announced the SCHA prize awards for best paper, which the associa-
tion awards every two years. One award is given to a graduate student and the other
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to a professional member of the association. The commitee was headed by Roger
Stroup and Robin Copp. For the period 1999–2000, the graduate student prize was
awarded to Harry Lesesne for his “With Common Courtesy and Efort from Every-
one: Southern Identity and School Desegregation in Spartanburg, 1964–1970.” The
professional member prize was awarded to Janet Hudson for her “Ben Bess and the
Dictates of White Supremacy: The Unpardonable Crime.” Special presentations were
made at the reception.
The Association recognized Bil Brockington and Calvin Smith for their decades
of service to the SCHA, noting that Calvin had been secretary for close to a decade
(and wil be President after today). Bil has served as treasurer for a decade if not
longer. Thanks for their solid and dedicated work to this organization over the years.
Calvin noted that the Association has a web page/web site which has been coordi-
nated through USCA for last four years. We are going to work and see if Archives can
take over the site in the near future. Members are encouraged to use this site to help
keep members informed. The address is www.aiken.sc.edu/scha [see end note of min-
utes for actual address].
Nat Pendleton noted that the Association needs to thank Fritz for his hard work
this year and for “geting this thing to work.” He has been “very good at cuting
through the red tape.”
A question was raised about the election of oficers. It was determined that this
wil be done folowing the day’s presentation.
Fritz introduced the speaker, Sam Thomas of the York County Culture and Heri-
tage Commission, who spoke on “Building Bridges for the Next Milennium: Part-
nerships in the History World.”
Folowing the speaker, the Nominating Commitee presented its slate of candi-
dates for the Election of Oficers for 2001–2002. Because of vacancies there was
discussion of the need for a public historian on the board as this person would be
replacing Fritz Hamer. There were nominations and volunteers with the final deci-
sion being that the current executive board should “hash this out” and inform the
membership.
[The Executive Board met briefly after the session and determined the folowing
slate of oficers for 2001–2002:
President: Calvin Smith (USC Aiken)
Vice President: Linda Hayner (Bob Jones University)
Secretary: Ron Cox (USC Salkehatchie)
Treasurer: Rodger Stroup (SC Archives & History Center)
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At Large: J. Tracy Power (SC Archives & History Center)
Sam Thomas (York County Culture & Heritage Commission)
Robin Copp (South Caroliniana Library)
Co-editors for the Proceedings:Robert Figueira (Lander University)
Stephen Lowe (Presbyterian Colege)]
Fritz relinquished the podium at 2:12 P.M., at which point Calvin took over. Calvin
noted that the actual web address for the site is www.usca.sc.edu. “If al else fails,” he
said, “point your browser to USCA and press the ‘what’s hot’ buton.”
With no additional business or announcements, the president declared the meet-
ing adjourned at 2:14 P.M.
Session 4 (2:30–3:30 P.M.)
Doing Local History in South Carolina: Three Perspectives was chaired by James
Farmer and included panelists Wayne King (Francis Marion University), Alen Charles
(USC Union), and James Farmer (USC Aiken).
17th Century British History was chaired by Amy McCandless and featured papers
on “A Study of Sovereignty and Alegiance: Calvin’s Case, 1608 by Lisa Stefen and
“In the Deep Mid-Winter: Fuel Price in 17th-Century London” by Linda Hayner.
Folowing the afternoon session a reception for SCHA members was held in the
Reading Room of the South Caroliniana Library from 3:45 until 4:30 P.M., at which
point the 2001 Annual Meeting of the SCHA was oficialy adjourned.
Respectfuly submited,
M. Ron Cox, Jr.
USC Salkehatchie
Secretary, SCHA
